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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Significant and persistent flows of entry and exit, that is, turbulence, are a 
common feature of most industries, across countries and over time. By 
means of a new database for the Italian graphic papermaking industry 
between 1964 and 2004, this research inquires into the extent and character 
of entry and exit in an industry where innovation in products and processes 
has been incremental and largely predictable and, therefore, unlikely to be 
the main driving force of firm turbulence.   
 
The first part of the thesis deals with methodological issues concerning 
compilation of the thesis’ database, which records, annually, plants’ and 
firms’ major demographic events, attributes and proprietary linkages, thus 
allowing comparison between the dynamics of plants and firms throughout 
the reference period.  Special attention was given to avoid measurement 
distortions that would have risen from using business register administrative 
files. 
 
The second part focuses on what factors are more likely to affect survival 
prospects of plants and firms. Using logistical analysis, econometric results 
confirm that plant exit has been determined by efficiency of its equipment, 
diversification strategy of the proprietary firm and, unexpectedly, its 
organizational history. Using survival analysis, econometric results reveal 
that the risk of exit for firms is lowered by pursuit of external growth strategies 
(acquisition of plants), concentration of production into graphic paper and 
being equipped with modern machinery.  
 
The third part examines the effects of firm turbulence on the evolution of 
concentration in the industry. The data show that acquisitions have been an 
important source of turnover among the leading companies and that a 
significant portion of the leading companies has been relatively new. The 
analysis also indicates that at least some turbulence has led to instability of 
market shares among the leading firms. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Traditional theory accords exit and entry conditions a fundamental role in 
market structure as they determine the nature of potential competition 
between incumbents and would-be entrants. From this conceptual 
perspective, it is apparent that net entry is an important indicator of the 
toughness of competition, with an expected negative correlation between net 
entry and concentration levels. Yet, theory is rather vague concerning the 
relationship between net entry and turbulence1, for net entry could be 
compatible, mathematically, with different amounts of actual gross entry and 
exit flows. How should one conceptually interpret situations such as those 
characterised by high entry and exit flows but negligible net entry? Do they 
indicate that the market is more competitive as the high levels of turbulence 
would suggest or less competitive as the low levels of net entry seems to 
indicate? If the latter is correct, does it mean that much of turbulence is 
irrelevant, at least, with respect to competition? And, if so, why has the 
market not developed mechanisms that would lead to a better alignment of 
turbulence to net entry flows?  
 
This conceptual elusiveness is felt all the more in the face of mounting 
empirical evidence that points to the concurrent existence of high turbulence 
flows and small amounts of net entry. This thesis investigates the extent and 
character of turbulence and its impact on the market structure dynamics, 
through the means of a longitudinal case study. 
 
The following section clarifies the context and scope of my research, 
provides a brief description of the methodology employed to construct the 
                                            
1
 The terminology employed in connection with market entry and exit is not universally 
adopted and some divergences exist. In the literature of entry and exit, the term turbulence 
has come to denote “the flux created in an industry’s total composition by flows of births and 
deaths” (Beesley and Hamilton, 1984, p. 220). Though widely adopted, this usage is not 
universal (see section C.2). Throughout the thesis, turbulence indicates the sum of gross 
entry and exit.  
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database for quantitative analysis and, finally, outlines the thesis structure 
and main results.  
 
 
1.1 The Context and Scope of the Thesis 
 
Since Edwin Mansfield (1962) emphasized the lack of even crude answers to 
the quantitative effects of various factors on rates of entry and exit and, more 
generally, on the dynamic processes governing an industry’s structure, a 
copious amount of empirical evidence on market entry and exit (turbulence) 
has been accumulated2. Data show that “entry appears to be relatively easy, 
but survival not” (Geroski, 1995). Across different industries, countries and 
times, analysis of longitudinal census-based databases at three-, four- and 
five-digit ISIC levels usually reveals that: 
  
 Entry and exit occur simultaneously and higher-than-average entry rates3 
are associated with higher-than-average exit rates; 
 
 Net entry rates and entry penetration rates4 are modest;  
 
 A remarkable percentage of new firms do not survive their first decade. 
However, those entrants that survive grow faster than incumbents and, 
as cohorts of new firms enter markets year-after-year, they account for 
increasingly larger percentages of the whole population of sellers. 
 
Against these empirical regularities, the traditional view of entry and exit as 
equilibrating forces appears to be an incomplete account of the phenomenon 
                                            
2
 Since the seminal work of Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1989) on patterns of firm entry 
and exit in the United States’ manufacturing industries, a multitude of studies have been 
conducted so far, including the work by Baldwin (1995) on entry and exit in Canada, the 
studies by Geroski (1991), and the latest OECD studies on comparative analysis of firm 
demographics and survival for OECD countries (OECD, 2003 and Bartelsman et al., 2005). 
Excellent surveys on this vast empirical literature have been provided by Siegfried and 
Evans (1994), Geroski (1995), Sutton (1997) and Caves (1998).  
3
 Entry(exit) rate is defined  as the ratio of number of total entering firms(exiting firms) to total 
number of firms that exist in the industry in a given year. 
4
 Rate of entry penetration is defined as the ratio of total amount of gross sales attained by 
entrants to total industry sales. 
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because one should not see such persistent high levels of turbulence. In the 
face of this evidence, scholars have begun to develop the idea that firm 
entry is the mechanism through which industrial populations churn. As the 
market is the proving ground where, through competition, selection of the 
fittest occurs, entry represents the channel through which new business 
ideas challenge and, if successful, displace well-established models of 
conducting business. Since selection requires a variety of alternatives from 
which to choose, this fact can justify why entry per se is fundamental to the 
evolution of markets: it is the seedbed for innovation.  
 
Can turbulence be explained only on the basis of a reservoir of potential new 
business ideas? Innovators can be found among entrants as well as among 
incumbents. As Baumol (2004) noted, major breakthroughs have tended to 
come from small new enterprises, while incremental improvements that 
multiply capacity or increase reliability and user-friendliness have been in the 
realm of larger established firms. This suggests that turbulence, as a 
seedbed for innovation, is likely to be a feature of industries in their initial 
stages but should be expected less in mature industries.  
 
Furthermore, not all entrants are innovative, and those who are may not be 
as abundant as policy-makers may believe. There are enough new firms that 
are created and operate without introducing anything innovative in their 
modus operandi. Firms are heterogeneous with different degrees of 
efficiency and are able to learn about their own level of efficiency only once 
they started producing (Jovanovic, 1982). If comparatively more efficient than 
rivals, they survive and grow. Otherwise, they wind down their operations and 
exit. Entry occurs because the market has no a priori means to pick future 
winners. 
 
In approaching the issue of what drives turbulence, it might be fruitful to 
begin by assuming that turbulence has an impact on the competitive situation 
but that not all types of entrants and exitors are likely to have equal effects on 
the competitive situation. There are a variety of other reasons that guide 
  4 
would-be firms to enter an industry and those reasons may not stem from the 
Schumpeterian notion of creative destruction. At times, entrants appear 
because they see an opportunity for immediate financial gains or, simply, 
because they have miscalculated demand. At other times, it is because they 
find attractive the opportunity to replace an incumbent who has decided to 
exit or they consider diversification into new sectors a vital strategy, whether 
or not they introduce innovation. Similarly, incumbents leave because of 
financial problems or simply, in the case of family companies, the founder 
and/or heirs decide not to continue the business. Corporations may leave 
because of the strategic interest to focus on their core business and the like. 
 
The central proposition in this dissertation is that turbulence, which includes 
any sort of entry and exit5, affects the competitive situation because, first of 
all, it alters the configuration of the population of the industry and, by doing 
so, is likely to change strategic behaviour among competitors. Thus, my 
hypothesis is that it is the routes taken by entrants and exiting firms to 
acquire, assemble and dissolve their resources endowments that help 
explain why turbulence is such a pervasive phenomenon and how, through it, 
market structures are differently affected.  
 
Without undermining the significance of turbulence as an agent of change, in 
this thesis I shall focus on those circumstances where turbulence is expected 
to be minimal and not primarily driven by innovation in products and 
processes or by significant demand variations. By concentrating on an 
environment where it is unlikely that turbulence is driven by innovation and 
demand shocks, one can start to address the nature of that portion of 
turbulence that seems far from being the engine of competition and is the 
most elusive for theoretical understanding. Policy implications are not 
negligible. Instead of looking at buoyant entry rates as an indicator of the 
                                            
5
 In defining entry, Bain specifies that exclusions of expansion by established firms, 
acquisitions of existing production capacity by new legal entities, whether by purchase from 
pre-existing firms, and reorganisations involving a change of corporate name and structure 
or through other means are “in some degree arbitrary, since the introduction of a new owner 
of old capacity may constitute a distinct change in a competitive situation, and since 
expansion of an established competitor may, from the standpoint of another established firm, 
have about the same significance as entry of a new firm with new capacity” Bain (1956) p. 5.  
  5 
vitality of markets, the thesis proposition suggests that policy-makers should 
focus on the dynamics of the various sorts of entry and, even more, exit, to 
obtain some indication of the degree of competition in markets.  
 
 
1.2 The Empirical Approach 
 
Given the scope of this thesis, a longitudinal case study approach has been 
chosen6. The case study concerns the graphic segment of the Italian 
papermaking industry from 1964 to 2004. This choice allows one to focus on 
an industry that experienced neither substantial changes in demand nor 
introduction of breakthrough innovations during the period under 
consideration, while being able to trace individual stories of firms with a 
reasonable degree of accuracy.  
 
In fact, the fundamentals of modern papermaking have remained the same 
since the nineteenth century, when mechanical paper machines and the use 
of wood as the main fibre source were introduced. Since then, technical 
advances have taken the form of improvements in the width and speed of 
paper machines, the most important component of a paper mill. Such 
advances have been largely predictable. Furthermore, because paper mills 
are special-purpose facilities with no alternative use should they prove 
uneconomic, capital investments are strategic decisions that, once 
undertaken, restrict further moves for many subsequent years. 
 
As this approach lacks the breadth of many longitudinal census-based 
studies on turbulence, there is the underlying concern that the research 
findings may be specific to this particular case study. However, I believe that 
the advantages of this approach may outweigh the disadvantages. In fact, 
the highest degree of disaggregation at which the previous longitudinal 
census-based databases are available is generally four-digit ISIC level. At 
this level, industries are agglomerates that encompass enterprises engaged 
                                            
6
 See Geroski (2001) for an overview of the advantages of this methodology 
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primarily in the same or similar kinds of economic activity but, often, at 
different stages of the manufacturing process. Consequently, the boundaries 
of a census-based industry are likely to be too broad, masking the actual 
degree of competition and its eventual impact on market structure. 
Furthermore, this database permits linking enterprises over time through the 
plants that they have operated. This is a novelty among databases generally 
used for the study of firm demography, at least, among those that I 
discovered. This feature is the fundamental tool that makes it possible to 
compare the dynamics of turbulence at plant level versus those at firm level.  
 
 
1.3 The Structure of the Thesis 
 
The thesis is structured into three main parts. The first deals with some 
methodological issues concerning compilation of longitudinal databases and 
problems that may arise in measuring entry and exit flows. Specifically, 
Chapter 2 reviews measurement issues that compilation of a longitudinal 
dataset on entry and exit generally entails, while Chapter 3 delves into the 
extent to which firms can be identified with the reporting units of registered 
company or enterprise. The chapter assesses measurement differences and 
highlights the extent to which entry and exit dynamics of the Italian graphic 
paper industry are in line with the stylised facts described in the literature. 
The analysis reveals that turbulence is characteristic of the sector but, had 
registered companies been used as unit of observation instead of 
enterprises, the amount of turbulence observed would have been nearly 
double.  
 
Having clarified the nature and scope of the thesis’ datasets, the second part 
focuses on what factors were more likely to have affected survival prospects 
of plants and firms. It highlights differences in the mechanisms through which 
such factors have exerted their influence. This part begins with Chapter 4, 
which summarises the demographic changes in the populations of plants and 
firms over the second half of the twentieth century. Despite expansion of the 
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sector, data reveals a steady contraction of its populations to the extent that, 
by 2004, only half of those existing in 1964 were still in operations. While 
contraction in the number of plants was mainly caused by a steady shutdown 
of less efficient production sites, that in the number of firms was 
accompanied by a moderate turbulence throughout the period. Entry of new 
firms and exit of old ones occurred continuously, steadily churning the 
population. In view of these dynamics, Chapters 5 and 6 study plant exit and 
firm survival in terms of a mixture of plant characteristics and firm attributes. 
Using logistical analysis, econometric results confirm that plant exit was 
determined by efficiency of its equipment and, to a lesser extent, by the 
diversification strategy of the owning firm. Unexpectedly, the econometric 
results provide also statistical support for the role of plants’ organisational 
histories. The data reveals that plants that had undergone ownership and 
registration transfers in the last 25 years of their existence were less likely to 
exit. Turning to firm survival, the risk of exit seems to be lowered by pursuit of 
external growth strategies (acquisitions of plants), concentration of 
production into graphic paper and being equipped with modern, larger paper 
machines. Unexpectedly, duration analysis does not provide support for the 
repeatedly observed size-age dependence in firms. However, other authors 
have observed this peculiarity in the case of the Italian manufacturing sector.  
 
The third part of the thesis examines the effects that firm turbulence had on 
evolution of concentration. Chapter 7 analyses turnover changes among the 
largest firms from 1964 to 2004 revealing slower turnover at plant level 
compared to that at firm level. Most plants that were ranked among the 
largest in 1964 continued to be so 40 years later. By contrast, firms’ market 
dominance was often eroded over time. Like in a matching game, new firms 
appeared and established ones grew by acquiring existing plants in an 
attempt to gain market dominance. Drawing on the previous analysis, 
Chapter 8 offers some points for further research.   
 
The thesis includes three appendices. Appendix A is a technical note on 
economics of modern papermaking, which describes the basic demand and 
  8 
supply conditions in the industry. It is intended to explain some of the sector 
dynamics and rationale for inclusion of specific variables in the econometric 
analysis. Appendix B presents a brief account of consumption and production 
in the Italian paper industry, with special emphasis on the graphic segment 
after World War II. Appendix C lists all the variables used in the quantitative 
analysis. Additional data tables are grouped together in Appendix D.  
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  CHAPTER 2 
DESIGN AND COMPILATION OF THE DATABASE 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The study of industrial demography requires databases that capture the life 
trajectories of individual firms and plants over time, recording chronologically 
the proprietary changes that shape the configuration of industrial populations 
and market concentration. Such a database was not available at the time of 
writing. It had to be compiled by weaving together information from the 
trade’s publications, historical studies, administrative records and telephone 
conversations. The result is a novel longitudinal micro-database for the Italian 
graphic paper industry that records, annually, plants’ and firms’ major 
demographic events, attributes and proprietary linkages from 1964 to 2004.  
 
Assembling the database was a complex endeavour because information 
needed to be gathered from a multitude of sources, which were designed for 
purposes different from those of this study. Thus, no standard procedures 
could be applied. There were, though, some precedents that provided 
guidance on methodological issues: the early frame of the NBER Enterprise 
Microdata sub-project (Lipsey, 1978); the Canadian census-based 
Longitudinal Manufactures Research File (Baldwin and Gorecki, 1989; 
Baldwin, 1995); the American Longitudinal Research Database (LRD) 
(McGuckin and Pascoe, 1988); and, recently, the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) Entrepreneurship Indicators Project, 
under which OECD and Eurostat developed a framework for regular, 
harmonised measurement of entrepreneurial activities in their member 
countries (EU-OECD, 2007). In addition, a number of articles 1  provided 
critical assessments of potential measurement biases, mostly associated with 
commercial data sources.  
 
                                            
1
 Including Aldrich et al. (1989), Birley (1984), Busenitz and Murphy (1996), Johnson and 
Conway (1997), Kallenberg et al. (1990), Mason (1983), Murphy (2000) and Williams (1993). 
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This chapter details compilation of the thesis’ database, explaining the 
methodological solutions adopted. Section 2 outlines the scope of the 
database and section 3 discusses definitional issues concerning the firm. 
Section 4 reviews the units of observation generally used for measuring the 
firm and specifies the thesis’ approach. Section 5 describes the data sources 
and summarises the steps undertaken in collecting the data and organising it 
into a database.     
 
2.2 Industrial Demographic Frames 
 
Compilation of databases for the study of industrial populations over time 
begins with definition of entry and exit, demarcation of the population of 
interest and specification of time horizon. Since the advent of longitudinal 
census-based datasets in the mid-1980s, these aspects have been largely 
discussed2 and scholars have reached a substantial agreement on definitions 
and their limitations. The thesis’ dataset adopts their schematisation.   
 
 
2.2.1 Market Entry and Exit 
 
An entry is defined as the appearance of a firm in a given market, with an exit 
as one’s disappearance. Firm entries and exits are prompted by a limited, 
countable number of basic demographic events: foundations of new firms, 
cessations of old ones and expansions/conversions of existing businesses 
from their original production lines to different ones (Baldwin, 1995).  
 
Borrowing from demographic methods (Hinde, 1998), these events can be 
represented as transitions made by individual firms between four states: not 
yet born, alive and in a population X, alive and in another population Y, and 
dead (Figure 2.1).  
 
 
                                            
2
 Primary methodological discussions on longitudinal databases include McGuckin (1989), 
Baldwin and Gorecki (1989) and Baldwin (1995). 
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Figure 2.1: Multi-state representation of events of corporate demography 
 
 
Within this frame, a firm entry in population X can occur because of a 
transition from not yet born state to alive (birth) or a migration from alive in 
population Y to alive in population X while continuing to be in population Y 
(diversification) or leaving population Y (conversion). Similarly, exit can occur 
because of a transition from alive to dead (death) or from alive in population 
X to alive in population Y (conversion). This applies to plants, with no 
substantial differences.   
 
Firm entry by birth is called de-novo, or new-to-the-world, entry and is 
distinguished from entry by conversion/diversification, which is known as de-
alio 3, or new-to-the-industry, entry. The reason for this distinction lies in 
differences in resource endowments and motivations that de-novo entrants 
exhibit compared to de-alio ones at the entry stage. These initial differences 
are generally believed to have a significant impact on performance of new 
firms, especially during their first years of activity.  
 
                                            
3
 Carroll et al. (1996) and Khessina and Carroll (2008). 
 
Not yet born 
 
 
Alive  in 
population X 
 
 
Alive in 
population Y 
 
 
 
Dead 
Birth 
Conversion 
Diversification 
Death 
Entry Exit 
Exit Entry 
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By contrast, the distinction between exit by death and conversion is rarely 
considered in the literature, although the choice of a specific exit route may 
be the result of different survival strategies and affected by specific firm 
characteristics (Schary, 1991 and Manjón-Antolín and Arauzo-Carod, 2008). 
Dissolution of a firm can occur through voluntary liquidation or bankruptcy 
and can be accompanied by concomitant shutting down of its production 
site(s) or their sale or a mixture of the two. 
 
 
2.2.2 Industrial Populations 
 
 
Units of analysis 
 
The database uses two basic units of analysis4: plant and firm. A plant is 
defined as the production unit that engages, under a single ownership or 
control, in one, or predominantly one, kind of activity at a single location. The 
terms establishment, production site, factory and mill are used 
interchangeably with that of plant. A firm is a specialised organisation 
bringing together factors of production and transforming them into goods and 
services to be exchanged in the market (Magill, 1997, p. 546). As such, a firm 
is the economic entity that groups together all plants under common 
ownership.  
 
The chief interest among scholars in this field rests on firms because they are 
the entities that decide whether to enter or exit as well as when to construct a 
new plant or close an old one or invest in its upgrading. While agreeing with 
this view, the thesis considers both units of analysis, as there are also 
important feedback effects from plant to parent firm.  
 
                                            
4
 The unit of analysis is the entity that is being studied. It is distinct from the notion of unit of 
observation, which is the entity for which information is collected and recorded. Although it is 
desirable that the unit of analysis coincides with the unit of observation, this is not always 
possible. In those cases—as for the firm—where coincidence cannot be ensured, the best 
possible approximation is to be sought. The issue of identifying the most appropriate 
observation unit for the firm is discussed in detail in Chapter 3.   
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First, in capital-intensive industries, plants are special-purpose facilities with 
limited alternative use should they prove uneconomical. This implies that the 
ability of a firm to change its core activities is minimal in the short run. If a 
plant is uneconomical, the firm is likely to be locked in and its performance be 
negatively affected until further investment or closure. Thus, the causal 
influence runs from plant to firm. Secondly, plants and firms are bound 
together by ownership linkages that change over time. If a plant is profitable, 
the parent firm has the option to exit by selling it and, thus, recover part of the 
initial capital investment. This circumstance represents an opportunity for a 
potential firm to enter the industry. Again, the life trajectories of plants help to 
document growth-strategies of firms from their foundation to dissolution.  
 
Although rare in studies of firm turbulence5, organizing the thesis’ database 
in terms of plants and firms was the fundamental tool that made possible to 
study the nature of industrial rurbulence and ensure data accuracy.   
 
 
Sample industry 
 
Selection of the graphic segment of the Italian paper industry has been 
motivated by aggregation suitability, representativeness, relevance and 
availability of data.  
 
Industrial populations are aggregated in terms of markets or industries. 
Although the two terms are often used interchangeably in the empirical 
literature on entry and exit, they do not necessarily lead to the identification of 
the same population6. Industries are groups of firms that produce similar or 
identical products using analogous production techniques, whereas markets 
are meetings of suppliers and consumers (Samuelson and Nordhaus, 1997). 
In principle, studies of firms’ mobility should be conducted in the context of 
markets, since competition arises among suppliers seeking to serve the 
same set of customers (demand-side substitution), rather than among firms 
                                            
5
  The most notable study that analyses demographic turnover at both plant and firm levels is 
Baldwin (1995). 
6
  A critical account of the implications of using a market view, as opposed to an industrial 
view, in studying the competitive process is provided by Geroski (1998).    
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using similar techniques but offering different products. But a firm’s decision 
to diversify into a given product market is often affected by its existing 
technology (supply-side substitution). It is, therefore, fundamental to maintain 
a close concordance between market and industry in studies of firm mobility 
as it facilitates estimation of the impact of technological factors on firm’s 
survival. In this context, the graphic segment of the paper industry presents a 
substantial concordance between industry and market boundaries. On 
demand-side substitution, graphic paper is used as a medium for written 
communication and does not have a ready substitute. On supply-side 
substitution, all producers apply the same technology and their machinery is 
designed specifically for graphic grades. Thus, the graphic segment of the 
paper industry can be regarded as an independent market where suppliers 
are competitors. A note of caution is, however, necessary. The graphic 
segment is not a homogeneous product market. There are several product 
niches within it, and papermakers are not all actual competitors because they 
specialised in a limited number of paper grades 7  within their respective 
segments. Yet, they are all potential rivals. Should they find it profitable to 
move to another niche within their segment, they can do so with a relatively 
modest investment in adjusting their equipment to the new grades. Demand- 
and supply-side substitution is discussed in more detail in Appendix A.   
 
With respect to the industry’s representativeness, the selected industry 
should, in principle, exemplify behavioural patterns common to a wider group 
of industries. With this in mind, empirical literature on the industry life cycle 
(Gort and Klepper, 1982) suggests that, during the mature phase of an 
industry, compressed profit margins drive less efficient producers out of the 
market increasing sharply exit rates. Moreover, cross-section studies 
(Siegfried and Evans, 1994) have repeatedly found that the cost of fixed 
capital required to operate a minimum efficient scale plant has a strong 
negative effect on entry. The graphic paper industry seems to satisfy these 
conditions. The Italian paper industry is mature and highly capital-intensive. 
                                            
7
  A paper grade is a class of paper identified as having the same fibre, colour, additive, and 
chemical composition and manufactured to the same physical and mechanical 
characteristics.  
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Technological advances are incremental, predictable and readily available to 
all papermakers since innovation primarily originates outside the industry, 
mainly from few worldwide manufacturers of paper machines. Appendix A 
provides a detailed account of the technical features of papermaking, capital 
requirements and technological innovation.  
 
As to relevance, the paper industry is one of the oldest industries in Italy, 
dating back to the Middle Ages. Since the Second World War, it has been a 
niche sector. According to Balliano and Lanzetti (1976, p. 11), the share of 
the paper industry in total MVA8 was 1.3 per cent in 1969 and 1.2 in 1972. 
Today, it represents about 0.87 per cent9 . Within the European context, 
however, the Italian graphic paper industry accounts for a significant, though 
decreasing, market share. In 1968, Italian production of graphic paper 
represented some 12.2 per cent of European total production10.  By 2001, the 
share had declined to 4.511.   
 
Finally, compilation of a database requires availability of data whose access 
and hand-matching handling are practicable. The graphic paper industry 
satisfied this requirement. It is well-documented in the trade’s magazines and 
publications, with an uninterrupted time series of relevant economic variables 
from 1964 to 2004. The reconstruction of plant and firm life trajectories 
generated a few hundred profiles. One might have considered the entire 
paper industry with its four segments—graphic, packaging, sanitary and 
industrial papers—so as to compare potential divergences in entry and exit 
patterns. However, this was beyond time limitation and ready availability of 
data sources for this study. To provide an idea of the task, in 1964 alone, 
there were 566 companies and 640 plants12 in the whole paper industry, of 
which two thirds were small-scale operations producing less than 1,000 
                                            
8
 As the data on paper production is expressed in tonnes whereas manufacturing value 
added (MVA) in monetary terms, it has been impossible to calculate the industry’s share in 
total manufacturing.  
9
 See IPI, Industria della carta e cartone. Retrieved from www.riditt.it/documenti/Carta.pdf on 
18 September 2008. 
10
  Calculation based on data published in OECD, The Pulp and Paper Industry in the OECD 
Member Countries and Finland 1967-68, Table II, p.28.   
11
 Calculation based on data published in CEPI, 10 Year Statistical Summary, 2002.  
12
 Assocarta, Annuario delle cartiere d’Italia 1964.  
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tonnes annually. To gather information on all firms and plants would have 
been formidable requiring visits to each municipal archive of defunct small 
enterprises.       
 
 
2.2.3 Time Horizon 
 
Traditionally, research on market entry and exit has mainly used two 
quantitative methodologies. The original—widely applied until the end of the 
1970s—was cross-section econometric analysis at industry level 13 . An 
annual entry or net entry rate was regressed on a number of basic industry 
characteristics across a broad range of sectors. This approach had the merit 
of revealing main economy-wide relations, as the focus was on inter-industry 
differences. But, it also had some undesirable limitations. It ignored intra-
industry differences.   
 
The reaction to these limitations was the use of longitudinal or panel data 
econometrics, which have come to dominate empirical work on market entry 
and exit since the early 1990s. By combining the cross-section and time 
dimensions, longitudinal or panel datasets record individual subjects over a 
period of time and allow for heterogeneity in the micro units. As McGuckin 
(1989, 1995) argued, the typical assumption of homogeneity of individual 
firms constituting aggregates in cross-section analyses of entry and exit is 
often inadequate. Firm-specific variables, such as ownership, activity and 
location, are too often considered as time-invariant, although they do change 
over time with significant impact on the firm’s performance and, therefore, 
survival. Moreover, panel data allow a better analysis of dynamic 
adjustments.  
 
As my objective is to study long-term evolution of a market, the thesis takes 
the approach of a longitudinal case study of a particular industry observed 
over several decades. By tracing a significant portion of the history of 
competing firms and their plants, it provides sufficient data to make sound 
                                            
13
 Examples of this approach include Orr (1974), Deutsch (1975) and Chappell et al. (1990).
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inferences about market dynamics while minimising the risk that such 
dynamics might reflect the vagaries of the moment. As Geroski and Mata 
stressed, “developing longitudinal case studies to study how markets evolve 
is well worth the effort” (2001, p. 1000). 
 
2.3 Refining Definitions of Units of Analysis 
 
Intuitively, entry and exit can be measured by counting appearance and 
disappearance of units into and from a market during a given period. While 
this basic rule is sufficient to identify entry and exit of plants, it becomes 
problematic at firm level. This is because of the many-faceted nature of a 
firm, which comprises production facility, legal personality14 and ownership. 
What constitutes an entering, continuing or exiting firm depends crucially on 
the researcher’s specification of newness, independence and inception vis-à-
vis these three dimensions15.  
 
 
Newness 
 
In principle, there are as many definitions of being new as there are 
combinations of which aspect of a firm—legal personality, ownership and 
plant location—is new. Discontinuity in one or more of these three aspects 
distinguishes a new firm (entrant) from a continuing (incumbent) or an exiting 
one (exitor or leaver16). Each definition has advantages and disadvantages, 
its use in some degree arbitrary depending on the scope of the research.  
 
At one extreme, a firm can be regarded as new only if it is an entirely new 
business that has been set-up from scratch. In this case, entry involves the 
combined appearance of a new legal personality, new owner and new plant. 
                                            
14
 Legal personality, also referred to as artificial or juristic personality, is the status of an 
artificial entity that the law treats as if it were a natural person (human) and accords specific 
rights and duties. Corporations are examples of juristic persons. Depending on the country’s 
jurisdictions, partnerships may or not be granted some degree of legal personality.    
15
 For a discussion of definitional difficulties in the empirical research on firm creation, see   
Mason (1983).   
16
 In the literature, there is no standard antonym of “entrant”. The term “exitor” or “leaver” are 
often used to indicate the exiting firm.   
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This is the approach used by Bain in his renowned work on barriers to 
competition. The author defines entry as “establishment of an independent 
legal entity, new to the industry…and… the concurrent building or 
introduction by the new firm of physical production capacity that was not used 
for production in the industry prior to the establishment of the new firm” 
(1956, p. 5). While recognising that acquisition of existing production capacity 
by a new owner may constitute a distinct change in a competitive situation, 
Bain excludes it from evaluation of entry barriers because it does not affect 
the overall production capacity of an industry.  
 
At the other extreme, a firm might be thought as new if it involves merely a 
new legal personality, brought about by any administrative modification such 
as a change in its legal form or an internal reorganization. By and large, 
scholars seem to agree that a new firm that is simply the reorganization of an 
old one under a new name and structure should not be regarded as new, 
since it hardly involves a significant recombination of resources17. The total 
amount of the industry’s production capacity as well as its distribution by 
ownership remains unaltered leaving the competitive scene unchanged.  
 
Between these two extremes, there are situations where a new business is 
regarded as such when two of the three elements are new. Nowadays, with 
the shift of research attention from entry barriers to firm mobility, the majority 
of scholars18 regard entry as the emergence of a new owner with a new 
agglomeration of plants, regardless of whether such plants are newly built 
and/or acquired.  
 
In compiling the thesis’ database, I followed the latter. A firm was qualified as 
new (entrant) if a new cluster of plants were controlled by a new-to-the-world 
or new-to-the-industry owner (see Section 2.2.1), regardless of the status of 
its plants and the legal personality to which they were associated. The status 
of its plant or plants at the time when the new owner entered the market, 
                                            
17
 This approach has been adopted in the EU-OECD Manual on Business Demography 
Statistics (2007). 
18
 Baldwin (1995) provides one of the most exhaustive accounts in this respect. 
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however, qualified the entry mode. A new owner could have entered by plant 
construction, (greenfield entry) or by plant acquisition. Whether the new 
owner started operation under a new legal unit (registered company) or an 
existing one was inessential to definition of an entrant.     
 
 
Independence  
 
In studies of competition, a firm is regarded as a self-contained economic 
entity, which takes its decisions autonomously without involvement of any 
other firms. Being autonomous is a relative concept, for there are many 
formal and informal inter-company affiliations that render control more 
concentrated than one would gauge from a first glance at company 
directories and business registers.  
 
First, some companies are linked together through subsidiary-parent 
relationships, whose nature varies considerably. At one extreme, there are 
cases in which a parent company confines its role primarily to that of a 
stockholder, allowing a subsidiary to act independently under direction of its 
own board. At the other, a parent may exercise such strong control over the 
subsidiary by, for example, commingling funds, interchanging employees, 
sharing office facilities and the like, that the distinction between parent and 
subsidiary as separate independent corporations becomes blurred. In 
principle, all subsidiaries operating in a given market should be regarded as 
part of the same firm, regardless of the degree of autonomy conferred in 
them. In practice, this procedure often yields incomplete results because 
subsidiary-parent relationships are not necessarily traceable in administrative 
databases or commercial directories19. 
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 Even in the case of Dun and Bradstreet files, which include codes for the establishment, 
parent and ultimate parent company, Lipsey (1978) found that many establishments in multi-
plant firms lacked parent and ultimate parent codes. However, the Longitudinal 
Manufactures Research File based on the Canadian Census of Manufactures identifies all 
establishments under common ownership (Baldwin and Gorecki, 1989). More generally, 
subsidiaries are treated as independent firms as long as they are assigned a different 
identification code.   
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Secondly, companies are interconnected through linkages such as control of 
family groups, participation of financial intermediaries and interlocking 
directorates (Scherer and Ross, 1990). Although widespread and lawful, 
these practices raise questions about the independence of board decisions 
and, in turn, actual degree of competition among firms. However, adjusting 
data to take into consideration these linkages is extremely difficult because 
this kind of information is not easily retrievable and, even if it were, there is 
no definition of how much control is acceptable until competition is de facto 
decreased.  
 
In Italy, these linkages are reckoned to be substantial 20 . The trade’s 
directories, magazine articles and sector studies have provided ample 
information about subsidiary-parent relationships and family groups, allowing 
identification of firms as economic entities grouping all plants under the same 
ownership. But to collect information on composition of boards of directors 
over time proved unmanageable. Therefore, the potential impact of 
interlocking directorates on competition has not been pursued.   
 
 
Inception 
 
Entry timing has been the subject of intense debate among scholars in 
entrepreneurship research and organisational ecology, since the creation of a 
firm is regarded as a process, rather than a discrete event. Birley (1984) 
identifies eight different points in time at which the firm can be said to exist21 
and notes that the process can take several years. The most popular 
approaches are to equate the start-up date with date of registration of the 
legal entity (business registers), recruitment of first full-time employee 
(employment surveys or national employment insurance files) or first 
payment of taxes (VAT files). None is optimal. Listings by registration dates 
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 In a recent study of Italian corporate interlocking directorates between 1952 and 1972, 
Rinaldi and Vasta (2005) found that the average number of interlocks per company in the 
manufacturing sector had decreased from 7.2 in 1960 to 5.4 in 1972, which compares with 
an average for the whole economy of 8.5 and 5.9.  
21
 The eight starting points suggested by Birley (1984) are: (1) the owner makes the decision 
to start, (2) first date when the owner becomes self-employed, (3) incorporation date, (4) 
establishment of a bank account, (5) acquisition of premises and equipment, (6) receipt of 
the first sale order, (7) first payment of taxes, and (8) recruitment of first full-time employee.  
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may include firms that are not necessarily actively trading22; listings by first 
full-time employee exclude those firms without any employees or with part-
time and self-employed labour; and listings by first payment of taxes 
excludes those firms whose annual turnover is below a certain threshold.    
 
In the research database, the issue of timing has been resolved by assuming 
date of start of activity as start-up date and, if unavailable, date of foundation. 
Similarly, date of exit was assumed to be date of cessation of activity in the 
case of voluntary liquidation or date of receivership in that of bankruptcy.   
 
2.4 From Definition to Measurement 
 
In compiling a dataset, a crucial aspect is to ascertain the degree of 
concordance between the reporting unit of the data source that the 
researcher intends to use and the unit of analysis of the research itself. 
Discrepancies between the two are likely to lead to substantial measurement 
biases of the phenomenon under investigation. Compilation of databases at 
firm level is a case in point. This section outlines, first, the methodology used 
in business registers to record business data and, then, discusses the thesis’ 
approach to counting plants and firms.  
 
Before turning to the methodological question of suitable measurements for 
the firm, I clarify the notions of unit of analysis, statistical unit and/or unit of 
observation. The unit of analysis is the entity that is being studied; the 
statistical unit, also referred to as analytical unit, is the real or artificially 
constructed unit for which statistics are compiled; and the unit of observation, 
also referred to as reporting unit, is the entity for which information is 
collected and recorded 23 generally by institutional and commercial 
organizations.  Statistical units can be units of observation or created by 
                                            
22
 Some registered companies are legal devices (shell companies) set up for administrative 
reasons or formed by company agents for off-the-shelf sales at a later date. In this context, 
Mason (1983) quotes a study by Scott, which found that 23 per cent of all companies 
registered in Scotland in 1969 had never traded.   
23
 See OECD Glossary of Statistical Terms, 2007 Retrieved from 
http://stats.oecd.org/glossary on 23 June 2010. 
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statisticians, often by splitting or combining observation units through 
estimation and imputation.  
 
 
2.4.1 Statistical Units in Business Registers 
 
In Europe, one of the main sources of business data is the business register. 
As described in the EU Recommendations Manual (2003), the conceptual 
model underlying the organization of information in business registers is 
centred around three fundamental entities: enterprise, local unit and legal 
unit24.  
 
 
operates an                                         which carries on activities in its 
 
Figure 2.2: Relationship among enterprise, legal unit and local unit 
 
Local unit refers to a specific site that engages in one main productive 
activity, such as workshop, factory, office and the like25. Legal unit refers to 
an entity, recognized by law, which has the right to conduct business in its 
own name, is capable of owning goods and assets, incurring liabilities and 
entering into contracts, as well as it may be sued and taxed. It coincides with 
the common notion of a registered company (herein referred to as 
“company”). Enterprise refers to “the smallest combination of legal units, that 
is, an organizational unit producing goods or services, which benefits from a 
certain degree of autonomy in decision-making, especially for the allocation 
of its current resources. An enterprise carries out one or more activities at 
one or more locations” (Council Regulation EEC No. 696/93 of 15 March 
1993).  
                                            
24
 In principle, business registers also include a fourth statistical unit: the enterprise group, 
which is the entity that groups together all enterprises under common ownership or control. 
However, most European Statistical Offices are still examining implementation 
methodologies in this respect.  
25
 The Council Regulation on Community states, “a local unit is an enterprise or part thereof 
(e.g. a workshop, factory, warehouse, office, mine or deport) situated in a geographically 
identified place. At or from this place, economic activity is carried out for which—save for 
certain exceptions—one or more persons work (even if only part-time) for one and the same 
enterprise” (European Union Manual, 2003, p. 60).  
legal 
unit 
enterprise local 
unit 
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In this context, a legal unit provides the legal basis for an enterprise to 
operate. The relationship between a legal unit and an enterprise can be as 
simple as one enterprise to one legal unit or more intricate, where an 
enterprise consists of a number of legal units. With rising complexity in the 
business world, the latter configuration has become increasingly more 
frequent.  
 
Being defined as the organizational unit producing goods or services, the 
enterprise is the statistical unit that best approximates the firm. Unfortunately, 
most business registers26, including the Italian one, collect information mainly 
for legal and local units, but not for enterprises. In this regard, Hult (2001) 
notes, “The enterprise unit is not recorded in all [European] Business 
Registers. …[Even when] the method refers to enterprises, in reality the 
treatment is done to legal units.” (p. 7).  Therefore, use of data on local units 
to count firms was potentially problematic. The next section details the 
approach adopted.   
 
 
2.4.2 Thesis’ Approach 
 
Lack of records at enterprise level constituted a major limitation27 in the use 
of the Italian Business Register for compilation of the thesis’ database. 
However, such limitation was tractable.  
 
If a firm is viewed as a cluster of plants under common ownership, 
constructing its empirical counterpart is essentially the problem of grouping 
together all plants or companies, which are owned by the same entity, under 
a unique identifier, that is, the enterprise. To achieve such result, what is 
needed is to trace all proprietary linkages between plants and companies at 
any time during a given period.  
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 For an overview of business demographic data by OECD country, see Bartelsman et al. 
(2003).  
27
 Exceptions are Baldwin and Gorecki (1989) and Baldwin (1995), who provide detailed 
accounts of validation of identifiers in administrative datasets. In addition, the Eurostat-
OECD Manual on business demography statistics (2008) describes the typology of events 
during the life of enterprises and how they are dealt with in business registers.   
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I followed this approach. The result is a database structured around three 
statistical/observation units: plant (or establishment), company and 
enterprise. Figure 2.3 illustrates the relationships between the thesis’ units of 
analysis and its statistical/observation units.  
 
Units of Analysis 
Statistical/Observation Units 
Business Register Thesis 
 
 
  
 
Figure 2.3: Units of analysis vs. units of observation 
 
Identification of plants and companies was straightforward. The Italian 
Business Register records systematically all local units 28 specifying their 
major use as well as all legal units with their registration number. The trade’s 
yearbooks usually report information on production sites including addresses 
and telephone numbers. Such information proved crucial in tracing plants as 
well as detecting errors.  
 
On the contrary, detection of ownership/control linkages was lengthy, since 
such linkages had to be discovered from magazine articles, industrial studies 
and direct interviews with company’s staff or management. However, I 
believe that cross-referencing among sources virtually annulled attribution 
errors in this respect.  
                                            
28
 The Italian Business Register records the location of the legal entity as headquarters, 
regardless of whether or not it houses production facilities. This implies that plants could be 
reported as headquarters or simply local units. However, description of the main activity 
carried out at each local unit resolves most questions.  
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Firm 
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Although the thesis does not analyse survival of companies nor market 
dynamics at their level, information on foundation and dissolution of legal 
entities was accurately recorded for each plant and enterprise. The reason 
was twofold. First, it allowed accurate assessment of measurement biases 
that could have arisen if the legal unit had been used as a proxy for the firm 
(Chapter 3). Secondly, it allowed accounting for administrative 
reorganizations of enterprises and plants, which  firms use, at times, to 
increase their chances of survival (Chapters 5 and 6).  
 
2.5 Thesis’ Database 
 
2.5.1 Typology of Databases 
 
There are a number of public and private sources from which longitudinal 
datasets on industrial demographics can be assembled. On the commercial 
side, there are buying guides, telephone directories, company reports from 
credit rating agencies and membership directories of chambers of commerce. 
These sources have the advantage of being public, though purchase of 
listings and auxiliary information can prove rather expensive. They often 
provide auxiliary information on product lines, equipment and other economic 
information, and frequently specify headquarters, branches and subsidiaries.   
 
On the public side, there are various longitudinal micro-level datasets based 
on administrative sources, such as business registers, social security files, 
employment registers, national censuses of manufactures, sales tax files and 
other statistical surveys. Following efforts by various public administrations to 
deregulate external access to data, these files have become the primary 
source of demographic data since the mid-1980s. They are comprehensive, 
spatially disaggregated, machine readable and reasonably up-to-date. 
However, their access has to be negotiated. Administrative records are 
generally confidential in nature, with their use strictly regulated by privacy 
and statistical laws. In general, no statistical information at firm level can be 
provided if there is any possibility to identify the single firm from publicly 
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available sources29. An additional crucial weakness concerns the data unit, 
which is generally defined at finer levels than required by most industrial 
studies (Kalleberg et al., 1990 and Baldwin and Gorecki, 1989). This can be 
a major problem, which is discussed in detail in the next section.     
 
Coverage and timeliness of databases varies considerably across sources, 
countries and sectors.  Although it is commonly recognised that selection of 
the data source has a substantial bearing on the identification of the 
population of interest, few studies have systematically addressed the issue. 
Even those30 that have cannot provide more than general guidelines because 
they refer to the United States, which has a greater selection of reliable and 
comparable data sources than most other countries in the West. 
Nevertheless, these studies point to the same conclusion: no data source is 
definitely superior to another, so its selection should be carefully evaluated 
on the basis of the research focus. In this respect, Kalleberg et al. (1990) 
stated, “the most general conclusion we draw about representativeness is 
that tolerably representative samples can be drawn from several ... 
sources…. One way to see this in terms of bias is that no dummy variable for 
a source accounts for more that 3 percent of the variance in age … and 2 
percent of the variance in size” (p. 683). Although appealing, this suggestion 
can rarely be pursued as there are few instances when scholars have access 
to multiple databases.   
 
 
2.5.2 Italian Sources  
 
In the Italian context, there are official and commercial sources, both with 
strengths and weaknesses. As a result, none could be selected as the 
                                            
29
  An OECD (1998) study provides a useful overview of the confidentiality requirements for 
access to administrative micro-data in the OECD countries in the late 1990s. Since then, it is 
likely that improvements have occurred in some countries. But, even so, confidentiality 
requirements still limit access to information on the trade and legal names of businesses.    
30
 One of the first scholars, who investigated what data source best identified businesses, 
was Birley (1984). By comparing the magnitude and characteristics of samples drawn from 
Dun and Bradstreet’s Dun’s Market Indicator files (DMI), Country Unemployment (ES202) 
files and telephone directories, the author concluded, “the major variable to affect the 
reliability of the data base identified is the source itself” (p. 67).  
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primary source. Nevertheless, all provided some useful information for the 
compilation of the thesis’ dataset at plant and firm levels as well as the time 
series of the industry’s evolution over the period studied.  
 
On the official side, the National Statistical Office (ISTAT) provides census 
data on the total number of companies and establishments at 4-digit ISIC 
level for 1971, 1981, 1991 and 2001. It also provides, commercially, the 
annual figures of companies and plants from 1996 to 2001 as well as total 
number of entries and exits from 1999 to 2001. These can be disaggregated 
by employment size, geographical location and legal form. The National 
Institute of Social Security (INPS) records social security payments for 
employees by companies. Since all Italian companies are compelled to 
transfer such payments to INPS on a regular basis, appearance and 
retirement of identification codes have been used by several scholars to 
identify entry and exit in the Italian manufacturing and service sectors. The 
Business Register maintains administrative files for each company founded 
and operating in Italy recording all administrative and statutory changes that 
have occurred during their lifetime. All companies are compelled to register 
within 30 days from their constitution or within the terms prescribed by the 
civil codex as well as to notify the Register all subsequent statutory 
modifications. By structure 31 , it is a centralised electronic repository of 
information, which provides, on commercial bases, lists of continuing and 
exiting registered businesses by registration number, commercial name, 
location of headquarters and local units, NACE class of activity and dates of 
business founding, registration, liquidation, bankruptcy and closure. On 
request, historical company profiles (visura storiche) can be consulted on-
line.  
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 In its current form, the Italian Business Register was established by law no. 580 of 23 
December 1993, which called for the merger of the former register for incorporated 
companies (Registro delle società) with that of small businesses (Registro delle ditte).  Prior 
to the establishment of the Business Register, the Registro delle società was maintained by 
the commercial sections of provincial courts (Cancellerie Commerciali dei Tribunali), 
whereas the Registro delle ditte by the provincial chambers of commerce. 
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Unfortunately, none of these administrative databases could be used as 
primary sources for the compilation of the thesis’ database. The ISTAT 
census publishes aggregate data at ten-year intervals and for the whole 
paper industry, rather than at individual level and the graphic segment alone. 
INPS would not provide data due to confidentiality, whereas the listings of the 
Business Register are not accurate. The major drawbacks of the Business 
Register are that the basic reporting unit is the registered company (the legal 
unit), there is no trace of companies that closed before the 1980s as 
electronic consolidation32 of company information dates back to the early 
1990s and specification of principal activity is often incorrect. However, it did 
prove an invaluable source for ascertaining or checking companies’ 
demographic events, once the list of all papermakers had been compiled.  
 
On the commercial side, a number of directories by the Italian association of 
pulp and papermakers (ASSOCARTA), the Ente Nazionale per la Cellulosa e 
per la Carta (ENCC) and Paperloop have provided comprehensive annual 
lists of paper plant and companies, with technical information on production. 
The fundamental directories are the Annuario delle cartiere d’Italia, 1964, 
1970, 1976 and International Pulp & Paper Directory, 1989-2002, which 
contain information on location, plants, type of production, machinery and 
annual capacity. In addition, Cellulosa e Carta published a monthly list of 
companies that had entered and exited the industry and, as a supplement to 
its monthly issues, an annual list of all papermaking companies. Although 
more accurate in reporting actual competitors in the industry, these lists 
suffer from numerous spelling mistakes in company names, which have 
required double checking across all sources to avoid incorrect entries or 
exits, and do not specify the type of paper produced.   
 
In addition, the trade’s magazine, Industria della carta, and FAO’s Pulp and 
Paper Capacity have provided time-series data for the industry’s production, 
capacity, trade and consumption. Several scholarly studies as well as 
                                            
32
 Files of companies that ceased operations before the 1980s are unavailable, 
electronically. They can be consulted only at provincial courts or chambers of commerce. 
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surveys conducted by ASSOCARTA and ENCC have also provided data on 
the evolution of the industry’s structure.   
 
 
2.5.3 Compilation of the Thesis’ Database 
 
With no access to official census-based datasets or already compiled ones, a 
different strategy had to be pursued. The construction of the research 
databases had to be based by weaving together information from a multitude 
of different sources, from the trade’s magazines and directories to business 
register’s profiles, company reports, history books and telephone 
conversations. Given the length of assembling information and inputting it in 
an electronic format, I decided to confine the database to the graphic 
segment of the paper industry. Although the number of observations is 
limited to 78 plants, 74 firms and 117 registered companies, the set of 
observations represents the entire population rather than a mere sample.  
 
The compilation of the longitudinal case study progressed in stages. It started 
by assembling a list of all paper mills and corresponding companies 
producing graphic paper in Italy in 1964. The source was the 1964 Annuario 
delle cartiere d’Italia by Assocarta, which was a comprehensive and accurate 
account of all Italian paper companies and their plants in operation in 1964. 
Since the Annuario explicitly indicates grade class or classes of paper 
produced by each company, it was relatively straightforward to identify those 
companies and plants that manufactured graphic paper only or in 
combination with other kinds in 1964. This list was, then, integrated by 
adding all new plants engaged in production of graphic paper that had been 
listed in subsequent editions of the Annuario, Cellulosa e Carta and, from 
1989 to 2004, in the Pulp and Paper International Directory.  
 
Once the lists of all plants and registered companies that operated at any 
time between 1964 and 2004 were complete, individual pre-organised 
profiles of plants were prepared collating information from a multitude of 
different sources. An example of a plant profile is reproduced in Table D.1 in 
Appendix D. Each plant profile contained three major sections. The 
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demographic section included a brief account of the history of the plant and 
information on mill location, date of construction and eventual closure. The 
technical section detailed principal activity, type of operation, machinery and 
production capacity, whereas the section on proprietary relationships 
recorded all ownership changes—at firm and registered company level—that 
a plant had undergone during its life or, at least, in its last 40 years. It 
included dates of acquisition and sale as well as corporate characteristics of 
the acquiring entity. The dates of plant construction and closure were 
obtained from history and industrial archaeology books and information about 
expansion projects and plant capacity from the trade’s surveys, companies’ 
reports and specialised magazines. Dates of foundation and closure of 
registered companies were obtained from the Italian Business Register, while 
information on ownership linkages was gathered from magazines and official 
documents from the Italian anti-trust authority as well as local councils. In 
instances of ambiguities or missing information, I conducted telephone 
interviews with the companies concerned or former employees. This second 
stage was very time-consuming as most sources were fragmented, 
accessible only in paper form and held in various libraries and repositories.  
 
With the plant profiles completed, the construction of the database entered a 
third stage, which consisted of transforming the information assembled into 
quantitative variables. The result is a master excel database, from which 
three longitudinal datasets were derived: PLANT.xls, recording data at plant 
level, ENTERPRISE.xls at firm level and COMPANY.xls at company level. 
Table 2.1 reproduces a section of PLANT.xls. This structure also applies to 
the other excel files.    
 
year 
PLANT 
code 
PLANT  
name 
ENTERPRISE 
name 
COMPANY  
name 
PLANT  
event 
PLANT  
state 
OTHER  
variables 
1971 54 rivagarda bertelsmann gardaA acquisition ongoing   
1971 58 sassoferrato frezzotti sentinofad checkpoint ongoing   
1971 16 chiampo marchi valchiampo checkpoint ongoing   
1971 57 sarego marchi sarego construction entry   
1971 24 duino ferraro timavo checkpoint ongoing   
1971 6 arbatax ferraro arbatax checkpoint ongoing   
1971 54 rivagarda legrenzi gardaA sale ongoing   
 
Table 2.1 Excerpt from PLANT.xls 
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Having identified all the proprietary linkages among plants, companies and 
enterprises, this third stage was laborious but rather straightforward. It mainly 
consisted of coding systematically the information contained in the plant 
profiles and, then, constructing variables at company and enterprise level 
from those at plant level. Table 2.2 lists the basic variables of the data files33 
for the thesis’ units of analysis.  
 
 PLANT.xls ENTERPRISE.xls 
Identifier   Identification code  Identification code 
 Name   Name  
 Current year  Current year 
Location  Town  Town 
 Province  Province 
 Region   Region  
Key dates and events  Date of construction  Date of foundation 
 Start-date of producing graphic paper 
 Start-date of producing graphic paper 
(i.e. date of entry) 
 End-date of producing graphic paper 
 End-date of producing graphic paper 
(i.e. date of exit) 
 Date of shut-down  Date of dissolution 
 Current state  Current state  
  Mode of entry/exit 
Proprietary/administrative 
events  
 Date of plant acquisition/ 
administrative transfer/sale  
 Date of expansion/reorganization/ 
contraction  
 Name of the acquiring/divesting 
enterprise 
 Name of the acquired/divested plant  
 Name of the acquiring/divesting 
company 
 Name of the acquiring/divesting 
company  
Background  Founder’s profession  Founder’s profession 
 Founder’s sector of origin  Founder’s sector of origin 
Production   Plant’s current capacity   Enterprise’s current capacity 
 Owing enterprise’s current capacity   
 Owing company’s current capacity   
 Grade specialization  Grade specialization  
 Inter-sector production  Inter-sector production  
Equipment  Current total number of paper 
machines by width class 
 Current total number of paper 
machines by width class 
 Current number of paper machines 
installed after WWII by width class 
 Current number of paper machines 
installed after WWII by width class 
  Single-multi-plant operation 
 
Table 2.2 Basic variables in PLANT.xls and ENTERPRISE.xls  
 
 
As to key events, whenever possible, four key dates were recorded: the 
founding/construction date, the year in which the plant and the enterprise 
began production of graphic paper, the year when they stopped producing for 
the graphic industry and the year of closure. However, when the start- or 
                                            
33
 Definitions of the variables used in the thesis are provided in Appendix C. 
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end-date of activity was unknown, the date of foundation or dissolution was 
considered. Moreover, when only the year or the month was known, then, the 
date was approximated by the mid-point, that is, the 30th June in the former 
case and the 15th of the month in the latter. 
 
Obtaining data on the number and type of paper machines in operation in a 
given year required some detective work. Through company histories and 
telephone conversations with plant managers and technicians, it was 
generally possible to fill the gaps or correct the information published in the 
trade’s directories. However, it proved unachievable to obtain accurate and 
complete information about the machinery in operation in eight plants and on 
plant upgrading in fourteen plants. As a result, the equipment variables had 
to be simplified to numbers of paper machines installed pre- or post-WWII 
and wider or narrower than 3 meters.   
 
The main difficulty in constructing quantitative data was, however, the 
estimation of production capacity. The trade’s directories record yearly 
tonnage figures, but the accuracy proved to be modest. Not only were the 
times series, now and then, incomplete, but the reported values were, at 
times, inconsistent. Therefore, it was frequently necessary to make 
conjectures about yearly levels of capacity on the basis of the known reliable 
data values as well as information on type of machinery in operation and 
capital investment in plant upgrading. Although inevitably speculative, this 
practice led to an acceptable level of concordance with published aggregate 
figures. The time series of the industry’s total capacity of graphic paper 
approximates the corresponding times series published by FAO within the 
range of   5 per cent.  
 
In summary, the thesis’ database is accurate in counting correctly plants and 
firms as well as recording their proprietary life trajectories over a relatively 
long period. However, it is limited in data on output exported and sales. This 
hampered the study of the effects of the business cycle on entry and exit at 
individual and industry levels. In addition, the incomplete information 
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concerning the exact dates when plants were upgraded has also prevented 
an analysis of the investment function.  
 
  
Note on Terminology 
 
In the thesis’ database, enterprise indicates the empirical counterpart of the 
firm. Company is used to designate the registered legal entity that has the 
right to conduct business in its own name. Enterprises may consist of one or 
more companies.  
 
The potential measurement bias that would have arisen from using company, 
rather than enterprise, to count firms is elaborated in the next chapter. In 
Chapters 5-8, the terms enterprise and firms are used interchangeably 
because of their substantial correspondence.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
ENTRY AND EXIT IN ITALIAN GRAPHIC  
PAPER INDUSTRY, 1964-2004 
 
 
 
Preliminary to the following chapters that analyse exit and survival, this one 
presents the aggregate picture of turbulence in the graphic segment of the 
Italian papermaking industry from 1964 to 2004. After an initial overview of 
the structure of the industry, the remainder of the chapter focuses on the 
dynamics of entry and exit of plants and enterprises1. This chapter is 
complemented by Appendix B, which highlights development of the sector in 
terms of its aggregate capacity, production, consumption and trade.  
 
4.1 Structure of the Graphic Paper Industry 
Numbers 
 
Figure 4.1 illustrates the total annual number of existing plants and 
enterprises2 in the graphic papermaking industry during the period under 
consideration. The annual entry, exit, net entry and turbulence flows of plants 
and enterprises are presented in Tables D.4 and D.5 of Appendix D.  
 
Despite significant growth in production and apparent consumption of graphic 
paper from 1964 to 2004 (Figure B.3, Appendix B), the industrial population 
has been constantly shrinking throughout the period: plants declining from a 
peak of 70 in 1965 and 1966 to 40 in 2004 and enterprises from 49 to 22, 
during the same period (Figure 4.1).  
                                            
1
 As discussed in the previous chapters, the enterprise is the empirical proxy for the firm. 
Given their substantial concordance, the two terms can be used interchangeably. However, 
because of the statistical nature of this chapter, only the term “enterprise” will be used.  
2
 Existing plants or enterprises are defined as those units that were still in operation as at the 
end of each year. It includes any entries and excludes any exits that occurred during the 
year. They differ from continuing units, as the latter are defined as those entities already in 
existence in the previous year and continued to be at least until the last day of the year 
under consideration.   
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Figure 4.1: Number of existing plants and enterprises, 1964-2004 
 
 
Distribution by size  
 
This steady contraction of the population has been accompanied by a 
considerable shift towards plants and enterprises of larger size (Tables 4.1 
and 4.2).  
 
In 1964, nearly 60 per cent of plants had an annual capacity of no more than 
10,000 tonnes and the dominant3 class size4 was up-to-5,000 tonnes 
annually. Two decades later, the weeding out of smaller operations was 
mostly completed. In 1984, the dominant class size was 25,000-50,000 and 
the percentage of plants producing no more than 10,000 tonnes annually had 
decreased to 35 per cent of the total. These results appear to be broadly 
consistent with the minimum efficient scale (MES) as estimated by industry 
experts5 in the late 1970s.  
 
 
                                            
3
 The dominant size class is defined as the class with the highest proportion of enterprises of 
that size class in the total number of existing enterprises in a given year.  
4
 The breakdown by size class corresponds to that commonly reported in the trade’s 
magazines and statistics. The inequality of size classes reflects the fact that an increase in 
the width of a paper machine generates more than a proportional increase in its output.  
5
 Farinet (1989) reported the Ministry of Industry’s MES estimations for main category of 
machines. In the late 1970s, MES for a plant manufacturing printing and writing grades was 
70 tonnes daily, equivalent to some 21,000-23,000 tonnes annually, and the optimal width of 
the paper machine was 2.5 meters.   
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Size class               
(tonnes) 
1964  1974  1984  1994  2004 
median 
size 
%  
median 
size 
%  
median 
size 
%  
median 
size 
%  
median 
size 
% 
up to 1,000 500 10.1  150 7.7  575 7.0  1,000 5.9  560 5.0 
1,001-5,000 3,000 30.4  3,600 20.0  4,000 15.8  3,350 11.8  3,600 10.0 
5,001-10,000 7,500 17.4  8,500 15.4  8,500 12.3  9,000 11.8  8,000 2.5 
10,001-25,000 17,000 15.9  15,750 21.5  17,000 15.8  12,500 9.8  13,500 12.5 
25,001-50,000 40,000 15.9  36,500 12.3  32,250 17.5  40,000 25.5  35,000 27.5 
50,001-100,000 75,000 8.7  75,000 18.5  70,000 17.5  70,000 17.6  70,000 12.5 
100,001-250,000 120,000 1.4  140,000 4.6  130,000 14.0  180,000 15.7  130,000 17.5 
above 250,000 0 0.0  0 0.0  0 0.0  380,000 2.0  330,000 12.5 
Total  7,500 69
* 
 15,000 65
* 
 24,000 57
* 
 36,000 51
* 
 42,500 40
* 
Note: (*) indicates total number of plants in operation in the corresponding year 
 
Table 4.1: Distribution of plants by size class, selected years 
 
From the mid 1980s, the restructuring of the industry has progressed towards 
expanding operations. Although the dominant size class has remained the 
same, 25,001-50,000, the percentage of plants with a capacity more than 
100,000 tonnes has nearly doubled. As a result, the overall median of plan 
size has grown from 24,000 tonnes in 1984 to 42,500 tonnes in 2004.  
 
Similar upward trends are also found at enterprise level, although the speed 
of restructuring has been somewhat slower (Table 4.2).  
 
Size class                        
(tonnes) 
1964  1974  1984  1994  2004 
median 
size 
%  
median 
size 
%  
median 
size 
%  
median 
size 
%  
median 
size 
% 
up to 1,000 1,000 10.4  560 10.3  1,000 9.7  1,000 12.0  120 4.5 
1,001-5,000 3,000 31.3  3,600 33.3  3,875 25.8  4,000 20.0  3,600 18.2 
5,001-10,000 7,750 16.7  8,750 10.3  9,000 9.7  8,000 8.0  0 0.0 
10,001-25,000 12,000 12.5  15,000 12.8  21,150 12.9  11,750 8.0  14,250 9.1 
25,001-50,000 39,500 10.4  41,500 7.7  38,000 3.2  40,000 20.0  39,500 27.3 
50,001-100,000 65,000 14.6  77,500 15.4  57,000 19.4  85,000 8.0  71,000 22.7 
100,001-250,000 205,000 2.1  120,000 2.6  134,000 12.9  192,500 16.0  0 0.0 
above 250,000 291,000 2.1  393,500 7.7  701,250 6.5  895,500 8.0  385,000 18.2 
Total 7,750 48
* 
 9,000 39
* 
 19,300 31
* 
 28,000 25
* 
 40,250 22
* 
Note: (*) indicates total number of enterprises in operation in the corresponding year 
 
Table 4.2: Distribution of enterprises by size class, selected years 
 
In 1964, the percentage of small enterprises with an annual capacity of less 
than 10,000 tonnes was 58.4 per cent, with the dominant size class up to 
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5,000 tonnes. By 1994, the percentage of small enterprises nearly halved, 
the dominant size class increasing to 25,000-50,000. Although the dominant 
size class in today’s industry is still 25,000-50,000, the largest enterprise6 is 
some 40 times as large as the largest of the enterprises in this size class. 
This indicates a stratified market structure: a very large enterprise, three 
smaller but still large enterprises, many medium-sized operations and several 
small ones.  
 
The increase in enterprise size is as much the result of increases in plants’ 
size as of an increased agglomeration of plants under common ownership. 
As Figure 4.1 suggests, the average number of plants per enterprise7 has 
also steadily increased from 1.42 in 1965 to 1.82 in 2004. This aspect and its 
impact on concentration levels is analysed in detail in Chapter 7.   
 
 
Distribution by age  
 
Papermaking enterprises and plants exhibit a remarkable longevity (Tables 
4.3 and 4.4)8. Throughout the period under consideration, some two-thirds of 
the plants and some half of the enterprises were more than 50 years old. 
This implies that a considerable number of plants and enterprises survived at 
least a world war, if not two. Moreover, as the age class of plants and 
enterprises older than 100 years includes some mills spanning several 
centuries, this suggests the absence of specific upper bounds for age9 for 
both plants and enterprises.   
 
 
                                            
6
 The largest enterprise in 2004 was Cartiere Burgo spa with an annual capacity of some 
1,905,000 tonnes.  
7
 There are a few enterprises that, besides graphic plants, operate other mills producing 
different types of paper. Therefore, the average number of graphic plants per enterprise 
should not be intended as an overall measure of the size of enterprises but, rather, as an 
indication of the consolidation process that the graphic sector underwent.  
8
 The inequality of age classes is motivated by the need to provide more detailed information 
on the younger firms, rather than the older ones.    
9
 Had one analysed registered companies instead of enterprises, the conclusions would be 
opposite. The percentage of registered companies older than 50 years was consistently less 
than a third (17.5 in 1964, 23.5 in 1974, 31.7 in 1984, 30.3 in 1994 and 33.3 in 2004) and 
virtually none exceeded 100 years of age.  
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Age class                 
(years since 
entry) 
1964  1974  1984  1994   2004 
median 
age 
%  
median 
age 
%  
median 
age 
%  
median 
age 
%  
median 
age 
% 
up to 5 1 11.6  3 1.5  0 0.0  1 2.0  0 0.0 
5-10 6 7.2  10 7.7  7 1.8  0 0.0  0 0.0 
11-25 14 7.2  16 21.5  21 17.5  20 3.9  11 2.5 
26-50 39 5.8  36 4.6  31 14.0  33 27.5  41 30.0 
51-100 68 29.0  74 20.0  80 24.6  88 23.5  85 25.0 
above 100 162 39.1  167 44.6  194 42.1  198 43.1  214 42.5 
Total 68 69
* 
 78 65
* 
 88 57
* 
 90 51
* 
 98 40
* 
Note: (*) indicates total number of plants in operation in the corresponding year 
 
Table 4.3: Distribution of plants by age class, selected years 
 
 
Age class                 
(years since 
entry) 
1964  1974  1984  1994  2004 
median 
age 
%  
median 
age 
%  
median 
age 
%  
median 
age 
%  
median 
age 
% 
up to 5 4 14.6  2.5 5.1  4 14.3  1.5 8.0  1.5 9.1 
5-10 7.0 10.4  7.5 5.1  6 7.1  5 4.0  7.5 9.1 
11-25 14 10.4  18 25.6  21.5 14.3  17 12.0  21.5 9.1 
26-50 40.5 16.7  45 10.3  30 21.4  39 20.0  44.5 18.2 
51-100 62 29.2  65 33.3  71 35.7  81 36.0  89 40.9 
above 100 166 18.8  128 20.5  151 7.1  124 20.0  134 13.6 
Total 48 48
* 
 57 39
* 
 42 28
* 
 69 25
* 
 67 22
* 
Note: (*) indicates total number of enterprises in operation in the corresponding year 
 
Table 4.4: Distribution of enterprises by age class, selected years 
 
 
Yet, the age structures of the groups of plants and enterprises younger than 
50 years differ considerably. While the population of plants becomes older as 
time elapses, that of enterprises seems to be able to rejuvenate itself. Table 
4.3 shows that the dominant age class for plants progressively increased 
from 0-5 in 1964, to 11-25 in 1974 and 1984, and to 26-50 in 1994 and 2004.  
By contrast, the dominant age class of enterprises has always been 26-50, 
with an exception in 1974.  This is the result of different turbulence dynamics 
at plant and enterprise level.  
 
4.2 Patterns of Plant Entry and Exit 
 
In 1964, there were 69 existing plants, of which two were new. Since then, 
nine additional plants have entered the sector, of which five between 1965 
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and 1974 and four between 1977 and 1993. No plant had been built or 
converted to production of graphic paper after 1993. By contrast, exit 
occurred throughout the period almost incessantly. Figure 4.2 and Table D.4 
in Appendix D depict these dynamics.  
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Figure 4.2: Number of plant entries and exits, 1964–2004 
 
 
The nature of these demographic patterns is revealed more clearly when 
looked at in light of the evolution of market demand and supply. As shown in 
the first chart of Figure 4.2, plant entry occurred almost exclusively in the 
years when the industry’s overall capacity (dashed line on the secondary y-
axis) grew at a pace similar to domestic consumption (solid line on the 
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secondary y-axis). Conversely, when consumption began to be increasingly 
satisfied by import, no new plant was erected.  
 
The higher frequency with which new plants were constructed until the late 
1960s is not surprising. As explained in Appendix A, a paper mill is a specific-
purpose facility that, if proven unprofitable, cannot be easily converted to 
another production. Moreover, construction of a new, efficient plant causes 
an abrupt considerable increase in the overall industry’s capacity, which is 
likely to drive prices and profits down if it is not justified by a buoyant 
demand. Therefore, greenfield investment generally occurs when long-term 
demand prospects are looking up. As discussed in Appendix B, such 
circumstances characterised the 1950s and 1960s, when demand was 
growing at buoyant rates and domestic producers were shielded from foreign 
competition10. Most greenfield investment occurred during those decades. By 
1974, however, demand growth had exhausted most of its drive and began 
fluctuating. With overcapacity in the industry (Figure B.3, Appendix B), 
installation of new plants was hardly an option.  
 
Instead, lack of a positive association between plant entry and expanding 
capacity and consumption, which characterised the second half of the 
reference period, can be explained by the Government’s liberalization 
policies introduced in the mid-1980s. To compete in an increasingly 
liberalized market, where Scandinavian producers enjoyed comparative 
advantages in production of commodity grades11, Italian producers had to 
change their strategies from production of newspaper and magazine grades 
to value-added ones12, which are generally produced in smaller quantities 
                                            
10
 Due to technical characteristics of the software used for this figure, the growth dynamics of 
apparent consumption and capacity are not simple to recognize.  Figure B.3 in Appendix B 
provides a clearer illustration of the evolution of apparent consumption, capacity and 
production.  
11
 According to FAO figures, in 1984 the Italian production of newsprint, which is par 
excellence the commodity grade, was less than 5 per cent (207 thousand tonnes) of that of 
Finland, Norway and Sweden together (4,225 thousand tonnes). By contrast, in the same 
year, the Italian production of printing and writing grades corresponded to some 43 per cent 
(2,005 thousand tonnes) of the total of the three Scandinavian countries (4,602 thousand 
tonnes). This situation has remained substantially unchanged until today. 
12
 An overview of the restructuring of the Italian industry in the 1980s can be found in PPI 
(1987) and Ferrari (1999).  
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and represent less attractive niches for larger foreign competitors. Such 
strategy was carried out by upgrading existing plants, rather than 
construction of new ones. That is why no new plants, except for one, were 
built in the last two decades.    
 
Turning to exit, the second chart of Figure 4.2 above shows that shutting 
down operations occurred throughout the period, irrespective of the long-term 
trends of capacity and consumption. In principle, this pattern may reflect the 
natural weeding out of obsolete plants. If so, one would expect plants to be 
generally dismantled during downturns when profits are eroded due to 
depressed demand and high inventory stocks.  However, data do not support 
a strong association of this kind.   
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Figure 4.3: Plant exit and de-trended production, 1964-2004 
 
 
Figure 4.3 shows the number of plant exits against the de-trended time 
series13 of production of graphic paper. In principle, this figure is difficult to 
interpret because of the two-way causation between exit and downturns in 
production. Nevertheless, the general notion that plants are more likely to be 
shutdown during downturns is not confirmed. Exit occurred in significant 
numbers also during upturns when the market was a supplier market and 
papermakers used their machines even beyond the optimal operating rate to 
                                            
13
 The de-trended series has been obtained by, first, regressing production on time t and, 
then, calculating the deviations of the observations from the trend.  
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satisfy orders. The data suggest that plant closure underlies a more complex 
decision where profitability considerations are likely to operate with time lags.  
 
Finally, inter-sector mobility has been only a marginal phenomenon in the 
graphic papermaking industry. Of the 11 plants that entered the industry, only 
four were converted, partially or entirely, to graphic paper. Of the 38 plants 
that exited, only three converted production to non-graphic grades. With 
technological advances, paper machines have become increasingly more 
grade-specific equipment, making conversion to grades different from the 
original ones unprofitable.   
 
4.3 Patterns of Enterprise Entry and Exit 
 
Unlike plants, enterprises continued to enter and exit the industry throughout 
the entire period. From 1964 to 2004, 26 new enterprises entered and 52 
exited. Again, the data do not indicate any significant evidence that entry of 
enterprises increased during upturns and exit during downturns. Moreover, 
entry and exit appear to be evenly spread across upturns and downturns of 
business cycles. Figure 4.4 illustrates entry and exit of enterprises against 
the de-trended times series of production and consumption. 
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Figure 4.4: Enterprise entry and exit, 1964-2004 
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Figure 4.4: Cont. 
 
However, interesting temporal patterns emerge when entry and exit flows are 
analysed in terms of the mode through which enterprises have appeared and 
disappeared from the market. Figure 4.5 shows the annual number of 
enterprises that have entered by plant construction (greenfield) and by plant 
acquisition as well as the annual number of enterprises that have exited by 
plant shutdown and plant sale.  
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Figure 4.5: Enterprise entry and exit by mode, 1964-2004 
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Of 26 entries, seven were by plant construction and the remaining 19 plant 
acquisition. Of 52 exits, 20 were by plant shutdown and 32 plant sale.  
 
Although relevant, greenfield entry and exit by plant shutdown do not account 
for the bulk of turbulence. Greenfield entry has been almost exclusively 
confined to the first phase of the development of the industry after the post-
war recovery era. These dynamics appear to be consistent with the standard 
view of market evolution in the presence of economies of scale. In a situation 
of substantial balance between demand and overall capacity, would-be 
entrepreneurs are likely to refrain from entering competition by adding new 
capacity that, if the market cannot absorb it, would inevitably lead to 
overcapacity and, in turn, drive prices down.   
 
The bulk of turbulence has been confined to the second half of the period 
under consideration, when entry by acquisition and exit by sale dominated 
market dynamics. With virtually no enterprise constituted through 
construction of new plants, 19 ones that wished to enter the industry had no 
alternative than to acquire existing plants. In the context of an industry, such 
as papermaking, where capacity is a strategic variable, these empirical 
regularities appear understandable. If the industry’s capacity is comparable 
to long-term demand, the most appropriate strategy for an enterprise to 
expand is through acquisition of existing plants.   
 
 
To summarise, the industry witnessed a progressive decline in the number of 
papermaking plants and enterprises. While the contraction in the population 
of plants resulted from halting construction of new establishments and 
shutting down existing ones, that of enterprises from continuously churning 
the population and changing the proprietary distribution of the industry’s 
capacity. This leads to investigate determinants of closure at plant level 
(Chapter 5) and of survival at firm level (Chapter 6). 
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CHAPTER 3 
WHAT MEASURE FOR THE FIRM? 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Analysis of market competition rests on the firm, as the economic entity that 
clusters all plants under common ownership. Although straightforward to 
define conceptually, its empirical counterpart is rarely available. 
Administrative and survey data generally collect data at the level of 
companies, that is, the smallest unit to which law attributes a legal 
personality. As a firm may consists of more than one legal unit, counting 
firms in terms of companies may lead to overestimation of demographic 
turbulence. As Baldwin and Gorecki (1989) stressed, ―users of administrative 
and survey data have to proceed cautiously when they employ these sources 
for purposes that were not originally envisaged. This is especially the case 
when the appearance and disappearance of identification codes in these 
data bases are used to defined births and deaths. Identification codes can 
appear and disappear for …reasons none of which may satisfy the particular 
definition of entry and exit that the researcher has in mind‖ (p. 257).  
 
Whether measurement discrepancies are an insidious feature is, ultimately, 
an empirical matter. In sectors dominated by micro- or small-scale 
operations, where enterprises are more likely to consist of only a legal unit, 
measurement discrepancies may not be an issue. However, in capital-
intensive industries such as papermaking, intricate patterns of corporate 
ownership are likely to be the rule, suggesting that measurement biases may 
be relevant.  
 
By and large, scholars have always been aware of the problems associated 
with the peculiarities of individual databases, and they have made corrections 
so as to exclude those entries and exits that they recognized as fictitious. 
But, detection of these cases has seldom been a documented routine 
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procedure. In fact, little1 is known about the magnitude of these 
measurement biases. Although they are likely to differ across industries, 
countries and times, evidence of their existence and size would help to clarify 
the extent to which industrial turbulence is such an empirical regularity. 
 
Drawing on the thesis’ database that allows a clear distinction between 
enterprise and company, this chapter attempts to assess the magnitude of 
measurement biases in the Italian papermaking industry. The next section 
compares the time series for entry, exit, net entry and turbulence between 
the two proxies, Section 3 delves into companies’ modes of demographic 
turnover and spurious turbulence2 and Section 4 presents concluding 
remarks.   
 
3.2 Enterprises vs. Companies 
 
To assess measurement divergences in the Italian graphic paper industry, 
three aspects of entry and exit patterns have been considered: magnitude of 
entry and exit flows, correlation between entry and exit, and entrants’ market 
penetration. These aspects are those on which the literature on firm 
turbulence has focused its main attention3.  
 
 
3.2.1 Magnitude and Correlations  
 
Figures 3.1, 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 illustrate entry, exit, net entry and turbulence 
flows of enterprises in comparison with those of companies. Tables D.5 and 
D.6 in Appendix D present the data in terms of numbers and rates. Net entry 
                                            
1
 With a few exceptions, studies on firm entry and exit are rather vague about the statistical 
unit used. They refer to the generic term ―firm‖. Therefore, it is difficult to gauge the 
relevance of measurement biases in their empirical findings. There are, however, few studies 
focusing on measurement biases. Johnson and Conway (1997) is a rare example of an 
analysis of the problems associated with the use of VAT registration data for the study of firm 
births. Another is a working paper by Jarmin et al. (2003) based on the US Census Bureau’s 
Longitudinal Business Database.  
2
 Spurious turbulence refers to that portion of turbulence that is regarded as irrelevant for the 
analysis of competition. Essentially, it encompasses the establishment and/or dissolution of 
companies for administrative/financial purposes, without ownership being changed.    
3
 See Section 1.1.  
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is defined as the difference between entry and exit, whereas turbulence as 
the sum of entry and exit4.  
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Figure 3.1: Entry in the Italian graphic paper industry, 1964-2004 
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Figure 3.2: Exit in the Italian graphic paper industry, 1964-2004 
 
                                            
4
 Sutton (1997) defines turbulence as the sum of gross entry and gross exit rates. Beesly 
and Hamilton (1984) proposed a similar measurement. They defined turbulence as the ratio 
of the sum of gross entry and exit to the initial stock of establishments in the industry.  
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The above figures show considerable differences in magnitude, though not in 
patterns5. Between 1964 and 2004, 61 new companies entered and 92 exited 
the industry. During the same period, only 26 new enterprises entered and 52 
exited. The average annual number of entries and exits were 0.63 and 1.30 
for enterprises and 1.49 and 2.24 for companies. The mean differences are 
statistically significant6.  
 
Consequently, industrial turbulence at company level was nearly twice that at 
enterprise level (Figure 3.3). Moreover, there were only four years when 
turbulence was zero, compared to 11 years of no turbulence at enterprise 
level. On average, the annual turbulence was 1.9 for enterprises and 3.7 for 
companies, the mean difference being statistically significant7. 
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Figure 3.3: Turbulence in the Italian graphic paper industry, 1964-2004 
 
 
By contrast, levels of net entry are remarkably similar for enterprises and 
companies. During the period, net entry mainly fluctuated between 1 and –2 
both at enterprise and company levels (Figure 3.4). Over the period under 
                                            
5
 The exceptions were 1989 and 1996 when companies’ exit and turbulence peaked due to 
the demise of two major multi-company enterprises.  
6
 The two-side mean comparison test for companies’ and enterprises’ mean is t(80)=-2.7351 
p=0.0038 for entry and  t(80)=-2.8249, p=0.003 for exit.  
7
  The two-side mean comparison test is t(80)==-3.0611, p=0.0015.  
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consideration, annual average net entry was –0.63 for enterprises and –0.76 
for companies, the mean difference being not statistically significant. As a 
result, decline in the number of existing companies nearly paralleled that of 
enterprises. 
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Figure 3.4: Net entry in the Italian graphic paper industry, 1964-2004 
 
 
Similar results can be observed in terms of rates. As shown in Figures 3.5 
and second chart of Figure 3.6 below, entry, exit and turbulence rates were 
nearly two thirds of the times higher at company than enterprise level. Over 
the entire period, the annual average rates of entry, exit and turbulence were 
2.0 per cent, 3.8 and 5.9 for enterprises and 3.9 per cent, 5.8 and 9.8 for 
companies (Tables D.5 and D.6 in Appendix D). The test for mean 
differences rejects the null hypothesis of no difference between companies 
and enterprises. 
 
In sharp contrast to these patterns is net entry. The substantial similarity 
between companies’ and enterprises’ net entry rates is reconfirmed (first 
chart of Figure 3.6).    Between 1964 and 2004, the average annual rate was 
-2.0 per cent for enterprises and -2.1 for companies. 
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Figure 3.5: Entry and exit rates in the Italian graphic  
paper industry, 1964-2004 
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Figure 3.6:  Net entry and turbulence rates in the Italian graphic  
paper industry, 1964-2004 
 
 
As to the empirical evidence that entry and exit rates are generally 
correlated, the data confirm this and indicate, once again, that correlation is 
higher at company than enterprise level.  The correlation coefficient between 
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entry and exit rates is 0.545 for enterprises and 0.783 for companies. Cross-
correlation between entry and exit time series does not reveal any 
remarkable patterns. 
 
Overall, these results appear to be in line with general findings, though 
turbulence in the Italian graphic paper industry appears to have been less 
pronounced. This is to be expected, since calculations at more aggregate 
ISIC levels include sectors more populated and less capital-intensive than 
papermaking and, therefore, more likely to have higher entry and exit flows. 
For the American paper industry8, Dunne et al. (1988) report entry rates 
ranging from 7.0 to 52.0 per cent (31.4 per cent average) and exit rates from 
14 and 43 per cent (29.9 per cent average) for the period 1963-1982. From 
the OECD study (2003) on firm demographics it can be inferred9 that, 
between 1987 and 1993, annual average turbulence rate for sub-section DE 
(manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products, and publishing and printing) 
was some 14 per cent. This compares with 6.4 at enterprise level and 11.2 at 
company level for the Italian graphic paper industry during the same period. 
 
 
3.2.2 Market Penetration 
 
A common feature in industrial demographic patterns is that firms begin 
small. Consequently, the rate of entry penetration10 is usually modest. 
Geroski (1995) reported rates between 1.45 per cent and 6.36 in the United 
Kingdom over the period 1974-79. Dunne et al. (1988) found that, between 
1963 and 1982, overall market share of entrants into individual American 
four-digit industries ranged from 2.1 per cent (tobacco) to 26.4 (lumber). 
During the same period, American firms entering the paper industry 
                                            
8
 As inferred from the study, the industry includes manufacture of pulp, paper and paper 
goods. As the capital investment for manufacture of paper goods (converting) is substantially 
lower than for papermaking, greater turbulence is to be expected for this segment. 
Consequently, entry and exit rates should be higher.  
9
 The OECD study discusses major demographic developments, rather than trends specific 
to individual sectors at country level. However, in 2003 the study’s database could be 
downloaded from www.oecd.org/eco/FirmLevelDataProject. The figures herewith reported 
have been calculated using the downloaded data file for Italy. At present, the study’s 
database is no more available. OECD indicates that major statistical adjustments are 
ongoing.  
10
 Entry penetration is defined as total capacity of entrant divided by total industry capacity.  
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accounted for some 10.7 per cent of the whole industry, whereas firms 
exiting accounted for 12.2 per cent.  
 
Table 3.1 below records the average annual size—measured in terms of 
capacity—of existing enterprises and companies vis-à-vis the minimum and 
maximum size of entrants for each decades under consideration. In addition, 
it reports the minimum and maximum rates of entry penetration for each 
decade. 
 
  
ENTERPRISES 
Existing   Entering 
Average 
Size 
(tonnes) 
 
Individual size range 
(tonnes) 
Market penetration 
rate (%) 
  Minimum  Maximum  Minimum  Maximum  
1964 - 1973 37,669  400 45,000 0.0274 3.1974 
1974 - 1983 64,446  1,000 91,000 0.0676 3.8958 
1984 - 1993 92,967  1,000 185,000 0.0335 6.8775 
1994 - 2003 130,379  1,000 250,000 0.0340 8.9640 
2004 162,015  40,000 40,000 1.1222 1.1222 
        
  
COMPANIES 
Existing   Entering 
Average 
Size 
(tonnes) 
 
Individual  size range 
(tonnes) 
Market penetration 
rate (%) 
  Minimum  Maximum  Minimum  Maximum  
1964 - 1973 30,988  400 85,000 0.0274 3.1974 
1974 - 1983 49,403  120 18,000 0.1089 0.7999 
1984 - 1993 69,903  1,000 185,000 0.0399 26.9153 
1994 - 2003 106,004  120 1,835,000 1.6311 54.2623 
2004 148,513  40,000 40,000 1.1222 1.1222 
              
 
Table 3.1: Entry of enterprises and companies by size, 1964-2004 
 
 
By and large, the Italian graphic paper industry exhibited low rates of market 
penetration, except for the decades 1984-1993 and 1994-2004 when 
penetration rates at company level were high as result two major waves of 
corporate restructuring within firms of considerable size. More importantly, 
rates were generally lower for enterprises than companies, confirming once 
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again that the use of companies, rather than enterprises, would have led to 
overestimation.  
 
 
3.2.3 Temporal Dynamics 
 
The previous sections have highlighted that use of the company as unit of 
analysis leads to overestimation of industrial turbulence. But how dissimilar 
are temporal behaviours of demographic turnover between enterprises and 
companies? Figure 3.7 illustrates the temporal dynamics of entry, exit and 
turbulence for enterprises and companies.  
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Figure 3.7: Entry, exit and turbulence time series, 1964-2004 
 
At first glance, the times series of entry, exit and turbulence appear to follow 
similar temporal patterns, though with differences in levels. The augmented 
Dickley-Fuller test does not reject the null hypothesis that the variables 
exhibit a unit root at all common significance levels, confirming that all series, 
both at enterprise and company levels, are stationary. Furthermore, Barlett’s 
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test statistics11 does not reject the null hypothesis that entry, exit and 
turbulence time series are white noise processes. At enterprise level, 
Barlett’s statistics has a p-value of 0.247 for entry, 0.284 for exit, 0.272 for 
net entry and 0.283 for turbulence. At company level, Barlett’s statistic has a 
p-value of 0.632 for entry, 0.998 for exit, 0.875 for net entry and 0.987 for 
turbulence. So, it appears that, regardless of whether measured in terms of 
enterprise or companies, the temporal behaviour of firm entry, exit and 
turbulence appear to share similar stochastic processes.  
 
3.3 Companies’ Entry and Exit Modes 
 
In short, data suggest that using the company as a proxy for the firm 
significantly overestimates the scale of industrial turbulence, though not its 
temporal behaviour. Why is turbulence more pronounced at company level? 
The answer lies in the modes through which companies are founded and 
dissolved.  
 
 
3.3.1 Basic Modes of Entry and Exit  
 
Conceptually, a firm enters an industry by constructing a new plant 
(greenfield entry) or acquiring an existing one from an incumbent or exiting 
competitor (entry by acquisition). As a mirror image, a firm exits by shutting 
down its plant (exit by shutdown) or selling it to an entering competitor or 
incumbent (exit by sale)12.   
 
These four modes apply at enterprise and company levels. But, companies 
may also appear or disappear due to mere administrative or financial 
                                            
11 Bartlett’s periodogram-based test is a test of the null hypothesis that the data come from a 
white-noise process of uncorrelated random variables having a constant mean and a 
constant variance. In STATA 11, it is performed through the command wntestb.  
12
 In principle, firms may enter and exit by a mixture of the two modes. However, this 
strategy is generally rare. On one hand, firms tend to enter as single-plant, and when they do 
not do so, they generally acquire a number of plants, avoiding being simultaneously involved 
in the construction of new establishments. On the other hand, exiting firms are likely, first, to 
divest their profitable plants and, then, to close down their unprofitable operations. Because 
of this temporal sequence, dissolution of firms rarely occurs by a mixture of plant sales and 
shutdowns.  
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reasons. As businesses grow in size and complexity, it is customary for a 
business to restructure, administratively, its organisation by rearranging the 
configuration of its legal units. Consequently, new companies might be set up 
and/or others dissolved. Furthermore, as property is handed from generation 
to generation within a family, old companies are closed and new opened to 
reflect the transfer of property titles within the family group.  
 
The more intricate the patterns of corporate ownership are, the greater the 
potential for spurious turbulence13 is. As Scherer (1990) noted, surprisingly 
low aggregate industrial concentration levels are often linked to patterns of 
corporate engineering where intricate inter-corporate ties are disguised 
through a myriad of ostensibly separate companies. In those contexts, 
foundation or dissolution of companies for legal or administrative purposes is 
likely to be more frequent.  
 
To account for spurious turbulence, the thesis adds two new modes at 
company level: entry and exit by reorganization. Entry by reorganisation is 
defined as foundation of a new company while the set of plants under 
common ownership and the owner remain the same. Similarly, an exit by 
reorganization is dissolution of a company while concerned assets, which 
continue to belong to the same owner, are transferred to another company, 
either new or existing.  
 
 
3.3.2 Spurious Turbulence 
 
Tables D.8 and D.9 in Appendix D report entry and exit flows of enterprises 
and companies by mode.  Figure 3.8 below illustrates the evolution of overall 
entry and exit of companies (grey bars) against total market entry by 
reorganization (black circles). The distance between the height of the bar and 
the circles represents the amount of real14 entry or exit.  
                                            
13
 For a definition of spurious turbulence, see footnote 2 of this chapter.  
14
 Real entry(exit) is defined at the sum of entry by construction and acquisition(exit by 
shutdown and sale). Spurious entry(exit) coincides with entry(exit) by reorganization. Total 
entry(exit) is the sum of real and spurious entry(exit).   
   45 
0
2
4
6
8
10
1964 1974 1984 1994 2004
total entries
entries by reorganization
Entry
0
2
4
6
8
10
1964 1974 1984 1994 2004
total exits
exits by reorganization
Exit
 
Figure 3.8: Entry and exit of companies by mode 
 
Between 1964 and 2004, 61 new companies were founded, ten by opening 
new plants, 29 by acquiring existing ones and 22 by reorganisation of their 
legal or administrative structure. During the same period, 92 companies were 
dissolved, 23 by shutting down plants, 29 by divestiture of existing capacity 
and 40 by reorganisation15  (Table D.9 in Appendix D).  Total and real entry 
coincided 26 times during the period, whereas 19 times for total and real exit. 
The overall correlation coefficient between companies’ gross entry and exit is 
0.71, which reflects virtually zero correlation between greenfield entry and 
exit by plant shutdown, high correlation between entry by acquisition and exit 
by sale (0.782) and between entry and exit by reorganisation (0.803).  
 
The data show that spurious entries and exits contributed some 40 per cent 
to overall turbulence at company level in the period considered. Moreover, 
spurious entries and exits explain the relatively modest correlation of total 
entry and exit flows between companies and enterprises (0.569 and 0.518, 
                                            
15
 During the same period, 26 new enterprises entered the industry, of which 7 by plant 
construction and 19 by acquisition. Meanwhile, 52 firms exited, of which 20 by plant 
shutdown and 32 by plant sale. 
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respectively)16. While companies’ real entry and exit flows have mostly 
mirrored that of enterprises17, entry and exit by reorganization followed their 
own patterns, altering the correspondence between companies’ and 
enterprises’ time series.  
 
3.3.3 Should Spurious Entry and Exit Be Dismissed? 
 
Which modes to include or exclude from measurement of entry and exit is 
arbitrary, since it depends on the objectives of the specific research. As 
noted in Chapter 2, Bain (1956) limits his analysis to greenfield entry and exit 
by plant shutdown, since these two events affect both the industry’s 
population as well as its size. Other scholars include entry by plant 
acquisition and exit by plant sale, which has an impact on the industry’s 
population. By contrast, there is substantial agreement among scholars that 
entry and exit by reorganisation should be disregarded, as they are 
considered no more than administrative contrivances. They affect neither the 
industry’s population nor its size. In this respect, the Eurostat-OECD Manual 
on Business Demography Statistics states that re-structure within the firm, 
―does not involve a significant change in the total production factors within 
the economy, and does not, therefore, result in any births or deaths. It may 
[however] involve the creation and/or deletion of one or more [company] 
references on the (life) business register‖ (2007, p.29).  
 
In the literature, the answer to the question whether entry and exit by 
reorganisation should be excluded is positive. Nevertheless, the question that 
remains is how data on companies’ demographics can be adjusted to omit 
spurious entries and exits. A suggestion could be to exclude entry and exit by 
reorganisation from the total18. Unfortunately, this practice is problematic 
                                            
16
 In principle, correlations coefficients are not calculated for time series because of 
observations are potentially time dependent. However, the tests for stationarity described in 
section 3.2.3 do not reject the null hypothesis of a white nose process.  
17
 The correlation coefficients between companies’ and enterprises’ flows are 0.710 for 
greenfield entry, 0.753 for plant acquisition, 0.935 for plant shutdown and 0.795 for plant 
sale.  
18
 This procedure is comparable to the recommended practice of excluding all entries and 
exits that are recognized as the result of legal and administrative contrivances from the 
original data (Scherer, 2001). 
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because spurious turbulence also affects the number of existing legal entities 
at any point in time, hampering calculation of demographic rates. An example 
clarifies the point.  Suppose that at time t a family group owns three separate 
independent legal units and, subsequently, at time t+1, the same family 
group decides to dissolve them and transfer the physical assets to a new 
company. Under these circumstances, the business register would record 
three exits and one entry by reorganisation. If entries and exits by 
reorganisation were to be omitted, then, the decrease by two units in the total 
number of existing legal entities between times t and t+1 could not be 
accounted for. The problem of measuring firm turbulence by using 
administrative records, which cannot be systematically adjusted to omit 
spurious entries and exits, becomes relevant.  
 
But, should turbulence by reorganisation be dismissed altogether, as 
irrelevant in economic terms? One can object that this empirical evidence 
may be confined to the specific sector under consideration and/or to Italy. 
Even so, this evidence should not be underestimated. Firms often undertake 
corporate reorganisations in order to take advantage of administrative, 
financial or tax incentives. Therefore, high levels of spurious entries and exits 
may indicate that institutional factors or firm-specific strategies are at work.  
Government policies, legislation and fiscal regulations affect the convenience 
of firms to opt for one or another corporate structure. Similarly, the 
entrepreneurial culture of a country or a firm determines whether it operates 
as a consolidated entity or a myriad of purportedly separate companies. 
Although corporate engineering does not change the population of firms and 
the industry’s capacity, it should not be neglected because it reflects a firm’s 
strategy for survival. This reflection is further developed in the analysis of 
plant closure (Chapter 5).  
                                                                                                                            
Scholars generally exclude from the original data all exits that are recognized as the result of 
legal and administrative contrivances. 
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3.4 Implications  
 
There seems little doubt that the use of companies as the basic observation 
unit in administrative sources is inappropriate. In this chapter, I have 
demonstrated that the choice of the observation unit for measuring 
demographic turnover at firm level is not neutral. It has significant impact on 
several key statistics. In the context of the graphic paper industry between 
1964 and 2004, use of company as a statistical unit leads to substantial 
overestimation of demographic turnover. The amount of entry, exit and 
turbulence is doubled, if not greater. Rates of market penetration are also 
higher, overestimating the contribution of entry and exit in churning the 
population. Spurious turbulence accounts for some 40 per cent of total 
turbulence among companies and contributes considerably to maintaining a 
high correlation between entry and exit rates. Yet, the stochastic processes 
underlining demographic turnover are similar for companies and firms.   
 
For future research, these findings imply that special care needs to be used 
for treatment of administrative data and more detailed explanations on 
methodology used to correct such data needs to be included in exposition of 
research findings. Moreover, they suggest that administrative databases 
should be organized in such a way to provide data at enterprise and 
enterprise group level. Eurostat and OECD are moving in this direction, but 
compilation of such databases increases data requirements and calls for 
substantial changes in national systems of data collection. Although these 
methodological improvements are likely to be achieved in the future, 
statistical data for past decades are likely to remain affected by these 
weaknesses.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
PLANT EXIT 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
 
The previous chapter described how the market structure of the Italian graphic 
paper industry rationalised by steadily closing plants, with few new ones 
constructed. This scenario begs the question of what determines plant exit.  
 
In capital-intensive industries—where additions to capacity occur primarily in 
large lumps, are costly and require time to be installed—productivity and, in 
turn, profitability of a plant is determined by efficiency and suitability of its 
equipment. Although plant technological characteristics are crucial in affecting 
exit, they may be other factors. Inter-firm rivalry, differences in efficiency of 
closing and relocating assets from one industry into another may accelerate or 
retard exit. These considerations have induced scholars to include plants’ and 
firms’ characteristics in regressions of plant exit.  
 
But, another aspect which might be relevant is proprietary changes. This has 
attracted less attention, though it is a widespread phenomenon. Before being 
shutdown, plants often have a considerable history of being acquired and sold 
to new or incumbent firms. Lichtenberg and Siegel (1987) mentioned that, of 
some 18,000 plants throughout the United States manufacturing sector, some 
21 per cent underwent changes of ownership at least once between 1972 and 
1981. In the case of the Italian graphic papermaking, plant acquisition became 
the most preferred growth strategy for papermaking firms from the mid-1980s. 
Nearly 31 per cent of the plants changed ownership at least once during their 
last ten years of operations, and more than 42 per cent in the last 25 years.  
 
Most scholars are of the opinion that organisational changes are irrelevant for 
the study of turbulence because they do not change industry’s total capacity 
or the competitive scene. But, an opposing view is slowly emerging (Caves, 
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1998). It is based on empirical evidence1 about the positive impact of 
ownership changes on plants’ productivity. This evidence suggests that, if an 
acquisition proves to be a mutually beneficial match between an acquired 
plant and the acquiring firm, a plant’s chances of survival increase. If 
acquisition is intended to reduce overall capacity in the industry, then, 
chances worsen.  
 
This chapter estimates the probability of plant exit as a function of three sets 
of factors: plant characteristics, firm attributes and plant organisational history. 
The next section reviews theoretical foundations and empirical evidence. 
Section 3 details data and variables and Section 4 presents descriptive 
statistics. Section 5 describes the results of multivariate logistical regressions. 
Implications and concluding remarks constitute Section 6.  
 
5.2 Modelling Exit 
 
In the existing economic literature of entry and exit, there are no models of 
plant survival as such. Instead, there are models of firm exit from which 
theoretical predictions of plant exit are derived. It is the firm that decides 
whether to maintain and, possibly, upgrade a plant or shut it down. Hence, 
empirical work on turnover of plants and firms inevitably shares similar 
theoretical foundations.  
 
The decision to exit is essentially a choice between the profitability of exiting 
now and exiting at some future date. At any point in time, an incumbent firm 
compares the expected present discounted value from operations to the 
opportunity cost of remaining in the industry. If the latter is larger, the firm 
exits, foregoing current net profits and potential future earnings in the industry. 
If not, it continues, collects current net profits and retains the option of further 
activity in the industry. Within this conceptual frame, several models have 
                                            
1
 Noteworthy studies on productivity and change in ownership include Lichtenberg and Siegel 
(1987), Jensen et al. (2001), McGuckin and Nguyen (1995a) and Ravenscraft and Scherer 
(1987). 
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been developed, depending on assumptions about costs, information 
available to firms, industry structure and demand.  
 
 
5.2.1 Competitive Models of Industry Selection 
 
In a perfectly competitive industry with complete information, traditional theory 
on investment decisions predicts that the least efficient plants will close first. 
With efficiency commonly approximated by size, this prediction implies that 
larger plants are more likely to survive.  
 
This Darwinian selection of the fittest can also be expected to prevail in less 
restrictive settings. By assuming that firms discover their true efficiency after 
entry (models of Bayesian passive learning) or improve their performance 
while producing (models of active exploration or active learning)2, these 
models predict that efficient firms grow and survive, while inefficient ones 
decline and, eventually, leave. Regardless of the learning process, these 
competitive models of industry selection with incomplete information provide 
theoretical support to entry, growth and exit behaviours that are broadly 
consistent with the empirical evidence that the probability of survival increase 
with size and age.  However, the nature of these assumptions about the 
process by which firms learn about their true costs is not neutral. It has 
important implications for the set of state variables used in regressions of 
probability of exit. Pakes and Ericson demonstrated that ―the active learning 
model implie[s] that the stochastic process generating the sales of surviving 
firms [is] ergodic3…, while [the] passive learning model implie[s] that the 
conditional distribution of future sales would be positively related to initial 
sales, no matter the time that elapsed in the interim‖ (1998, p.37).  That is, 
current size would depend only on current attributes in the active learning 
                                            
2
 The models of passive learning include Jovanovic (1982), Lippman and Rumelt (1982) and 
Hopenhayn (1992), whereas those of active exploration Ericson and Pakes (1995) and Pakes 
and Ericson (1998). The latter study provides a comparison between the two classes of 
models.   
3
 As explained by Ericson and Pakes (1995) and Pakes and Ericson (1998), exhibiting ergodic 
characteristics mean that the effect of being in a given state in a particular period erodes away 
as time lapses from that period.    
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models and on current and initial characteristics in the passive learning 
models.  
 
To provide some empirical evidence, Pakes and Ericson (1998) tested these 
predictions on a panel of Wisconsin firms for the period 1978-1986. The 
authors found that the expected current size of manufacturing firms was 
weakly increasing in initial size, but strictly increasing only in retail trade. 
These results suggest a selection process of active exploration for the former 
sector and of passive learning for the latter. In addition, Baldwin and 
Rafiquzzaman (1995) found that both processes were at work in the Canadian 
manufacturing sector during the period 1971-1989. However, passive learning 
appeared a more important contributor to the overall growth of a cohort. 
Audretsch (1995), Dunne et al. (2005), Klepper (2002), Mata et al. (1995) and 
Thompson (2005) provide further empirical evidence of the effects of firm’s 
initial size or founder’s experience prior to entry on the current size and 
survival. As these two learning processes are not mutually exclusive (Caves, 
1998), they may occur contemporaneously or one may be more prominent 
than the other in certain industries or stage of the industry life cycle.  
 
 
5.2.2 Oligopolistic Models of Industry Selection   
 
The prediction of a positive relationship between size and survival could be 
reversed under specific oligopolistic conditions. The argument is that strategic 
interaction among competitors may affect the profitability of waiting for rivals to 
exit, leading, therefore, to situations where higher-cost plants survive lower-
cost ones. Assuming size heterogeneity among producers, identical unit costs, 
inflexible scale of operations and monotonically declining demand, Ghemawat 
and Nalebuff (1985) proved the existence of a unique perfect equilibrium in 
which the largest firm is the first to leave as soon as its profits turn negative 
due to shrinking demand. The intuition behind this is that, because of the 
impossibility to reduce capacity incrementally, a larger firm can operate as a 
profitable monopolist for shorter periods than a small firm can do. Recognising 
this advantage, a larger firm exits first. Extended to allow incremental 
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divestment, the model predicts that large firms are the first to reduce capacity 
and would do so until their size becomes comparable to that of smaller rivals4.  
 
However, it seems that there is no natural generalisation of these basic 
predictions. By using an extension of Ghemawat and Nalebuff’s model, 
Whinston (1988) analysed the equilibrium in a declining industry where firms 
have multi-plant operations. In this setting, the author demonstrates that there 
is no simple prediction based on plant size. Patterns of divestment and exit 
depend upon a multitude of aspects of industry structure and market decline. 
For example, Whinston’s model reveals that, under some circumstances, 
―making one of its plants larger than that of its single-plant rival may improve 
the multi-plant firm’s strategic position compared with having two plants that 
are each smaller than its rival’s plant‖ (p. 570).   
 
Moreover, the simple rule of the largest exiting first is also not confirmed by 
models of war of attrition. An example of this strand of the literature is the 
duopoly model by Fudenberg and Tirole (1986), in which neither firm knows 
the fixed cost of its rival but has prior beliefs regarding it. Under the 
assumption of an arbitrarily small probability that both firms may be profitable 
as duopolists, the authors demonstrate that high-cost firms leave earlier than 
low-cost ones. As suggested by the authors, fixed costs should be interpreted 
as the operating cost that a firm must incur to be in the industry plus the 
opportunity cost of profits forgone in alternative ventures.  
 
It is sufficient to assume differences in the way firms evaluate their opportunity 
costs (Baden-Fuller, 1989) for contemplating the eventuality that a firm with 
better access to financial resources or more opportunities for diversification 
may leave first. Empirical work on declining industries5, as well as recent 
                                            
4
 The basic conclusion that larger firms exit first holds true also in situations of demand 
expansion and possible re-entry. For some parameter configurations, Londregan (1990) 
proves that, in the presence of substantial start-up costs, a higher-cost firm can exploit its 
commitment and pre-empt its lower-cost rival.   
5
 The literature includes the case studies by Anderson et al. (1998), Baden-Fuller (1989), 
Deily (1991), Gullstrand (2005), Lieberman (1990), Klepper and Simons (2000), and Olley and 
Pakes (1996). Both Caves (1998) and Sutton (1997) provide overviews of empirical findings 
on plant and firm exit in declining industries.  
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longitudinal studies for the manufacturing sector6, generally confirms a mild 
influence of firms’ attributes. Being owned by a large, multi-unit, multinational 
or diversified firm seems to increase the chances of exit, though these effects 
are weaker and less systematic than plant characteristics such as size, age, 
product specialisation and labour productivity.  
 
Turning to the papermaking industry, it is expected that technological factors 
will play a crucial role in determining plant closure. Maintaining inefficient 
plants in operation is costly. It is more convenient to shut them down. But, the 
possibility that parent firms’ structural features alter the timing of closure of 
their plant(s) cannot be ruled out.    
 
 
5.2.3 Organisational Changes 
 
By and large, models of industry selection assume that a firm’s decision to 
close a plant is between two alternatives: either to continue operations and, 
possibly, upgrade equipment or to exit by shutting down. Selling off assets 
during firm’s lifetime or at exit is not considered. But, these sell-offs are 
responsible for much of firm turbulence and, as it appears, productivity 
improvements. The recent literature on ownership changes and productivity7 
has highlighted a positive relationship between the two. In particular, 
McGuckin and Nguyen (1995) found that ownership changes could improve 
the performance of large, but less productive, plants or boost smaller 
operations with above-average levels of productivity. Using an unbalanced 
panel of more than 28,000 American manufacturing plants from 1977 to 1987, 
the authors found that, ―First,… plants with high productivity were the most 
likely to experience ownership change. Second, plants that experienced 
ownership change improved their productivity 5-9 years after being acquired. 
Finally, for large plants, those having 250 workers or more, firms tend to 
                                            
6
 Examples of studies of plant exit from the manufacturing sector as a whole or subsets are in 
Bernard and Jensen (2007), Colombo and Delmastro (2000), Disney et al. (2003), Dunne et 
al. (2005), Harris and Hassaszadeh (2002), Persson (2004) and Tveterås and Eide (2000). 
7
 Caves (1998) provides an overview of the literature on entry and exit through control 
changes, which includes the studies by Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987), Lichtenberg and 
Siegel (1987), Baldwin (1995) and McGuckin and Nguyen (1995).    
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acquire plants with low productivity rather than those with high productivity‖ (p. 
272-73).  The second finding is consistent with the results of Lichtenberg and 
Siegel (1987) and Baldwin (1991), who found  that, generally, transferred 
plants experienced significant increases in productivity.  
 
This empirical evidence suggests that ownership changes may alter the 
chances of survival of a plant in ways different from those expected, had the 
plant not been transferred. The explanation lies in the logic of match-making 
where the overall performance of the match is conditional on the quality of 
integration among its once separate assets. To clarify the point, assume that a 
plant has not changed hands for some time. This could be either because 
profitability of the plant is so low and beyond rescue that no other firm is 
interested in buying it, or the parent firm is managing the plant effectively. In 
either case, the plant’s survival prospects remain the same because no 
change has occurred in the parent firm’s asset configuration. Therefore, the 
probability of exit continues to depend on the plant’s characteristics and 
parent firm’s attributes.  
 
However, if a plant was transferred to another firm, this implies that the 
acquiring firm had placed a higher value on the acquired plant than the selling 
firm, presumably because the acquiring firm is in a better position to exploit 
opportunities of economies of scale or scope8. If the match proves to be 
mutually beneficial9, the acquired plant is likely to improve its productivity 
because managed by a more able owner and/or integrated into a different 
asset configuration that offers greater synergies. Consequently, the plant’s 
chances of survival are now better than they would have been, had it 
remained within the selling firm. If the match proves to be unsatisfactory at a 
point in the future, the acquiring firm will soon try to relinquish control. As long 
                                            
8
 McGuckin and Nguyen (1995) pointed out that the reason for divergence in values is not 
necessarily due to poorly performing sellers. The authors noted, ―there are many motives for 
acquisition that are compatible with obtaining good performing plants: monopoly power, 
synergies, and tax incentives are all reasons that do not require purchase of low productivity 
plants‖. (p. 260) 
9
 The fact that matches might undergo further ownership changes does not affect the 
conclusions. As long as a plant maintains a certain strategic value for at least some 
competitors, it will continue to be transferred until a suitable match is found.  
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as the transferred plant continues to be regarded by competitors as a 
desirable asset, it will be reshuffled among competitors postponing closure.  
 
In the case of a particularly worthless acquisition, prospects of survival will be 
likewise altered. Closure may be postponed because some time will elapse 
before the acquiring firm becomes aware of the actual efficiency of the 
acquired plant10. But, an opposite effect could also be possible. To destroy 
capacity, an acquiring firm may wind down the acquired plant’s operations 
faster than the selling firm would have ever done, had it not been able to sell 
the plant. Consequently, the plant’s survival prospects would plummet to 
levels much lower than they would have been, had the plant not changed 
hands.  
 
As Bernard and Jensen (2007) noted, the motivations behind an acquisition 
range from exploitation of synergies to destruction of production capacity. 
Therefore, as long as profitability of a plant is influenced, inter alia, by its 
integration with other assets under the same ownership, a change in control is 
likely to alter the plant’s subsequent prospects of survival, at least in levels, if 
not in dynamics.   
 
A similar line of reasoning could also be applied to a firm’s decision to transfer 
plants from one to another of its registered companies (registration 
changes11). Firms frequently modify their organisational structures by 
dissolving and founding new registered companies as well as reshuffling 
plants among their registered companies. This practice is usually considered 
irrelevant for the study of entry and exit because it does not affect the 
                                            
10
 Unless the result of an evaluation mistake or in the presence of specific government 
subsidies for industrial restructuring or taxation incentives, it is irrational to acquire 
unproductive operations, even if the aim is to destroy capacity. In fact, there is no advantage 
in purchasing an inefficient plant in order to shut it down soon after. In addition, evaluation 
mistakes are very unlikely in papermaking since the efficiency of plants, especially paper 
machines, are, to a large extent, common knowledge.       
11
 Ownership change occurs when a plant has changed parent firm, regardless of whether its 
parent registered company has changed or not. By contrast, a registration change means that 
a plant has been transferred to a different parent registered company. This event may or may 
not be concomitant with an ownership change. Throughout the chapter, ownership and 
registration changes are broadly referred to as organisational changes.    
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configuration of the industrial population. However, firms decide to modify their 
organisational structure in order to take advantage of administrative, financial 
or tax incentives. If successful, such restructuring enables firms to grow, 
improving the survival prospects of their plants.  Like in the case of ownership 
changes, inclusion of registration histories may contribute to explain plant exit.         
 
Empirically, little is known. The scarce empirical findings seem to indicate a 
negative relationship between ownership change and survival. Bernard and 
Jensen (2007) included an indicator variable recording the occurrence of 
ownership changes in their estimation of determinants of plant deaths. The 
authors found evidence that, unconditionally, plants that had experienced 
changes in ownership in the previous five-year census period were more likely 
to have survived to the next one. When controlling for plant attributes, 
however, they found the reverse, with takeover targets more likely to fail than 
plants with unchanged ownership. Gullstrand (2005) obtained similar results, 
finding that changes in ownership increased probability of exit of plants in the 
Swedish textile and wearing apparel sector. However, since ownership 
changes are identified through changes in administrative file numbers of the 
owner, the results might be biased because of data inaccuracy.   
 
5.3 Econometric Specification, Data and Variables 
 
5.3.1 Econometric Specification and Data 
 
Generally, theoretical models of entry and exit do not have a tractable 
structure for empirical analysis. Thus, scholars use a simpler framework, in 
which the dependent binary variable—entry or exit—is regressed on a set of 
explanatory variables chosen on the basis of the theoretical model of 
reference and data availability. Most studies include size, age and some sort 
of productivity measures. More recently, founder’s experience (Dunne et al. 
2005; Thompson, 2005) and ownership changes (Bernard and Jensen, 2007, 
Girma et al., 2007) have been added.  
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To study the determinants of plant closure, the probability of observing plant 
i’s exit is modelled as: 
 
prob(EXITi=1|Xi) = Λ ( Xi) 
 
where Λ(*) is the cumulative distribution function for the error term (cdf) 
evaluated at given values of the covariates and Xi a set of covariates.  For 
estimation purposes, I use the logistic function to represent CDF.  
 
Although the thesis’ master database is a longitudinal set, the econometric 
analysis is performed using a cross-section structure. The information loss is 
deemed to be minimal since plants’ and firms’ characteristics refer to structural 
features, which are fairly stable over time. Like in the active learning models, 
time-dependent variables are measured at the time of exit, if the plant was 
closed before 31 December 2004, or in 2004, if the plant was still in operation 
as of 31 December 200412.  
 
 
5.3.2  Data  
 
The sample consists of 78 plants, of which 67 had been established before 
1964, two in 1964 and nine between 1965 and 1994.  Although limited in size, 
the cross-section data do not present particular statistical problems for the 
logistical regression.  
 
In regression models of categorical and limited depended variables, a rule of a 
minimum of ten observations per variable is generally recommended. 
However, Long (1997) cautions that the minimum requirements for the sample 
size depend on the characteristics of the model and the data. If the number of 
parameters to be estimated is considerable, covariates present a high degree 
of collinearity or the distribution of the dependent variable is skewed (e.g., 
nearly all of the outcomes are either 1 or 0), then, larger samples than the rule 
prescribes should be used.  
 
                                            
12
 As most plants were built long before 1964 and their paper machines have been altered by 
significant investments since their construction, initial conditions were deemed unimportant.  
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Fortunately, the thesis’ cross-section database is not problematic. The 
dependent variable exhibits significant variation, with 38 of the 78 outcomes 
having a value 1. Thus, the aggregate proportion of exits is 0.487. The 
independent variables present, at times, some modest degree of association 
(Section 5.4 in this Chapter). Consequently, the number of covariates that can 
be simultaneously included in the regressions of plant’s exit should not exceed 
eight.  
 
 
5.3.3 Variables  
 
The dependent variable, EXIT, takes the value 1 if the plant exited at any time 
during 1964-2004 and 0 if it was still operating at the end of 2004. The sample 
includes plants that were already in operations in 1964 as well as the eleven 
ones that entered from 1964 onwards13.  
 
The probability of plant exit is estimated as a function of four broad classes of 
variables: plant characteristics, plant location, firm characteristics and plant 
history. The list of variables with their definitions is provided in Section C.3 of 
Appendix C.  
 
Plant-level variables 
 
Besides size and age, plant-level variables that control for profit heterogeneity 
are equipment specifications, product line diversification14 and grade 
specialisation15. With capacity highly constrained by technical specifications of 
paper machines in use (Appendix A), the state and characteristics of a plant’s 
equipment are likely to be key variables.  
 
Plant size (PSIZEMRK) is measured as percentage in industry’s total 
                                            
13
 Estimation of the logistical regression (herein not reported) with a reduced sample omitting 
the plants that entered after 1964 yielded no substantial differences.   
14
 Product-line diversification refers to the range of product lines operating at a single plant.  
15
 Grade specialisation refers to the degree of expertise required to produce value-added 
grades within a specific class of paper.  
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capacity16 at the time of exit, if the plant was closed before 31 December 
2004, or in 2004, if the plant was still operating at the end of the year. The 
reason for use of percentages, rather than absolute numbers, is to control for 
distortions that would have arisen due to the relatively long period under 
consideration. During the 40-year coverage of the thesis’ database, the 
minimum efficient scale (MES) has risen considerably, especially for 
commodity grades. Therefore, a plant that was above MES in the 1960s was 
likely to be below average in 2004.  It is expected that plant size exerts 
positive effects on plant survival.  
 
Plants’ relative importance within parent firms is captured by PSIZEG. It is 
plant’s share in parent firm’s total annual capacity at the time of exit, if the 
plant was closed before 31 December 2004, or in 2004, if the plant was still 
operating at the end of the year. The effect on the probability of exit is deemed 
to be positive. A multi-plant firm is more likely to close its smaller operations, 
rather than the larger ones, because they are comparatively less efficient.   
 
The essence of technological efficiency is captured by vintage and width of 
plant’s paper machines. As explained in Appendix A, technological innovation 
in papermaking has progressed towards larger and faster paper machines, 
which last, on average, 40 years, during which their width remains fixed. 
Therefore, age and width of its equipment reflect the technological limits of a 
plant, which overhauls cannot change. Specifically, VINTAGE45, VINTAGE64 
and VINTAGE04 are dummy variables indicating whether the newest paper 
machine in operation at exit or in 2004 was installed before 1945, between 
1945 and 1963 or between 1964 and 2004, respectively. It is expected that 
VINTAGE45 increases the probability of plant exit. Given the length of the 
period considered, paper machines installed before 1945 (i.e., before the 
                                            
16
 Plant–level data on values do not exist. The use of quantities, rather than values, might 
have serious implications for the regression because it may disguise the statistical 
significance of demand conditions as a key factor affecting the probability of plant exit. Since 
the 1980s, the paper industry worldwide has been characterised by larger price fluctuations 
while volume demand has continued to grow. As a result, demand expressed in values has 
exhibited larger fluctuations than volume demand. Because of its greater variability, sales are 
a more accurate proxy for size.      
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Second World War) are considered obsolete, regardless of the year of exit of 
the plant. The impact of VINTAGE64 is less clear because the degree of 
obsolescence of machines installed between 1945 and 1963 depends on the 
year of the closure of the plant. By contrast, VINTAGE04 is expected to 
reduce the probability of exit, as paper machines installed from 1964 to 2004 
are generally efficient.  
 
The indicator variable PMMAX indicates whether the largest paper machine at 
exit or in 2004 less than 3 meter wide17. After controlling for paper grades, it is 
expected that the impact of PMMAX on the probability of exit is negative. Two 
additional variables have been included to control for equipment efficiency. 
VINTAGE measures the percentage of paper machines installed after 1945 in 
total number. EFFICIENT indicates the percentage of paper machines wider 
than 3 meters in total number. Both variables can be expected to reduce the 
probability of plant exit.  
 
Following Jensen et al. (2001), plant age is included to control for managerial 
competency, which is commonly believed to drive productivity growth. LPAGE 
is measured as the logarithm18 of the number of years of being in operation. 
Technological vintage and managerial competency are differently related to   
age. If best-practice technology is embodied in new capital, then the most 
productive plants should be the younger ones. However, as plants age, 
managers accumulate experience and undertake investments to achieve 
economies of scale, which, in turn, improve plant-level productivity. Therefore, 
the net effect on the probability of exit is, a priori, uncertain.    
 
Finally, two additional variables have been introduced to control for product 
diversity. PSPEC is an indicator variable that distinguishes plants by grade19 
                                            
17
 The efficient width of paper machines producing printing and writing paper in the later 
1970s was 2.5 to 3 meters. Currently, most fine paper is produced on paper machines 3 to 3.5 
meters. The mid-value (3 meters) has been chosen as cut-off width.    
18
 The logarithmic transformation was introduced because the existence of some plants spans 
several centuries.  
19
 A paper grade is a type or class of paper identified as having the same physical and 
mechanical characteristics. Each class of graphic papers encompasses several different 
grades. For more details, see Appendix A.   
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specialisation: commodity paper (sold in large volumes) and specialty paper 
(customer-tailored and produced in small quantities). PSPEC takes the value 
1 if the plant was always manufacturing specialty grades in the reference 
period and 0 otherwise. In principle, small-scale plants of this kind do not 
imply a sub-optimal operation. Thus, PSPEC can be regarded as a cofounder 
for size. Moreover, with the liberalization of the industry in the mid-1980s, 
specialization in the production of specialty papers has been a successful 
strategy. Therefore, its impact is expected to be positive.  
 
PDIVER distinguishes plants by product lines. It equals to 1 if the plant was 
manufacturing only graphic papers during the period under consideration and 
0 if it produced a mixture of papers. Given that technological advances have 
moved towards increasingly specialised paper machines20, efficient plants 
have tended to specialise in one product-line. Thus, the coefficient of PDIVER 
is expected to be negative.     
 
 
Firm-level Variables 
 
Having controlled for divestment incentives related to plant scale and 
technological efficiency, I allow for the possibility that parent firms’ 
characteristics affect the decision of plant exit. As stressed in many studies, 
the larger and the older firms are, the greater the chances of survival. But, 
inter-firm rivalry as well as differences in efficiency of closing and relocating 
assets from one industry to another may alter the order of exit to the extent 
that larger plants would be the first ones to exit.  
 
To test for firm efficiency, two variables have been considered: size and age. 
GSIZEMRK is calculated as the share of a firm’s capacity in industry’s total. 
LGAGE21 is the logarithm of parent firms’ age. It is expected that firm size and 
age positively affect plant survival.  
                                            
20
 Unlike in the past, today’s paper machines are tailored to manufacture a limited number of 
grades. 
21
 As in the case of plants, the logarithmic transformation has been used to adjust for the long 
life span of several firms.  
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Differences in the opportunity costs of closing are captured by three variables. 
GTYPE is an indicator variable that equals to 1 if the firm was a multi-plant 
enterprise at the time of plant exit or in 2004 and 0 otherwise (single-plant 
firm). It is deemed that single-plant firms are more likely to be reluctant to 
close plants, when this would lead to their dissolution.  
 
GDIVER takes the value 1 if parent firm produced different kinds of papers at 
the time of plant closure or in 2004 and 0 if the firm limited its production to 
graphic paper only. Like in the case of GTYPE, parent firms producing only 
graphic paper are more likely to defer closure of their plant(s) as it would imply 
their dissolution or lead to substantial reduction of their market presence.  
 
The effect of product-line diversification might be mitigated by firms’ own 
origins. Even when enterprises venture into industries far from their original 
segment of the market, they often maintain a token interest in their original 
sector. Therefore, firms may be more reluctant to exit from their original 
industry compared to exit from recently entered markets. To account for this 
potential influence, an indicator variable GCORE has been included. It takes 
the value 1 if the original sector of the founder of the firm was different from 
graphic papermaking and 0 otherwise.  
 
 
History-level Variables 
 
Dunne et al. (2005) have found empirical evidence that a founder’s experience 
enhances prospects of plants’ survival. The more experienced founders are, 
the greater the changes are that their ventures will survive the first years of 
existence due to their greater managerial acumen and/or technical skills 
compared to new comers. GPAST1 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
founder has no prior experience in manufacturing; GPAST2 if the founder has 
been previously involved in manufacturing and GPAST3 if the founder has 
been involved in any segment(s) of the paper-value chain (pulping, 
papermaking, converting or distribution). It is expected that GAPST1 
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increases probability of plant exit due to the relative inexperience of the 
founder, whereas GPAST2 and GPAST3 decrease it.  
 
To test the impact of ownership changes on plant survival, a set of variables 
were constructed. OWN25 is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the 
plant underwent an ownership change—with or without a registration 
change—at least once in the previous 2522 years of the plant’s existence and 
COM25 if the plant underwent a registration change—with or without an 
ownership change. To test for intensity effects on the probability of exit, 
variables measuring the number of administrative changes were also 
introduced. OWN25TOT and COM25TOT record, respectively, the total 
number of ownership and registration changes that a plant underwent during 
its last 25 years. Because ownership and registration changes do not 
necessarily occur simultaneously, they were disaggregated into their 
constituent parts. OWNCOM25TOT records the total number of simultaneous 
ownership and registration changes that a plant underwent in its last 25 years, 
OWNONLY25TOT the total number of mere ownership transfers (i.e., without 
transfer to a different company) and COMONLY25TOT the total number of 
mere registration changes (i.e., without change in ownership change). It is 
expected that coefficients are significantly different from zero. No a priori 
assumption is made on the sign of the coefficients. 
 
 
Region- and Market-level Variables 
 
In papermaking, external economies have always played an important role. 
Access to water, for power and as a raw material in manufacture, pulp and 
skilled labour has influenced location of paper mills for centuries. From the 
twentieth century, these factors have become less relevant, but proximity to 
main arteries of communication, larger markets and economically growing 
areas have continued to exert a certain influence. To control for regional 
                                            
22
  Several time lags (5, 10, 25 and 40) have been considered. With the amount of investment 
necessary to acquire a papermaking facility, plants tend to remain under the same ownership 
for a number of years. 25 years was a reasonable period during which a plant could have, in 
principle, experienced one or more organisational changes. 
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agglomeration, three dummy variables were used: AREAREST, which takes 
the value 1 if a plant is located in central and southern Italy, AREANW if in 
north-western Italy, and AREANE if in north-eastern Italy. With the industrial 
expansion of the North, it is expected that location in these two areas would 
be associated with lower probabilities of plant exit.      
 
Because this research focuses on the graphic papermaking industry in Italy, 
most market factors are essentially given. The stage of development of the 
papermaking industry can be regarded as mature throughout the reference 
period and technological advances towards wider and faster machines have 
equally affected all competitors and every product segment. Yet, there would 
be sound justifications for inclusion of market conditions in an analysis of plant 
exit. Being a basic materials industry, the pulp and paper industry constantly 
alternates periods of high profits, in which equipment is utilised above optimal 
operating rates, with those of marked losses, in which equipment is operating 
at below full capacity, if not temporarily stopped. Therefore, it would have 
been reasonable to assume that adverse market conditions could have 
accelerated closure of inefficient plants while buoyant demand postponed it. 
Owing to its cross-section structure, this hypothesis could not be tested in the 
present logistical analysis. But, the loss is deemed to be minimal23.  Previous 
comparison between de-trended production time series and plant exit (Figure 
4.3, Chapter 4) did not reveal any specific association. 
 
5.4 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table D.10 in Appendix D reports pair-wise correlation coefficients among 
quantitative variables, whereas Tables D.11-14 reproduce cross-tabulations 
between categorical variables of plants’ and firm’s characteristics, regional 
agglomeration and organisational histories. Table D.15 reports the means of 
plant size, grouped by categorical plant and firm characteristics and Table 
                                            
23
 Comparison between de-trended production time series and plant exit reveals that market 
conditions do not appear to influence plant survival (figure 4.3, Chapter 4). 
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D.16 reports the means of each variable, grouped into survivors and exitors. 
These statistics reveal a number of significant associations of economic 
interest.  
 
 Surviving plants are nearly four times larger than exiting ones (Table D.16) 
confirming that size is a reasonable predictor of survival. As expected on 
the basis of technological advancements in papermaking, plant size is 
positively associated with the width of paper machines (PMMAX) as well as 
grade specialisation (PSPEC) and negatively with product-line 
diversification (PDIVER) (Table D.15). Larger plants are, on average, three 
times more likely to be owned by graphic papermaking firms (GDIVER) and 
four times by multi-plant firms (GTYPE) (Table D.16). These statistically 
significant associations with plant characteristics and firm attributes 
indicate that plant size—as a predictor of survival—captures both 
technological and managerial factors. 
 
 As expected, plants with more modern machines are nearly three times 
more likely to survive than those with older equipment (Table D.16). The 
association of vintage and width of paper machines is significant24. Of 50 
plants with paper machines narrower than 3 meters, 17 had them installed 
before 1945, 23 between 1945 and 1963 and 10 from 1964 onwards. By 
contrast, of 28 plants with paper machines wider than 3 meters, none had 
machines installed before 1945. However, VINTAGE does not reveal any 
significant association with firm attributes (not shown). This suggests that 
as a measure for plant efficiency, VINTAGE may be an alternative to size 
as predictor of plant survival. 
 
 With more than a third of firms being single-plant, firm size is strongly 
correlated with plant size (Table D.10). More interestingly, surviving plants 
owned by firms specialized in the manufacture of graphic paper (GDIVER) 
and/or with a tradition in graphic papermaking (GCORE) are nearly twice 
as many as those that produce a mixture of grades (Table D.16).  
                                            
24
 Statistics are available with the author. 
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 Firms of surviving plants were, on average, younger than firms of closing 
operations. The mean age difference is significant at 5 per cent level of 
confidence (Table D.16). The opposite applies to plants. Exiting plants 
were, on average, older than surviving ones, though the mean age 
difference is not statistically significant. This suggests that younger firms 
were more likely to own younger plants, which had better survival 
prospects.   
 
 Plants located in North-East Italy appear to have a higher probability of 
survival than those in other parts of the country. About 42 per cent of 
surviving plants are sited in this area, against only 10 per cent of exiting 
ones (Table D.16). Since localisation in this area is associated with 
comparatively newer equipment, multi-plant firms (Table D.12) and higher 
propensity to administrative reorganisation (Table D.13), this feature may 
reflect the more extensive degree of modernisation of plants in the North-
East. 
 
 The richer the administrative history of plants (COM25, COM25TOT and 
COMONLY25TOT), the more likely it is to survive (Table D.16). This may 
reflect the fact that such plants were also weakly associated with more 
modern equipment (PMMAX and PMVINTAGE) (Tables D.14 and D.16). 
Ownership changes appear to be more frequent among survivors than 
exitors, though their impact is not statistically significant (Table D.16). This 
statistical evidence gives an inkling of a world in which organisational 
restructuring within the firm may contribute to maintaining plants at the 
cutting edge of technology.    
 
5.5 Estimation Results for Multivariate Logits  
 
Estimation25 of multivariate logits is based on the following equation: 
                                            
25
 A methodological remark on the size of the thesis’ dataset is warranted. Scholars caution 
about using ML estimation techniques with samples less than 100 observations because the 
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where X is a set of explanatory variables, α a constant and β a vector of 
coefficients for the covariates. Instead of reporting the logit coefficients, odds 
ratios are reported. They indicate the change in the odds for an infinitesimal 
change in the value of the continuous variable or a unit change in the value of 
a dummy variable. When interpreting the odds ratios, coefficients greater than 
one indicate positive effects whereas coefficients between zero and one 
indicate negative effects.   
 
Table 5.1 presents the results of five logit regressions. To assess how firms’ 
features and plant’s organizational histories affect probability of exit, columns 
1 and 2 report the odds ratios when only regional- and plant-level variables 
are included, whereas Columns 3, 4 and 5 reports the results when various 
firm-level characteristics and history-level variables are added.  
 
 
Technological Efficiency and Location 
 
The econometric results confirm the significance of both location and plant 
characteristics in predicting exit. The signs of the coefficients are as expected.  
As expected in a capital-intensive industry such as papermaking, size or, 
alternatively, technological vintage seem to capture, most of the effects of 
plant characteristics on the probability of exit suggesting that a sort of 
Darwinian selection of the fittest is at work.  For Example, an additional 0.1 
per cent increase in the relative size of a plant (PSIZEMRK) reduces the odds 
of exiting by some 8 per cent26. 
                                                                                                                             
behaviour of ML estimators under those circumstances is largely unknown. However, the 
dataset used for this analysis consists of the entire population. In this particular case, 
McCloskey and Ziliak (1996) argue that significance tests are somewhat irrelevant. In fact, the 
p-value denotes the probability of a non-zero value if the true value of the coefficient were 
zero. But the coefficient is already the true value
25
. In discussing the results, I follow Long’s 
suggestion, ―given that the degree to which ML estimates are normally distributed in small 
samples is unknown, it is more reasonable to require smaller p-values in small samples‖ 
(1997, p. 54).   
26
 For a change of 0.1per cent, the odds ratio is 0.919839, that is, )1.083556.0exp( . 
Therefore, the percentage decrease in the odds of exiting is )100)919839.01( . 
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 (1) (2) (3)   (4)   (5)   
Regional-level variables                     
AREAREST 11.526 ** 5.700 ** 5.528 ** 5.849 ** 5.065  
 [1.62, 81.78]  [1.34, 24.29]  [1.06, 28.78]  [0.84, 40.56]  [0.67, 38.33]  
AREANW 10.451 *** 6.867 *** 5.847 ** 7.475 ** 7.761 ** 
 [1.88, 57.89]  [1.83, 25.76]  [1.20, 28.44]  [1.15, 48.78]  [1.18, 51.27]  
            
Plant-level variables            
PSIZEMRK 0.442 ***         
 [0.28, 0.68]          
PSIZEG 0.243          
 [0.04, 1.56]          
PDIVER 1.093          
 [0.29, 4.12]          
PSPEC 0.508          
 [0.14, 1.87]          
LPAGE 0.772          
 [0.43, 1.37]          
VINTAGE45    11.658 *** 19.088 *** 21.178 *** 23.321 *** 
    [1.94, 70.30]  [3.06, 118.93]  2.69, 166.48]  [2.50, 225.69]  
VINTAGE64    3.812 ** 5.858 ** 7.002 ** 8.124 ** 
    [1.18, 12.30]  [1.45, 23.61]  [1.43, 34.22]  [1.50, 44.09]  
            
Firm-level variables            
GDIVER      4.686 ** 9.852 *** 8.749 *** 
      [1.37, 16.03]  [1.98, 49.05]  [1.95, 39.29  
LGAGE      0.559 * 0.416 ** 0.580  
      [0.30, 1.02]  [0.20, 0.86]  [0.30, 1.13]   
            
History-level variables            
GPAST1        0.311    
        [0.06, 1.57]    
GPAST2        1.018    
        [0.16, 6.56]    
COM25        0.117 ***   
        [0.03, 0.56]    
COM25TOT          0.398 *** 
          [0.21, 0.77]  
OWNONLY25TOT          4.324  
          [0.70, 26.83]  
            
                      
Number of observations 78 78 78 78 78 
Convergence after 5 iterations 4 iterations 4 iterations 6 iterations 5 iterations 
Log likelihood -39.348 -42.743 -36.850 -32.384 -31.816 
Pearson chi2 70.03, p=0.476 6.34, p=0.175 79.25, p=0.058 78.51, p=0.121 90.35, p=0.036 
Hosmer-Lemeshow chi2 0.77, p=0.679 1.03, p=0.598 0.80, p=0.670 1.46, p=0.482 0.65, p=0.724 
Pseudo R2 0.272 0.209 0.318 0.401 0.411 
BIC -226.274 -232.554 -235.626 -231.488 -236.980 
Correctly classified (%) 71.79 74.36 79.49 79.49 84.62 
                      
Note: Confidence intervals in parentheses. (***) indicates 1% level of confidence, (**) 5% and (*) 10%. 
 
Table 5.1: Results of multivariate logits 
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When technological vintage, rather than size, is considered, the effects are 
even stronger. For plants with equipment installed before 1945 (VINTAGE45), 
the odds of exiting are some 11 to 24 times greater than for the plants with 
equipment dating back to the Second World War. Similarly, the odds of exiting 
for plants with paper machines installed during the period 1945-1963 
(VINTAGE64) are three to eight times greater than for the rest.   
 
Other plant-level characteristics such as product line diversification (PDIVER), 
grade specialization (PSPEC) and plant age (LPAGE) do not provide 
additional explanatory support to the model. The signs of their coefficients are 
as predicted but statistically insignificant. This may be due to the considerable 
degree of correlation that exists between them and size or technological 
vintage. Omission of these variables from the regression does not seem to 
bias the results27.  
 
Turning to regional-level variables, being located in North-East Italy decreases 
remarkably the probability of exit. The empirical results show that if a plant is 
located in South and Centre Italy (AREAREST), the odds are at least 5 times 
greater than been located in any other part of the country. Similar effects hold 
for plants located in North-West Italy (AREANW). Since location is associated 
with plant size and technological vintage, the robust significance of its 
coefficients across specifications28 is noteworthy. It suggests that location 
seems to capture some negative externalities of regional agglomeration such 
as competition from other industries, overwrought arteries of communication 
and other infrastructure or, simply, outdated entrepreneurial models.  
 
 
Firms’ Attributes  
 
Unlike for plants, the relative size of the firm owning the plant (GSIZEMARK) 
                                            
27
 The likelihood-ratio (LR) tests (not here reported) indicate that the null hypothesis of 
simultaneous no effects of PSIZEG, PDIVER, PSPEC and LPAGE cannot be rejected. 
28
 The exception is specification (5). The statistically insignificance of the coefficient for 
AREAREST is probably caused by the lower than average proportion of plants in Centre and 
South Italy that have undergone an organisational change in the last decades of their 
existence.  
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appears to exert an inverse effect on probability of exit29, though the effect is 
not statistically significant. Being correlated with plant size, it is plausible that 
its effect is entirely captured by equipment vintage.   
 
By contrast, firm age and product-line diversification have a distinct impact on 
plant survival. The odds of exiting for a plant belonging to a firm that produces 
a wide range of papers (GDIVER) are at least 4.6 times greater than for plants 
belonging to firms specialised only in graphic papermaking30. In addition, 
being owned by a ten years-older firm (LGAGE) also reduces the odds of 
exiting by at least 20 per cent31 (Column 3). 
 
Other firm-level characteristics such as firm’s core specialization (GCORE) or 
typology (GTYPE)32 seem to be insignificant. The likelihood-ratio tests 
confirmed that the null hypothesis of a zero coefficient for GTYPE and 
GCORE are not rejected at 1 per cent level.   
 
 
Ownership vs. Registration Changes  
 
Columns 4 and 5 of Table 5.1 report the estimation results when plants’ 
histories are added. Contrary to previous research, the background of the 
plant’s founder appears to be inconsequential, though having a background 
outside manufacturing (GPAST1) seems to decrease, rather than increase, 
the probability of plant exit.  
 
What matters are organisational changes, especially registration changes. 
Both ownership33 and registration changes decrease the probability of plant 
exit though only the impact of the latter is statistically significant. The odds of 
                                            
29
 Results not here reported.  
30
 Similar results are obtained for plants belonging to firms whose original core of business 
was graphic papers. Because GCORE and GDIVER are highly correlated, only one variable 
has been considered.  
31
 The regression results refer to the logarithm of firm’s age. Thus, an increase of ten years is 
equivalent to an increase of 2.302585 in LGAGE. For example, as per Column 3, the odds 
decreases by a factor of 0.231685 ( exp(-0.635102*2.302582)).  
32
  Results not here reported. 
33
 Not reported in Table 5.1.  
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exiting are about eight times as high as for plants with no registration change 
as for plants that underwent such change, holding all other variables constant 
(Column 4).  
 
The more dominant role played by registration, rather than ownership 
changes, is further confirmed when measures of intensity of registration 
changes are considered.  If organizational changes are disaggregated into 
their constituent parts (Column 5), for each additional registration change 
(COM25TOT), the odds of exiting decrease by a factor of 0.39, holding all 
other variables constant.  By contrast, mere ownership transfers 
(OWNONLY25TOT) appear to increase, rather than decrease, the probability 
of exiting. However, their impact is not statistically significant.  
 
Compared to specifications of the logit model with only regional-, plant- and 
firm-level variables (Columns 1-3), adding plant organisational histories to the 
set of explanatory variables improves the predictive power of the model 
(Columns 4 and 5). The Pseudo R2 are the highest, the percentage of 
correctly classified observations among the greatest and the BIC among the 
least. If the intensity of organisational changes is considered, the percentage 
of correctly classified observations is nearly 85 per cent. 
 
These results seem to be broadly consistent with the theoretical 
considerations explained earlier in this chapter. To reduce the probability of 
exit, ownership changes need to be accompanied by registration changes. 
The reason might lie in the fact that integration of an acquired plant into an 
acquiring firm requires a new administrative setting in order to exploit potential 
synergies. The same argument applies to mere registration changes. To take 
advantage of administrative or financial incentives, which, in turn, are likely to 
expand a firm’s resources, a new organisational structure is needed. By 
contrast, a ownership change that is not accompanied by a registration one—
that is, the acquired plant continues to operate under its pre-acquisition 
registered company—may reflect an intention of the acquiring firm not to 
integrate administratively the new plant into its own assets. In this case, the 
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acquiring firm may be more prone to shut down the acquired operation if it 
proves unprofitable. This would be in line with the empirical findings of 
Bernard and Jensen (2007) and Gullstrand (2005). 
 
5.6 Concluding Remarks 
 
Once again, the study of exit in the Italian papermaking industry confirms that 
survival of plants depends critically on their size. Although capacity is a good 
proxy for productivity and, in turn, profitability of a plant, technological vintage 
appears to be even more influential.   
 
Moreover, the study confirms that firm attributes and regional agglomeration 
add to the predictive power of the model. Firm attributes do not necessarily 
coincide with those found in other case studies. This is understandable 
because a successful attribute in a sector may be irrelevant, if not 
counterproductive, in another. In the case of papermaking, the successful 
strategy has been product line specialization, rather than diversification. It is to 
be noted that this business strategy has, however, a technological 
connotation, since innovation has progressed towards customised paper 
machines manufacturing a limited range of paper grades. Whether it is firms’ 
business strategies that have pushed technological advances in this direction, 
or vice versa, is not clear.     
 
The unexpected finding concerns the role of organisational changes. Whether 
or not linked to ownership changes, they appear to enhance the probability of 
survival of plants. These results suggest a relationship between the fate of a 
plant and the way the parent firm integrates, administratively, such plant in its 
physical assets. These results suggest that successful integrations are likely 
to require administrative restructuring.  
 
Despite the relatively long period considered for this study of plant exit, these 
findings appear to hold even for shorter intervals. As shown in Chapter 4, the 
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mid-1980s represented a turning point in the evolution of the Italian graphic 
paper industry, which was brought about by changes in the economic and 
regulatory climate. However, estimation of the logit models34 by introducing a 
dummy variable for the sub-periods (1964 to mid-1980s, and mid-1980s to 
2004) did not underline any substantial divergence in the role that the plant-, 
firm-, regional- and historical-level variables played in the probability of plant 
exit over the entire period.  
 
Although revealing, the study of organisational changes and their eventual 
effects on the probability of exit is still at its infant stage. Proxies used are 
unsophisticated measures and conceptual foundations need refinements. 
Empirical evidence may also reflect country or sector specificities that prevent 
generalisation. Therefore, the results should not be considered as definitive. 
However, the fact that this study, as well as the work of Bernard and Jensen 
(2007) and Gullstrand (2005), found organisational changes statistically 
significant should encourage further investigation in this direction. 
                                            
34
 The results have not been incorporated in the text. 
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CHAPTER 6 
SURVIVAL OF FIRMS 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
 
How long do firms survive in an industry? How does the duration of survival 
vary across individual firms? Answers to questions such as these are helpful 
for understanding competition over time. At the individual level, survival has 
often been regarded as an indicative, though hazy, measure of performance 
of firms. The longer a firm is able to survive in a given industry compared to 
its competitors, the more capable it appears to be. At the industry level, the 
distribution of individual survival spells sheds light on the speed at which 
different age classes of firms transit through an industry and, therefore, on 
how incumbents are, most likely, deterring new comers.  
 
The empirical literature on the determinants of firm survival is considerable1. 
It views survival as determined by a mixture of firm-specific attributes, 
industry characteristics and environmental conditions, measured at the date 
of entry and/or at current one. The theoretical literature discussed in Section 
5.2, Chapter 5, underpins this strand of empirical research. The preferred 
methodology used is the event-history analysis2.  
 
This chapter examines the comparative relevance of technological attributes 
and strategic orientation on the survival process of Italian firms in the graphic 
papermaking industry from 1964 to 2004. The next section discusses data 
structure, econometric specification and variables. Section 3 presents the 
non-parametric estimates of the survivor function by main time-independent 
characteristics. Section 4 examines the role of technological and strategic 
factors in survival among firms. Section 5 presents the conclusions. 
                                            
1
 Santarelli and Vivarelli (2007) and Manjón-Antolín and Arauzo-Carod (2008) review the 
recent literature on firm survival. The latter authors also present a critical examination of how 
survival analysis has been applied in this area.  
2
 Survival, duration, and event history analysis are synonymous.  
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6.2 Specification of the Econometric Model 
 
 
6.2.1 Data Structure 
 
The analysis draws on the thesis’ database of all firms that produced graphic 
paper in Italy between 1964 and 2004. It consists of 74 firms, of which 48 
were already in operation in 1964 and the remaining 26 entered at any time 
from 1964 to 2004. By the end of 2004, only 22 firms were still producing 
graphic paper. This implies that the survival data used in this analysis contain 
both right-censored and left-truncated event histories.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Illustration of types of event histories 
 
 
Figure 6.1 illustrates the various types of event histories in terms of calendar 
time. The vertical lines at 1964 and 2004 represent the beginning and end of 
the observation period, whereas the horizontal lines the event-histories of 
typical firms from the onset of becoming at risk of exiting (i.e., from the date 
of entry) to the occurrence of the event (i.e., exit). The event-history of firm C 
is ideal because its entire life trajectory is known. It entered and exited within 
the observation period. For all other firms, information about their life 
trajectories is deficient. The event-histories are either right-censored (firm A) 
firm A 
firm B 
firm C 
firm D 
pre-observation 
period 
post-observation 
period 
observation period 
2004 1964 
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or left-truncated (firm D) or both (firm B)3. Specifically, firm A and firm B are 
right-censored because exit was not observed before the end of the 
observation period. Firm D and B are left-truncated because the onset of 
becoming at risk of exiting occurred before observation began in 1964.  
 
The database contains 17 complete event histories (firm C type), 9 right-
censored (firm A type), 35 left-truncated (firm D type) and 13 left-truncated 
and right-censored (firm B type). Unlike censoring, left-truncation causes the 
sample to be biased because it excludes those firms that have not survived 
long enough to be observed in 1964. That is, the left-truncated cases 
observed at the beginning of the observation period tend to contain a 
disproportionate number of long-lived firms (Kennedy, 2005). But, the 
problem could be overcome because the date of entry was known for each 
firm in the database (Guo, 1993). With the necessary adjustments4, it is 
possible to utilize the left-truncated event-histories in the survival analysis.   
 
As the dates of entry and exit are recorded in terms of day/month/year, the 
duration data5 could be reasonably treated as continuous, allowing use of 
continuous-time survival models6.  
 
 
6.2.2 Econometric Specification 
 
Survival analysis is a method for analysing the length of time (duration) spent 
from the onset of being at risk of experiencing a specific event7 (original 
state) until it occurs (destination state) or until measurement is taken, if this 
                                            
3
 This section only discusses the cases that pertain to the dataset under consideration. For a 
review of all possible cases, see Cleves et al. (2008) and Blossfeld et al. (2007).    
4
 In practice, left-truncated subjects should enter the set of individuals at risk only from the 
time intervals during which such subjects are observed. In other words, their entry into the 
risk set is delayed until an intermediate events occurs (Hosmer et al.2008). Cleves et al. 
(2008) indicate that STATA version 9 has the capability to handle left-truncation data.  
5
 They are also referred to as survival data, failure-time, time-to-event, or event-history 
(Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2008, p.331). 
6
  In case of discrete-time duration data, survival models become models for dichotomous 
responses and logistical regression is applied. See Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2008, 
Chapter 8) for discrete-time survival analysis using STATA.   
7
 Because of its broad range of applications, the lexicon of survival analysis contains various 
synonyms for the basic concepts. The term event is often named death, failure or 
termination. The term hazard rate, which will be discussed later in this section, is also called 
transition rate/intensity, failure rate/intensity, risk function or mortality rate.   
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precedes the event (right-censoring)8. Let T denote the survival times and be 
a continuous random variable, with probability density function (pdf) f(t) and a 
cumulative distribution function (cdf) F(t) = Pr{T t}. The survivor function S(t) 
reports the probability of surviving beyond time t. Statistically, it is defined as: 
 
S(t) = Pr{T > t} =1 - F(t) = 
t
dxxf )(  
 
 
The hazard function h(t), or instantaneous rate of occurrence of the event, is 
defined as: 
 
h(t) =
0
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This expression is the ratio between the conditional probability that the event 
will occur in an infinitesimally small interval ( t )—given that it has not 
occurred before—and the length of the interval. Therefore, h(t) can be 
interpreted as the instantaneous rate of occurrence of the event. As the 
density function f(t) = dttdF )( , the hazard rate can also be written as the 
ratio between the density of events at t and the probability of surviving 
beyond t.  
 
Inherent to the logic of survival analysis, it is the notion that there is a time-
ordering between causes and effects, meaning that a change in some 
variables xt at time t may cause a change in the speed to which a subject 
moves to its destination state9. This, in turn, implies that transition rates can 
only depend on conditions that occurred in the past (before t), but not at 
current time t or in the future (Blossfeld et al. 2007, p. 27-28); hence, the 
importance of hazard rates in survival analysis. This feature of survival 
                                            
8
 The theoretical and applied literature on failure time methods is extensive and ranges from 
advanced to self-learning texts for biomedical, social sciences and engineering disciplines. 
The present exposition of the basic concepts in survival analysis is based on Box-
Steffensmeier and Jones (2004) and Bossfeld et al. (2007).   
9
 Blossfeld et al. (2007, p. 27-37) provide a detailed, not formal, discussion of time order and 
causal effects in event history analysis.  
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analysis lends itself to model the hazard rate as dependent on time and a set 
of covariates X, that is,  
 
h(t) =
0
lim
t
  
t
XtTttTt ),|Pr(
 
 
 
Several models have been proposed, depending on the assumptions made 
about the form of the survivor function and the way covariates exert their 
influence. In general, survival models are classified as non-parametric, when 
there are no restrictions on the form of the hazard function, semi-parametric, 
when the baseline hazard function does not need to be specified, and 
parametric models, when the hazard function is specified. Although 
parametric models yield more efficient estimates of the time dependency as 
well as of the covariate parameters, this property does not hold, for any 
sample size, if the hazard function is incorrectly parameterised (Box-
Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004). Therefore, in case of little or no a priori 
knowledge on the form of the survivor function, it is best to use non- or semi-
parametric models, though they yield less efficient estimates.   
 
Neither the literature in industrial economics, nor that in organizational 
ecology has yet developed theoretical models that can be used to obtain 
clear indications for the precise specification of survivor function for firms 
(Kiefer, 1988; Manjón-Antolín and Arauzo-Carod, 2008). In the absence of a 
theory-based specification of the hazard function, I use the most common 
approach: the semi-parametric Cox Proportional Hazard model. 
 
 
6.2.3 Variables 
 
The events that define the transition to failure are: (i) entry into the Italian 
graphic paper industry (original state) and (ii) exit from the same industry 
(destination state). Consequently, the dependent variable (SURVIVAL) is 
defined as the length of time (measured in days and shown in year-scale) 
from the date of entry to the date of exit or censoring (date of failure), if the 
firm had not yet exited the industry by the end of 2004.  
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In the present study, the hazard rate h(t) is assumed to depend on a set of 
firm technical characteristics, strategic orientation and history.  Demographic 
variables and size are also included. Section C.4 in Appendix C provides 
detailed variable definitions and statistics.  
 
Demographic variables   There are numerous distinctions that can 
be made about types of entrants. Two, however, have been repeatedly 
considered in the literature: the mode by which firms enter (greenfield or 
acquisition) and the extent to which firms are new (de novo or diversifying)10.  
To capture their influence, two indicator variables were introduced: ENMODE 
and ENSTATE.  
 
ENMODE equates to 1 if the firm entered by acquisition and 0 if entered by 
plant construction or conversion. Compared to greenfield entry, it is not clear 
a priori whether entry by acquisition improves or not the entrant’s chances of 
survival. Acquiring an established efficient plant is likely to decrease the odds 
of failure. Nevertheless, the success of a business also depends on the 
capability of the entrant to manage effectively the acquired plant, which can 
only be proven in the market. Therefore, no specific expectation about the 
sign of the coefficient of ENMODE is advanced.  
 
ENSTATE equates to 1 if the firm was a de novo entrant and 0 if it was a 
diversifying firm with activities elsewhere. From previous studies (Geroski, 
1991), it is expected that diversifying entrants have better survival prospects 
than de novo ones since they can rely on larger financial resources, proven 
managerial capabilities and lower sunk costs.  
 
Size variables The effect of size on firm survival has been repeatedly 
observed across countries and sectors. Three alternatives have been 
considered11. LSIZE is defined as the logarithm of the firm’s capacity (in 
                                            
10
 See section 2.1.   
11
 As firm’s size is regarded as an instantaneous variable in survival analysis (Cleves, 2008, 
pp.41-43), the values that are considered in the computation of hazard rates are those 
recorded at the date of failure, that is, at exit or 2004.  
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tonnes), SIZEMRK is the firm’s share in industry’s capacity and SIZECLASS 
is a categorical variable grouping plants in three basic categories: annual 
production capacity up to 25,000 tonnes (SIZECLASS1), between 25,000 
and 100,000 tonnes (SIZECLASS2), and above 100,000 (SIZECLASS3). The 
cut-off values for this variable have been chosen on the basis of the evolution 
of the dominant (i.e. most frequent) firm size. As shown in Table 4.2 (Chapter 
4), SIZECLASS1 was the dominant size for the first two decades and 
SIZECLASS2 for the subsequent decades. Although SIZECLASS3 has never 
accounted for a large proportion of firms, its relevance has been constantly 
increasing. As repeatedly observed12, size is expected to affect positively 
survival.  
  
Technical-level variables  To investigate the influence of 
technological efficiency, a series of variables were constructed on the basis 
of vintage and width of the paper machines in use at the time of firm’s failure 
date (exit or censoring). PMAGE indicates the firm’s total number of 
machines installed after 1945 and PMEFFICIENT total number of machines 
installed after 1945 and wider than 3 meters. PMAGE% and PMEFFICENT% 
measure the percentage of PMAGE and PMEFFICENT in the firm’s total 
number of machines. All four variables are expected to lower the risk of exit.  
 
Binary variables, which measured whether the largest and newest paper 
machine was at least 3 meter wide and/or installed after 1945 (such as those 
included in the logistical analysis of plant exit in Chapter 5), were considered 
not appropriate because they did not show much variability. Some 35 percent 
of all firms were multi-plant operations and, therefore, the occurrence of 
having at least a modern machine was higher than at plant level.  
 
Firm strategic and location variables  Production diversification 
within the paper industry, pursuit of external growth strategies (i.e., 
acquisitions or divestments) and localization of additional plants are strategic 
                                            
12
 See OECD (2003) for an international comparison.  
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considerations for any firm. They affect performance and sustainability. To 
capture their potential influence, the following variables were constructed. 
 
DIVER is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the firm always 
produced a mix of graphic and other papers (i.e., packaging, sanitary, 
industrial, etc.) and 0 if the firm manufactured only graphic paper. As 
explained in the previous chapter, it is expected that production-line 
diversification would increase the risk of exit.  
 
EXPAND and SHRUNK indicate, respectively, the number of acquisitions 
that a firm underwent during its existence (excluding the initial acquisition by 
which the firm was established) and divestments (excluding the sale of plants 
by which the firm was dissolved). EXPAND is expected to exert a positive 
effect on survival, while SHRUNK a negative one. An additional variable 
REORG records the number of organizational restructurings that a firm 
underwent during its life. No a priori prediction on the sign of the coefficient of 
REORG is advanced (see Chapter 5).  
 
Given the positive correlation between plant survival and location in North-
East Italy, an indicator variable AREANE was compiled. It is 1 if all plants 
belonging to a firm at the failure date were located in this area and 0 
otherwise.  
 
Owner’s background variables  The indicator variable 
ORIGINCORE was compiled to explore the potential influence of firm 
background. It is 1 if the entrant was a foreign firm or its original core 
activities were large businesses in sectors other than papermaking. 
ORIGINCORE is expected to be positively related to the risk of exit. Having 
substantial businesses outside papermaking or being a foreign corporation 
(generally a papermaker) would make the owner less reluctant to exit, should 
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its papermaking activities be less profitable than expected.  This variable is 
highly correlated with the demographic variable ENSTATE13. 
 
Temporal variables It is reasonable to suppose that the period in 
which a firm is established can affect its future prospects since distinct 
institutional settings and/or macroeconomic conditions affect firms’ 
technological, managerial and organization make-up. Given the considerable 
longevity of the Italian papermakers, the sample was divided into three 
groups: COHORT1, including firms established prior to 1950, COHORT2, 
including firms that entered between 1950 and 1963, and COHORT3, 
including entrants from 1964 onwards.  
 
Cofounders  In addition, a series of alternative categorical variables 
were included as potential cofounders. These were grade specialization 
(SPEC), multi- or single-plant operation (TYPE), firm’s background (PAST) 
and firm original sector (CORE). Their definitions are included in section C.4 
of Appendix C.   
 
6.3 Survival Patterns 
 
Preliminary to the multivariate analysis, this section investigates the overall 
survival patterns without introducing any a priori assumptions about the 
functional form of the hazard rate14. Figure 6.2 illustrates the Kaplan-Meier 
survival curves for the whole set of firms (ALL FIRMS) and for the set 
consisting only of firms established after 1964 (POST-1964 FIRMS). Figures 
6.3, 6.4 and 6.5 present the Kaplan-Meier survival curves stratified by firms’ 
typology. Time on the x axis is reported in analysis time, which is made to 
correspond roughly to historical years.  
 
                                            
13
 The difference between ENSTATE and ORIGIN lies in the definition of core business. The 
former classifies firms into manufactures of graphic vs. manufactures of graphic and other 
papers. The latter categorises firms into Italian papermakers vs. foreign and/or other than 
papermakers. The compilation of the variable ORIGIN required a certain degree of 
judgemental considerations.   
14
 This is carried out by looking at the Kaplan-Meier survival functions that measure the 
fraction of subjects at risk of exiting during the intervals between observed failure times. 
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Consistently with previous empirical findings (Geroski, 1995), Figure 6.2 
below illustrates that about half of the firms exited within the first decade and 
an additional quarter in the following 15 years. That is, just about quarter of 
firms survives beyond 25 years. Similar patterns can be seen among the 
post-1964 firms.  Though survival rates are generally lower, the difference is 
minor15, especially in light of the fact that the whole set of firms is biased 
towards long survivors16.   
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Figure 6.2: Kaplan-Meier survival curves 
 
 
Mode of entry, product line diversification and the original core business at 
entry do alter firms’ survival prospects.  
 
Figure 6.3 below show that, throughout the reference period, the estimated 
survival function for entry by acquisition lies below the one for greenfield 
entry. The difference is more manifest for post-1964 firms, probably because 
of preponderance of entries by acquisition among these enterprises (73 per 
cent). In this case, the null hypothesis of common survival curves is rejected 
                                            
15
 The survival rates at analysis times 10 and 20 are 0.5373 and 0.3106 for all firms and 
0.4830 and 0.3019 for post-1964, respectively.  
16
 As explained in section 6.2, the whole set of firms include a large portion of left-truncated 
data. However, the survival estimates are not biased because the truncated subjects are 
included in the risk sets only for the interval of their duration that occurred during the 
observation period 1964-2004.   
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at 5% level of confidence17. However, if the whole set of firms is considered, 
the null hypothesis is rejected at 10% level only on the basis of Wilcoxon 
test18, which provides more weights on the initial first years of survival. 
Therefore, the route by which firms enter the market might not be a strong 
predictor of their survival.   
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Figure 6.3: Kaplan-Meier survival curves by entry mode 
 
 
 
Instead, production-line diversification appears to be more relevant. Figure 
6.4 below compares the survival curves of firms that pursued a product-line 
diversification with those of firms that did not do so. In the first 20-30 years of 
existence, survival prospects are clearly greater if firms have concentrated 
their production in the manufacture of graphic paper, compared to rivals that 
have maintained a diversified production. This result reflects the trends of 
technological advances in papermaking. With post-war advances towards 
paper machines specializing in fewer paper grades, firms found more 
convenient to narrow their production-lines towards a specific type of paper, 
                                            
17
 The statistic of the log-rank test is chi2(1)=3.81, p>chi2=0.0510 and for the Wilcoxon is 
chi2(1)=3.89, p>chi2=0.0486.  
18
 The statistic of the log-rank test is chi2(1)=2.43, p>chi2=0.1189 and for the Wilcoxon is 
chi2(1)=2.84, p>chi2=0.0920. 
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rather than producing a full range of it. Moreover, the increasingly 
specialisation of distribution channels by paper grade may also have 
discouraged firms to pursue diversification strategies because of the amount 
of resources needed to maintain all channels open. 
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Figure 6.4: Kaplan-Meier survival curves by product line diversification 
 
 
With time, however, diversification seems to lose relevance. From the fourth 
decade onwards, the two survival curves mirror each other. The significance 
of this temporal difference is confirmed statistically. The Wilcoxon statistics19, 
which provides more weight for the first decades, indicate that the null-
hypothesis of similar curves is rejected, at least, at 5 per cent level of 
confidence for both sets of firms.  
 
On the contrary, the log-rank statistics20 do not reject the null hypothesis. 
This finding may not be in contradiction with the previous one. In fact, it may 
have originated by the fact that the complete sample (i.e. ALL FIRMS) 
contained a large percentage of firms that had been established before World 
War II when diversification was a successful strategy pursued by most firms.  
                                            
19
 The statistics of the Wilcoxon test are chi2(1)=4.82, p>chi2=0.0282 for the whole set and  
chi2(1)=3.81, p>chi2=0.0509 for the post-1964 set.  
20
 The statistics of the log-rank test are chi2(1)=2.26, p>chi2=0.1329 for the whole set and  
chi2(1)=2.18, p>chi2=0.1395 for the post-1964 set.  
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As to the firm’s background, the results are less definitive (Figure 6.5). 
Contrary to other studies (Thompson, 2005 and Dunne et al., 2005), being a 
papermaker seems not to have assured greater survival prospects21 to 
entrants. Specifically, having already a large, established core business in a 
sector outside papermaking at the time of entry or being a foreign 
papermaker (ORIGINCORE) appears to lower survival probabilities either 
after the first years or after two decades of permanence in the industry22.  
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Figure 6.5: Kaplan-Meier survival curves by core business 
 
 
This pattern is not unreasonable. Being a foreigner or having an established 
core business outside papermaking indicates a certain degree of strategic 
flexibility. Should firms not find profitable to stay in a particular industry, they 
are likely to be less reluctant to leave. Figure 6.5 suggests that such firms do 
so either within the first years or after a time span of about two to three 
decades. Papermaking is an industry where structural conditions change 
slowly and two to three decades may be a reasonable period for the relative 
                                            
21
 Several non-parametric estimates (not shown) stratified by type of profession of the owner 
at entry have yielded non significant results.   
22
 If the whole period and the ALL FIRMS set are considered, the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected at any level of significance. But, if the first 6 years of survival are considered, the 
null hypothesis is rejected at 5 per cent level (logrank test are chi2(1)=6.17, p>chi2=0.0130) 
Likewise, it is rejected at 10 per cent in case of the period between 20 and 40 years of 
survival (logrank tests are chi2(1)=3.31, p>chi2=0.0689).  
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profitability between papermaking and the sector of origin to have changed. 
The moderately higher hazard rates exhibited by outsiders in the first years 
are less easy to interpret. Although no definitive hypotheses can be 
advanced because of limited information, the histories of those firms that 
quickly left the industry suggest pursuit of hit-and-run strategies stimulated by 
the possibility of obtaining subsidies for rehabilitation of acquired plants.  
 
6.4 Multivariate Analysis  
 
The multivariate specification of Cox Proportional Hazard function is: 
 
),exp()(),,(
i
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i
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where g(t) is a baseline hazard of unspecified form, xi is the vector of 
covariates of firm i and β is a vector of parameters. Hazard ratios less than 1 
indicate that increases in the corresponding covariates reduce the risk of exit; 
the reverse if hazard ratios are greater than 1. Hazard ratios of 1 indicate that 
covariates have no effect.  
 
The results are reported in two subsections. The first discusses the size and 
age effects on survival without imposing any condition on demographic, 
technological or other firm’s characteristics. The second subsection explores 
the effects of firms’ features other than size on survival.  
 
 
6.4.1 Size 
 
The size-age dependence has been amply documented23. Evans (1987), 
Dunne et al. (1988), Mata and Portugal (1994) and Strotmann (2007), to cite 
a few, have found that larger and older firms have better chances of survival. 
In the context of specific industries, Thompson (2005) found a strong and 
significant effect for size—regardless whether measured as market share, 
gross tonnage or number of vessels produced—in the American shipbuilding 
                                            
23
 See Cabral (2007) for a brief and critical overview on the subject. 
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industry between 1825 and 1914. Similar evidence was obtained by Van 
Kranenburg et al. (2002) for the Dutch daily newspapers industry from 1950 
and 1996. The papermaking industry seems to follow suit. Based on data on 
pulp and paper mills operating in the United States during the period 1900-
1940, Ohanian (1993) found, “the probability of failure and mill growth  
generally were negatively associated with mill size and age” (p. 160). 
 
Yet, evidence on firm survival in the Italian manufacturing industry challenges 
this empirical regularity. Audretsch et al. (1999) examined the post-entry 
performance of 1,570 manufacturing firms established in 1987 for seven 
years and found no evidence that start-up size was positively related to 
survival. The authors’ ascribed this result to a number of potential causes 
such as the underdeveloped and highly imperfect Italian capital market, 
which might have acted as a de facto pre-entry selection process, features of 
social security files, which might have recorded entry dates with delay, and 
the success of industrial districts, which might have lowered the barriers to 
survival for firms operating within their boundaries. However, these 
explanations might not be the only ones.  
 
Against this background, the size-age dependence in the Italian graphic 
paper industry was tested by using the Cox Proportional Hazard model 
where the only covariate is the firm’s size. Table 6.1 reports the hazard ratios 
of this basic specification.  
 
Although survival in the Italian graphic paper industry seems to be positively 
related to size, the relationship is not statistically significant24. As shown in 
columns 1 and 2 of Table 6.1, an increase in the relative size of a firm 
reduces minimally the hazard rate and the effect is not statistically significant. 
The size dependence seems to emerge weakly only25 in case of small firms. 
When controlled for paper grade specialization and all firms are taken into 
consideration, being small (SIZECLASS1) is estimated to face some 1.8 of 
                                            
24
 Different measurements of size, such as multi/single plant and logarithm of current 
capacity, stratified by firm characteristics produce insignificant results (not shown).  
25
 Similar inconclusive results, not herein reported, have been obtained using different 
specification of the basic model. 
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the hazard of being larger (capacity higher than 25,000 tonnes). The rate is 
significant at 10 per cent level.  
 
 
 
All Firms 
Post-1964 
Firms 
  All Firms 
Post-1964 
Firms 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
SIZEMRK  0.952 0.968    
 (0.039) (0.067)    
SIZECLASS1     1.763* 1.140 
     (0.541) (0.751) 
SIZECLASS2       
       
SPEC     0.773 1.216 
     
(0.256) (0.809) 
Number of observations 74 47  74 47 
Convergence achieved after 3 iterations 3 iterations  4 iterations 3 iterations 
Log likelihood -141.435 -42.228  -140.692 -42.180 
stphtest (global) chi2(1)=0.18 chi2(1)=4.85  chi2(2)=0.91 chi2(2)=2.60 
  p= 0.671   p= 0.028   p= 0.634  p= 0.273 
            
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. (***) indicates 1% level of confidence, (**) 5% and (*) 10%. 
 
Table 6.1: Results of effects of size on hazard ratios 
 
 
A possible explanation of this quandary might be found in that specialty 
grades are manufactured in smaller quantities than commodity ones. Being 
small is not necessarily a limitation that curbs prospects of survival. Another 
explanation is that many firms exited by plant sale, which implies that plants 
acquired by entrants were generally of a size comparable to that of 
incumbents. Table 6.2 below supports this argument. 
 
 
 Total number 
Average 
SIZEMRK 
(percentage) 
SIZECLASS 1  
                  
(number) 
Surviving firms  22 2.89 11 
Exiting firms by sale 34 2.71 17 
Exiting firms by shutdown  18 0.36 17 
 
Table 6.2: Surviving and exiting firms by size and exit mode 
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Of 52 firms that exited the graphic paper industry, nearly two thirds (34 firms) 
were dissolved by selling their plants and their size was comparable to that of 
survivors. By contrast, the 18 firms that exited due to plant closure were all, 
but one, very small; hence, the reason for lack of a strong relationship 
between survival and size.  Had exit by plant sale been omitted from the 
sample, small firms would have faced a hazard rate that is about 13 times 
higher than that of larger firms26.  
 
Curiously, manufacture of specialty grades affects differently, though not 
significantly, pre and post-1964 firms. If all firms are considered, being a 
producer of specialty grades decreases the risk of exit (column 3, Table 6.1). 
The reverse occurs with post 1964 firms (column 4). This might indicate a 
sort of first-comer advantage, where the most successful firms in specialty 
papers were those that established themselves earlier in the twentieth 
century.    
 
 
6.4.2 Technical Attributes and Strategic Orientation  
 
The analysis of plant exit in Chapter 5 highlights that plant survival depends 
on a mixture of plant characteristics, organizational history and firm 
attributes. The analysis of firm survival suggests that firm strategies and 
location might be more relevant than technological factors.  
 
Table 6.3 reports the hazard ratios for the Cox regression where the 
covariates are firms’ technical, strategic and location variables. There is no 
evidence that these specifications violate the proportional hazard 
assumption.  
 
As expected, technological efficiency —measured as the number of modern, 
large paper machines—decreases significantly the risk of exit. An additional 
machine installed after 1945 and wider than 3m reduces the hazard rate by 
74 to 78 per cent. But, if post-1964 firms are considered, then the hazard 
                                            
26
 The hazard ratio is 13.23 and p>0.012.   
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ratio turns positive. This does not contradict the general prediction that 
technological efficiency is positively related to survival. First, the coefficient is 
close to 1 indicating that the effect is minimal. Most post-1964 firms own 
plants with machines established after the Second World War and, therefore, 
more modern. Secondly, it captures the unsuccessful history of a large plant 
at Arbatax, which was constructed in the early 1960s for the production of 
newsprint and equipped with two very large machines. Although technically 
efficient, profitability at that plant was often below average27 and none of the 
two post-1964 firms that owned it had been able to restore its efficiency.  
 
Being located in North-East Italy decreases the risk of exit by a factor of 0.3. 
As indicated in Appendix B, most of the pre-unification Italian states 
developed papermaking districts to meet their domestic demand for paper. 
Although the political unification of the country in the nineteenth century 
appears to have minimally disrupted the geographical distribution of paper 
mills, post-war industrialization has slowly produced today’s agglomeration of 
the graphic paper industry in North Italy, especially in the North East.  
 
Turning to production-line diversification, its importance is confirmed at 5 per 
cent level of confidence. Regardless of which set of firms28 is considered, 
producing a mixture of graphic and other categories of paper more than 
double the risk of exit. First, older machines are generally used for 
manufacture of a wider range of paper grades. Secondly, compared to 
specialized firms, diversifying ones would need today to establish and 
maintain considerable networks with a multitude of buyers, which only very 
large producers can afford.  
                                            
27
 One of the major problems, if not the major, affecting profitability at this plant was its 
location in Sardinia, where inputs and outputs had to be shipped.  
28
 Because the Grambsch-Therneau test revealed that the proportional assumption was 
violated for the coefficient of NEAST, the regressions were performed by stratifying the data 
on the basis of NEAST.    
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All Firms 
Post-1964 
Firms 
All Firms 
Post-1964 
Firms
1
 
All Firms 
Post-1964 
Firms
1
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ENTRYMODE 1.411 
           
 (0.430)            
DIVER (mixed=1) 2.296 *** 3.418 ** 2.216 ** 3.976 ** 2.024 ** 3.626 ** 
 (0.720)  (2.079)  (0.710)  (2.516)  (0.651)  (2.325)  
NEAST  0.387 ** 0.094 ** 0.336 **   0.320 **   
 (0.176)  (0.102)  (0.157)    (0.149)    
PMEFFICIENT 0.785 * 1.051  0.740 ** 1.019      
 (0.112)  (0.354)  (0.113)  (0.341)      
EXPAND          0.568 * 0.449  
          (0.173)  (0.277)  
SHRINK          2.017 ** 2.284  
          (0.641)  (1.431)  
REORG          0.625  0.982  
          (0.189)  (0.837)  
COHORT1 (before 1950)      0.119 **   0.073 **   
      (0.122)    (0.085)    
COHORT2 (1950-1963)      0.458    0.480    
      (0.236)    (0.244)    
Number of observations 169 47 169 47 169 47 
Convergence achived after 4 iterations 4 iterations 4 iterations 3 iterations 4 iterations 3 iterations 
Log likelihood -133.936 -37.003 -132.031 -33.543 -140.686 -42.145 
Grambsch-Therneau(global) chi2(4)=3.31 chi2(3)=5.26 chi2(5)=2.49 chi2(2)=0.03 chi2(7)=0.97 chi2(4)=4.58 
  p= 0.604  p= 0.154  p= 0.778  p= 0.987  p= 0.809  p= 0.333 
                          
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. (***) indicates 1% level of confidence, (**) 5% and (*) 10%. 
 
Table 6.3: Hazard ratios from Cox Proportional Hazard models 
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Besides production-line diversification and location, external growth 
strategies (Columns 3 and 5), measured as number of acquisitions 
(EXPAND) and divestments (SHRUNK), appear to affect the risk of exit. An 
additional acquisition decreases the hazard ratio by some 45-56 per cent29, 
whereas an additional divesture more than doubles the risk of exit. 
Organizational changes (REORG) decrease the hazard but, their influence 
appears not statistically significant. Although size per se does not 
significantly influence firm survival, external growth strategies do. 
Unfortunately, due to lack of precise information on how many times paper 
machines were upgraded, it was not possible to test whether internal growth 
strategies (growth by upgrading existing capacity) would make a similar 
impact30.  
 
Like in the case of plant exit, adding growth strategy variables improves the 
goodness of fit of the Cox model. As shown in Figure 6.6  
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Figure 6.6: Cumulative hazards of Cox-Snell residuals 
                                            
29
 In specification B3 of Table 6.2, the covariate for technological efficiency is omitted. The 
reason is that it is correlated with EXPAND. Understandably, firms tend to acquire plants that 
are equipped with relatively more modern machine; hence the correlation between 
PMEFFICIENT and EXPAND. 
30
 An attempt was made by using the total amount of capacity increased through upgrading 
and/or plant construction during the lifetime of the firm. The results indicated a statistically 
significant negative relationship with the risk of exit. However, when measured as 
percentage of the industry’s annual capacity, the coefficient was not significant.   
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Interestingly, being established before the Second World War reduces the 
risk of exit by 7 to 11 per cent and 45 to 48 per cent in case of firms 
established between 1950 and 1964. This suggests the presence of a sort 
first-comer advantage. However, some caution is warrant. Although the 
software package STATA has the capability to handle left truncated data, this 
result might reflect the fact that the set of pre-1964 firms is biased towards 
long-lived firms, whereas the post-1964 firms have not yet had the chance to 
survive more than 40 years. The median duration for the whole set is some 
34 years and the mean duration is some 43 years.   
 
6.5 Conclusions 
 
The analysis of firm survival produced a mix of expected and unexpected 
results. As predicted, strategic variables such as production-line 
diversification, localization and external growth strategies seem to have 
clearly affected survival prospects. Lack of more detailed information on 
firms’ growth strategies have hampered a deeper analysis of growth by 
acquisition compared to growth by plant upgrading. It is believed that further 
study on this area might bring useful insights in the process of survival 
 
Contrary to common knowledge, current size has not emerged as a predictor 
of the risk of exit. An explanation of this peculiarity can be found in the 
preponderance of exit by sale that characterise the evolution of the Italian 
graphic papermaking industry in the last decades. This suggests that the 
route through which firms come to existence and disappear are not neutral to 
survival patterns as well as to the dynamics of individual market shares. Had 
the dataset being larger, it would have been interesting to estimate 
competing risk models that would account for the alternative modes by which 
firms exit. In the specific case of the Italian papermaking industry, it might 
have allowed to discriminate the impact of size on exit by plant closure from 
that on exit by plant divestment. 
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The comparatively greater relevance of strategic and location variables than 
of size may be coincidental, reflecting the peculiarity of this database. But, it 
could also point to a genuine difference in the way these factors affect firms 
vis-à-vis plants. 
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
This study has revealed that fairly significant levels of turbulence may 
emerge simply from pursuit of entry strategies by acquisition. Such strategies 
have been a sensible choice in the Italian graphic papermaking since the 
1970s. To maintain supply and demand in fairly equal balance in face of 
moderate long-term demand prospects, would-be papermakers were left with 
little room for manoeuvre except for acquisition of existing plants. Had the 
study been confined exclusively to the appearance of de-novo firms 
established by greenfield investment and exit by plant shutdown, then 
turbulence in the Italian graphic paper industry would have mainly coincided 
with exit. By including entry by acquisition and exit by sale, then turbulence 
has emerged, instead, as a consistent feature of the industry. It has produced 
tangible effects. It allowed more modern plants to continue operating and 
firms to attempt to become leaders.  
 
By and large, the dynamics of acquisitions and sales seem to portray the 
evolution of the graphic papermaker population in the last decades as a 
matchmaking process, by which new and incumbent firms change the 
portfolio of their respective physical assets in their attempts to survive and 
grow. If this is the case, then, understanding the distribution of plant 
attributes becomes crucial for understanding turbulence dynamics at firm 
level. In industries where production is carried out in large and complex 
plants, it may be more useful to regard the firm as the combination of two 
separate elements: the entity that provided the legal foundation to the firm 
and the production site. The two do not need to be tied together for the whole 
duration of the firm’s life. This approach might also contribute to understand 
better the chain of causes-and-effects through which policy measures affect 
industries because such policies affect the firm’s selection of clustering 
together plants.    
 
123 
 
In this concluding section, I now outline some points for further research. A 
first point concerns the extent to which public policies may distort the 
convenience to enter and the length of their survival. Generally, new firms 
enter when they judge their business idea viable and are confident that they 
will succeed. But, new firms may purposely decide to enter just to exploit 
opportunities that have a very limited duration. While in the first case 
turbulence will result from a market selection process, in the latter from a 
deliberate hit-and-run decision.  As long as these two processes reflect the 
individual firm’s assessment of the nature of business opportunities, 
turbulence rates depict the evolution of the industry. However, the 
convenience of limited forays into the market can be prompted by specific 
public policies, such as subsidies, financial incentives to distressed 
companies and the like. The Italian graphic paper industry witnessed a few 
negative examples of this kind1, where firms were created, acquired plants 
and left soon after having received some public funds. The result was a rapid 
turnover in the space of few years. But, these anecdotes suggest that the 
new firms were clearly not interested in surviving. They enhance turbulence 
but do not reflect a willingness to compete. Therefore, similar turbulence 
statistics at aggregate level may disguise very diverse causes and underlying 
different welfare costs in terms of resource misallocation. More work should 
be done to analyse the relationship between turbulence and public policies 
and the potential distortions that certain measures may generate2.  
 
A second point concerns the dynamics of market shares and their stability or 
instability. This case study has shown that acquisitions were an important 
source of turnover among the leading companies and that a significant 
portion of these leading companies were relatively new. The life trajectories 
of Fabbri, Sottrici and, more recently, Marchi are cases in point. The first two 
were unsuccessful, while the last one appears more solid. Rapid external 
growth allowed Fabbri and Sottrici to become the first and the second largest 
                                            
1
 Unfortunately, evidence on the occurrence of these cases is anecdotic and could not be 
used in the quantitative analysis.  
2
 Cabral (2007) commented on the distortions on firm mobility that policy measures such as 
severance payments, legal and economic restrictions to layoffs and the like.  
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firms for a relatively short period of time. However, overburdened by debts, 
they, then, dissolved into bankruptcy. As the market cannot a priori pick the 
winners among entrants, so it cannot a priori single out the survivors among 
the leading firms. This case study indicates that at least some turbulence is 
linked to instability of market shares among the leading firms. In light of 
recent literature on market share dynamics and persistence of leadership 
(Geroski and Toker, 1996, and Sutton, 2007), it would be interesting to 
investigate whether different kinds of turbulence are linked to instability of 
market shares in excess of that predicted under a benchmark model3. Like in 
the case of duration of industry leadership, the central problem is that the 
observed amount of turbulence can be judged to be high or low only if 
measured against a benchmark model, for example, of Markovian kind. 
Exploring this issue could enhance understanding of the phenomenon of 
turbulence and its features.     
 
A final point relates to the importance of using case studies to refine the 
strength of the empirical regularities on entry and exit. This case study has 
documented a persistence of turbulence in an industry where was not 
expected, given the incremental and predictable technological advancements 
that characterise it. It suggests a more complex picture that aggregation 
disguises. It would be interesting to learn whether similar patterns typify the 
papermaking sector in other countries and/or other mature, capital-intensive 
industries.  
 
                                            
3
 The usefulness of using an appropriate benchmark against which to judge whether the 
duration of leadership is long or short has been recently revived by Sutton (2007). By 
developing a benchmark model of a Markovian kind, the author verified that at least some of 
the 45 Japan industries investigated exhibited a “Chandlerian” leadership persistence.   
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCENTRATION AND TURNOVER 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
The constant contraction of the industrial population of graphic papermakers 
suggests that the industry may have evolved into a concentrated structure. 
Yet, new firms have continued to enter and exit throughout the second half of 
the twentieth century, suggesting that entry barriers may not have been so 
high. Might high levels of concentration ratios conceal a continuous struggle 
to achieve and maintain market leadership1 in the Italian graphic paper 
industry? 
 
This issue has been approached in the literature on market concentration by 
investigating the relationship between concentration changes and market 
share stability2.  Volatile market shares may be regarded as indicative of the 
vigour of competition. From a conceptual point of view, oligopoly theory 
indicates that, as seller concentration rises, collusive behaviours are more 
likely to occur, with the consequence that market shares among the leading 
firms are less subject to wide fluctuations. Empirically, Gort (1963) and 
Heggestad-Rhoades (1976) found evidence of a positive association 
between degree of concentration and stability of market shares.  Although 
collusive behaviours are more likely in oligopolistic structure, the identity and 
size of firms change over time. By making collusive agreements less effective 
(Caves and Porter, 1978), exogenous disturbances caused by shifts of 
demand or costs, such as changes in consumer preferences, inflation costs, 
entry of new competitors, technological innovations and the like generate 
turnover in rankings and, in turn, increase market share instability.  
 
                                            
1
 Curry and George (1983) and Scherer and Ross (1990, Chapter 3) provide comprehensive 
overviews of the conceptual issues and empirical findings on industrial concentration.  
2
 Gort (1963), Caves and Porter (1978), Heggestad-Rhoades (1976), McGuckin (1972), 
Geroski and Toker (1996), Davies and Geroski (1997) and Sutton (2007). 
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Recent empirical studies on market instability include Baldwin and Gorecki, 
1994, and Davies and Geroski, 1997. The former investigated the 
relationship between concentration and firm mobility and compiled empirical 
evidence that a wide range of mobility patterns are consistent with a similar 
value of the four-firm concentration ratios. Davies and Geroski, instead, 
developed an econometric model to derive joint predictions about the 
instability of market shares and change of concentration. By using a dataset 
of 200 UK leading firms from 1979 to 1986, the authors found that fairly 
stable concentration levels coexist with considerable volatility in market 
shares among the leading firms, the two are loosely connected and entry 
contributes little to changes in concentration.  
 
The analysis of the Italian graphic paper sector confirms the concomitant 
presence of increasing concentration ratios and volatile individual market 
shares. The analysis also shows that these two seemingly unrelated 
dynamics originate from implementation of similar external growth strategies 
(entry and expansion by acquisition) by surviving firms. Section 2 presents 
the evolution of concentration in the period considered, Section 3 analyses 
turnover in the ranks of the four largest firms and Section 4 discusses the 
relationship between plant acquisition and dynamics of market shares. 
Concluding remarks comprise Section 5.   
 
7.2 Changes in Concentration  
 
The industry seems to have undergone a significant increase in seller 
concentration3, moving from a moderately to a highly concentrated structure. 
Table D.17 in Appendix D reports the four- and eight-firm capacity 
concentration ratios (CR4 and CR8) and the Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
(HHI) from 1964 to 2004, whereas Tables D.18 and D.19 report the individual 
annual shares of the first eight largest firms. Figures 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3 illustrate 
the trends in the annual concentration indexes for selected groups of firms.  
                                            
3
 Due to unavailability of sales data, market shares are calculated on the basis of production 
capacity (in tonnes).  
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Figure 7.1 Concentration indexes, 1964-2004 
 
 
As shown in Figure 7.1, concentration has risen in steps: periods of relative 
structural stability alternated with short periods, in which the largest 
incumbents rapidly increased their market shares by acquiring plants, mostly 
from enterprises in distress. In the years of such rapid increases (1972-1973, 
1989 and 2001-2002), CR4 increased, on average, 9.8, 8.7 and 3.4 points, 
respectively. This compares to 0.6, 0.6 and 0.4 for the immediate antecedent 
periods. HHI and, to a minor degree, CR8 followed similar patterns4  
 
Despite a steady movement towards a highly concentrated structure, two 
distinct dynamics seem to have been at work: one pre-1982, characterised 
by close rivalry among the three largest firms, and one post-1982, where the 
largest firm began to distance itself from the next two (Figure 7.2). 
 
                                            
4
 The average annual change in CR8 and HHI were, respectively, 5.7 and –1.4 per cent in 
1964-71; 5.9 and 16.6 per cent in 1972-73; 0.6 and 3.8 per cent in 1974-88; 5.2 and 32.3 per 
cent in 1989; -0.3 and 0.8 per cent in 1990-2000; and 1.3 and 4.3 per cent in 2001-03.   
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Figure 7.2 Concentration ratios for the first four firms, 1964-2004 
 
 
Until the mid-1970s, the individual market shares of the three largest firms 
were almost comparable. Then, the largest embarked on a rapid, but 
unsuccessful, expansion strategy that led the firm to divest, in 1981, a 
significant part of its plants to its top rivals (the pointed dip in the market 
share of the largest firm and the corresponding pointed peak in the 
cumulative shares of the other three top firms).  Nineteen eighty-two  was the 
turning point. It was the first year in which the market share of the largest firm 
surpassed the cumulative market shares of the next three largest 
corporations (CR2-4), a situation unchanged to date.  
 
By contrast, concentration amongst the lower ranking seems to have 
remained rather stable for most of the period (Figure 7.3). Until the mid-
1990s, the combined market share of the fifth to eighth largest firms (CR5-8) 
has fluctuated minimally, between 21 and 15 per cent. But, from the second 
half of the 1990s until 2004, all these firms experienced a steady erosion of 
their market shares, though not necessarily of their ranks. CR5-8 decreased 
from some 15 to some 7 per cent.  
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Figure 7.3 Concentration ratios for selected top ranked firms, 1964-2004 
 
 
There is little doubt that the industry has moved towards an ever more tight 
oligopolistic structure. However, these various indexes may overestimate the 
actual degree of oligopoly, especially in the last decade, because of failing to 
take into account foreign competition. In fact, due to a combination of direct 
state interventions and tariff protection measures, the Italian market for 
graphic paper had been sheltered from foreign competition until the early 
1980s, when the government finally embraced liberalization policies. Since 
then, foreign suppliers have gradually penetrated the Italian market for 
graphic paper, whereas Italian companies have ventured into European 
markets. Imports have increased from 35 per cent in 1988 to 83 per cent of 
total production, while exports from 25 per cent to 50 per cent. Therefore, 
measuring concentration at country level might be too restrictive, especially 
for the top four firms.  
 
7.3 Changes in Market Shares 
 
Turning to market shares, they reveal that membership in the ranks of the 
largest firms (commonly referred to as turnover5) was not necessarily long-
                                            
5
 Scherer and Ross, 1990, p. 68-70. 
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lasting.  Between 1964 and 2004, 24 firms appeared in the list of the eight 
largest enterprises at one time or another, of which 12 appeared in the list of 
the top four (Table 7.1). Only one of the top eight in 1964 remained as such 
throughout the period (Burgo). Since its foundation in 1906, Burgo pursued 
careful expansion strategies that combined a forward-looking attitude to 
product market trends with sound financial plans developed jointly with major 
Italian banks (Banca Commerciale in the early period and, subsequently, 
Mediobanca)6  
 
 
1964 2004 
1
st
 
Burgo 
(entered in 1906) 
1
st
 Burgo 
2
nd
 
Ferraro  
(entered in 1959, last appeared in 1972) 
2
nd
 
Marchi  
(entered in 1960, first ranked in 1989) 
3
rd
 
state  
(entered in 1928, last appeared in 2001) 
3
rd
 
Lecta  
(entered in 1998, first ranked in 1998) 
4
th
 
Donzelli  
(entered in 1925, last appeared in 1971) 
4
th
 
Fedrigoni  
(entered in 1888, first ranked in 1976) 
5
th
 
Rizzoli  
(entered in 1953, last appeared in 1988) 
5
th
 
Pigna  
(entered in 1870, first ranked in 1989) 
6
th
 
Sterzi  
(entered 1930, last appeared in 1980) 
6
th
 
Spinoglio  
(entered in 1985, first ranked in 2001) 
7
th
 
Avondo  
(entered in 1787, last appeared in 1968) 
7
th
 
Cariolaro  
(entered in 1986, first ranked in 1997) 
8
th
 
Mondadori  
(entered in 1957, last appeared in 1988) 
8
th
 
Favini  
(entered in 1906, first ranked in 2004) 
Note: the years when the firm entered the industry as well as when first and last appeared in the top 
four ranking are reported in parenthesis. 
 
Table 7.1: Eight top firms in 1964 and 2004 
 
 
A first impression of the magnitude of the turnover can be gauged by 
comparing the lists of the top eight firms in 1964 and 2004.  Of the top eight 
firms7 in 1964, Avondo, Donzelli and Ferraro dropped from the list in the 
following decade. The two modern plants of Ferraro were acquired by the 
newly constituted Fabbri in 1973 and Avondo’s plants and the majority of 
                                            
6
 As detailed in appendix A, investment projects in papermaking require vast financial 
resources. Therefore, sound financial plans are essential to minimize the risk of liquidity 
crisis, at a later stage. Although no systematic financial information on the expansion 
strategies adopted by papermaking firms was available at the time of the thesis, 
circumstantial evidence suggests that the too rapid aggressive M&A strategies of Fabbri (the 
largest firm between 1973 and 1980) and Sottrici (the second largest group between 1989 
and 1996), which were financed by borrowing, were at the root of their dissolution.  
7
 As firms can comprise several companies under their ownership (see section 3.2), they are 
cited by the name of their owner, rather than the commercial name of their companies.  
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Donzelli’s assets were acquired by the state in 1969 and 1972, respectively. 
In the 1980s, three other firms dropped in ranking: Sterzi and Rizzoli due to 
severe financial difficulties and Mondadori because of a change in the 
orientation of its core business8. Finally, the State dropped from the 
classification in 2001, following the sale of Cartiere Miliani to Fedrigoni. 
 
In reverse, the list of the eight top firms in 2004 contains six enterprises that 
entered the eight-firm list in the previous 15 years. The entries of Marchi, 
Fedrigoni and Favini are the result of expansion strategies that combined 
internal and external growth, whereas the emergence of Cariolaro and Pigna 
was due to plant upgrading. The entry of Lecta in the top four coincided with 
its entry by acquisition of the plant at Riva del Garda, previously owned by 
Bertelsman, which occupied the eight-firm classification from 1973 to 1997.  
 
Yet, it is changes in individual market shares, rather than in ranking, that 
better indicate the nature of competition among these top firms9. In principle, 
frequent changes in ranking may be caused by small changes in individual 
markets. Infrequent ones may conceal substantial displacement of the 
second-, third- and fourth-ranked firms (Gort, 1963). Table D.18 in Appendix 
D presents the individual market shares of the four largest firms in all years 
between 1964 and 2004. Figure 7.4 illustrates the competitive struggle 
among the largest firms during relevant intervals10.  
 
                                            
8
 Between the 1950s and early 1965, the three major Italian publishing and printing houses, 
namely Mondadori, Fabbri and Rizzoli ventured into papermaking in order to secure, at 
subsidized price, a constant supply of coated and uncoated grades for their vast printing 
operations. However, with the decision of the Italian government in the early 1980s to reduce 
subsidies, the economic rationale for vertical integration strategies disappeared. 
9
 A critique of the superiority of market share, rather than ranking, in the analysis of the 
dynamics of concentration is provided by, among others, Hymer and Pashigian (1962). The 
authors devised an instability index defined as the sum of the absolute value of the change 
in shares of all firms and found that concentrated industries often exhibited above-average 
market share instability. Application of this index to the thesis’ context is not appropriate. As 
market share is computed on the basis of capacity, rather than sales, the corresponding 
time-series of the annual instability index could fluctuate substantially from one year to 
another, just due to one large capital investment.    
10
 Similar analysis (not shown) has been done for the next group of four largest firm (five to 
eight rank). Once again, it confirmed the presence of significant turnover throughout the 
period under consideration.   
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Figure 7.4: Market shares of selected top ranked firms 
 
 
Inspection of the data indicates a substantial turnover throughout the period, 
despite increasing concentration. The first chart in Figure 7.4 depicts the 
dynamics of market shares of the three players that came to dominate the 
market in the 1970s, namely Burgo, Fabbri and the state. Through 
acquisitions of plants from traditional corporate groups facing severe financial 
crisis, the state and, especially, Fabbri rapidly increased their market shares 
to a level that made them comparable to the long-established Burgo. From 
occupying the eleventh position in 1965, Fabbri surpassed Burgo in 1973 and 
retained the top position until 1980. Such elbow-to-elbow rivalry, however, 
lasted until the late 1970s. In 1979, Fabbri entered Burgo’s Board of 
Directors while Fabbri’s modern plant at Sora was transferred to Burgo11. In 
1982, in pursuit of a modernization strategy, the most modern plants of 
Fabbri were acquired by Burgo while Fabbri applied for receivership. Fabbri’s 
enterprise group was finally dissolved in 1988.  
 
                                            
11
 With this move, the two firms ceased de facto to be direct competitors, until 1982, when 
Fabbri entered into receivership. Fabbri’s empire was finally dissolved in 1988.  
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The second chart in Figure 7.4 illustrates rivalry for the second, third and 
fourth positions,  from the demise of Fabbri in the mid-1980s to that of Sottrici 
a decade later. In 1986, the state was the third top firm and Bertelsman the 
fourth, together accounting for some 12 per cent of the industry’s capacity. 
Sottrici had just entered the ranks of the eight largest firms and Marchi was 
the ninth. Three years later, through a series of acquisitions, Sottrici had 
become the second largest firm and Marchi the fifth. Bertelsman and the 
state alternated their positions between the fourth and sixth. But the 
aggressive acquisition strategy pursued by Sottrici, which was mainly 
financed by borrowing, revealed its shortcomings by the mid-1990s. The high 
level of indebtedness coupled with a market downturn caused ownership to 
be transferred from the Sottrici family to their creditors (mainly banks), which, 
then, decided to dissolve the enterprise group.  
 
The third chart shows the competitive scene among the top firms in the last 
years. Once more, acquisition strategies resulted in the ascendance of 
Marchi to the second position and Fedrigoni12 to the fourth. Since the latter 
was caused by acquisition of Cartiere Miliani from the state,  the dynamics of 
market shares of Fedrigoni mirrors that of the state. By contrast, Lecta13 
increased its market share by internal growth (upgrading its equipment).  
 
 
In short, leaving aside the dynamics of the largest firm (Burgo), turnover 
among the leading firms has been a constant feature of the industry. It is the 
result of pursuance of growth strategies through acquisition by old, as well as 
relatively new, enterprises. The Italian case provides further evidence that 
mature, highly capital intensitive industries with a concentrated structure do 
not necessarily deter competition.  
 
 
                                            
12
 Fedrigoni is an old firm, established in the nineteenth century and specialised in technical 
papers since the 1930s. Because speciality papers are produced in limited amounts, its entry 
into the four top leaders is remarkable.  
13
 Lecta acquired the plant at Riva del Garda from Bertlesman in 1997.  
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7.4 Plant Acquisitions, Market Shares and Concentration 
 
Inspection of individual market shares of the top firms also suggests that 
external growth strategies (that is, plant acquisitions) have played a 
fundamental role in determining the ascendance and demise of firms 
throughout the period14. In this case, the dominant role of acquisitions 
appears particularly remarkable. Between 1964 and 2004, industry’s capacity 
nearly tripled, from 1,224,390 to 3,524,320 tonnes. To achieve this level, 
3,250,200 of new capacity were installed and 950,270 scrapped. During the 
same period, the total volume of capacity that had been acquired (divested) 
was 3,323,200, marginally higher that the total volume of new capacity and 
45 per cent higher than the total volume of net new capacity.    
 
Using a technique devised by Weiss (1965) and applied, among others, by 
Desvousges and Piette (1979) and, more recently, by Davies and Geroski 
(1997), the contribution of mergers and acquisitions to changes in 
concentration ratios can be measured by decomposing the difference 
between the total capacity of the top largest firms (majors) at start and end 
period (reference interval) into its constituent parts: total capacity acquired by 
the end-of-period majors during the reference interval (external growth 
contribution), total new capacity built by the end-of-period majors during the 
reference interval (internal growth contribution) and total capacity of the start-
of-period majors that had been displaced by end-of-period majors during the 
reference period15.  Such decomposition yields the following results for the 
changes in the four-concentration ratio in the Italian context (Table 7.2). 
                                            
14
 Curry and George (1983) provide a critical overview of the empirical literature on mergers 
and concentration, outlining the different methodological approaches and conflicting 
empirical findings. Yet, the authors conclude that, “When all the facts and arguments have 
been assembled it is difficult to escape the conclusion that mergers have been the dominant 
factor in increasing concentration” (1983, p. 247).     
15
 Weiss (1965) decomposes the change in concentration between the start and end period 
into mergers, internal growth and displacement. The effect of mergers is defined as, “the 
percentage of initial industry capacity assignable to plants acquired by the four(eight) largest 
firms at the end of the period (hereafter time two majors)”, the effect of internal growth by 
time two majors as, “the amount by which they were able over the period to increase the 
share of total industry capacity assignable to their plants and acquisitions” and the effect of 
displacement as, “the portion of the growth of the time two majors’ share of total capacity 
which went into catching up with time one majors and therefore did not increase 
concentration” (p. 174).   
 118 
 
Period Acquisitions 
Internal 
Growth 
Displacement Total Change 
1965-1974 0.427 -0.120 -0.178 0.129 
1975-1984 0.053 0.042 -0.021 0.010 
1985-1994 0.256 0.019 -0.221 0.054 
1995-2004 0.132 0.123 -0.148 0.107 
 
Table 7.2: Decomposition of total change in CR4 by period 
 
 
From Table 7.2, it appears that acquisitions had been chiefly responsible for 
the increase in concentration in all four periods. Without acquisitions, and 
with the other components unchanged, concentration would have either 
decreased or remained essentially stable over the four decades. Although 
undoubtedly significant, the contribution of acquisitions according to this 
decomposition is, however, likely to be exaggerated because it does not take 
into account its potential association with displacement (Weiss, 1965). Four 
of the seven displacements observed at four-firm level were caused by 
acquisitions of plants by majors ascending into the ranks of the top four. The 
correlation coefficient between acquisition and displacement is 0.728.  
 
The importance of acquisitions in the dynamics of market shares and 
concentration ratios can be also assessed by comparing the largest plants in 
1964 with those in operation in 2004. Table 7.3 below shows for each of the 
fifteen largest plants in 1964 and 2004 the owning firm at the time, its rank 
and the number of ownership changes that the plant had undergone during 
its existence.  
 
In line with the results of the decomposition of concentration changes, the 
leading firms during the last 40 years centred their growth strategies around 
acquisition of large plants owned by other large firms. In 1964, 12 of the 15 
largest plants were owned by firms among the eight leading firms. In 2004, all 
15 largest plants were integrated into the assets of the six majors. Despite 
the turnover in the ranks of the major firms, nine of the biggest plants in 1964 
had remained so, 40 years later. Of these nine plants, only two (Verzuolo and 
Manova) had not changed hands, that is, they remained property of the 
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leading firm throughout the 40 years. The bulk of them (seven plants) had 
experienced an average of two ownership transfers between 1964 and 2004. 
Similar conclusions can be deduced looking at the list of the largest plants in 
2004. With the exception of Alzano, owned by Pigna since its foundation in 
1870, all five other majors had at least one of their largest plants acquired at 
some point during the last 40 years.    
 
 
 1964  2004 
 Plant name Firm 
Ownership 
transfers 
 Plant name Firm 
Ownership 
transfer 
1
st
 Duino Ferraro (2
nd
) 2 1
st
 Verzuolo Burgo (1
st
) 0 
2
nd
 Mantova Burgo (1
st
) 0 2
nd
 Duino Burgo (1
st
) 2 
3
rd
 Verzuolo Burgo (1
st
) 0 3
rd
 RivaGarda Lecta (3
rd
) 2 
4
th
 
Arbatax 
(exit in 1997) 
Ferraro (2
nd
) 
2 
 
4
th
 
Sora 
(entry in 1965) 
Burgo (1
st
) 1 
5
th
 Marzabotto Rizzoli (5
th
) 1 5
th
 Avezzano Burgo (1
st
) 2 
6
th
 
Serravalle 
(exit in 1985) 
Avondo (7
th
) 3 6
th
 Chieti Burgo (1
st
) 2 
7
th
 
Verbania 
(exit in 1983) 
Vulcanizzata(9
th
) 1 7
th
 Toscolano Marchi (2
nd
) 3 
8
th
 Tolmezzo Pirelli (10
th
) 1 8
th
 Mantova Burgo (1
st
) 0 
9
th
 Ascoli Mondadori (8
th
) 2 9
th
 Tolmezzo Burgo (1
st
) 1 
10
th
 
Corsico 
(exit 1997) 
Burgo (1
st
) 0 10
th
 Fabriano Fedrigoni (4
th
) 1 
11
th
 Toscolano Donzelli (4
th
) 3 11
th
 
Sarego 
(entry in 1971) 
Marchi (2
nd
) 0 
12
th
 Chieti State (3
rd
) 2 12
th
 Villorba Marchi (2
nd
) 3 
13
th
 Riva Garda Legrenzi (11
th
) 2 13
th
 Alzano Pigna (5
th
) 0 
14
th
 Avezzano Torlonia (13
th
) 3 14
th
 Germagnano Spinoglio (6
th
) 1 
15
th
 Crevacuore Donzelli (4
th
) 3 15
th
 Marzabotto Burgo (1
st
) 1 
Note: Firms’ current rank is reported in parenthesis. 
 
Table 7.3: Top plants in 1964 and 2004 
 
 
That external growth has been a fundamental strategy throughout the four 
decades can be explained in terms of the increased importance of 
economies of scale over time. As described in Appendix A, technological 
advances have expanded enormously the capacity of paper machines, 
which, in turn, have increased the optimal size of plants. Consequently, the 
average size of plants and firms has steadily increased over the period 
(Chapter 4). If plant-scale economies stimulated firms to increase their size, 
demand conditions did not call for expansion of industry’s capacity. From the 
late-1960s to the 1980s, the industry suffered from substantial overcapacity, 
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while trade liberalization measures in the mid-1980s forced Italian producers 
to concentrate their investments in improving product quality, rather than 
quantity16. In this context, pursuit of external growth strategies appears 
reasonable and likely to be the most successful one for firms intending to 
gain prominent positions in the market. The fact that concentration has 
increased is an inevitable consequence.  
 
However, this case study reveals that the effects of such external growth 
strategies are not necessarily long-lasting, as the ascendance and demise of 
Fabbri and Sottrici indicate. In fact, a series of acquisitions may lead to a 
substantial leap in the position of the acquiring firm in the short-run, but such 
acquisitions may or may not be successful in the medium- or long-run. As the 
literature on plant ownership changes indicates (Chapter 5.2.3), the 
performance of an acquisition is conditional on the quality of integration of 
acquired plants in the asset portfolio of acquirying firms. If the integration is 
successful, then, acquiring firms will maintain their assets and market 
position; if unsuccessful, they will try, or be forced, to relinquish control over 
part or the whole of their assets, with the consequent loss of market shares. 
But, as soon as unsuccessful mergers are dissolved, new acquisitions are 
pursued. If plant-scale economies explain changes in concentration in the 
long-run, it is firms’ growth strategies that are likely to explain how 
concentration evolves.   
 
Postscript 
 
This concluding note presents the most recent developments for the eight top 
firms in 2004.  Burgo (the largest firm since the mid-1980s) and Marchi (the 
second) merged in 2006. Spinoglio (ranked sixth in 2004) went into 
bankruptcy in 2007 and dissolved. Its plant at Germagnano was, 
subsequently, acquired by the Grazzini family. Similarly, Favini (ranked 
                                            
16
 Being a country with no forest resources, Italian producers are at disadvantage in 
production of commodity grades, which are produced in large quantities. The most 
advantageous product strategy for them is to manufacture highly value-added grades, whose 
world demand is limited.    
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eighth in 200417) went into liquidation in 2008 and was acquired by Orlando, 
a private equity fund. Both firms are successfully operating the mills. 
Fedrigoni, with its acquisition of Cartiere Miliani in 2001, has strengthened its 
European position in the segment of technical paper and banknotes. 
Cariolaro and Pigna continue to maintain their position.   
 
Not having access to recent information on the current capacity of each plant 
and firm in operation, it was not possible to calculate whether concentration 
has increased or stabilized. However, if all firms maintain the same 2004 
shares, this would mean that the group Burgo-Marchi accounts for nearly 69 
per cent of the entire Italian production18. The recent developments seem to 
confirm continuation of the incessant turnover of plants and firms that 
characterised concentration in the period 1964-2004.  
 
                                            
17
 Besides the Italian mills at Rossano Veneto and Crusinallo, the Favini family acquired two 
other plants in the Netherlands in the late 1990s. Its position in the 2004 top firms refers only 
to its Italian operations.  
18
 With this merger, Marchi entered into the world’s top 100 largest firms.  
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APPENDIX A 
TECHNICAL NOTES ON MODERN PAPERMAKING 
 
 
 
This Appendix provides a brief account of papermaking and the paper 
industry. The aim is to provide an overview of the basic demand and supply 
conditions that have shaped the industry and, by doing so, explain some 
features of the thesis‘ data and quantitative analysis. Unless otherwise 
mentioned, this account refers to the industry as a whole, rather than solely 
to the graphic segment. Since the structural features of manufacturing paper 
are essentially the same for the various kinds of paper.   
 
These technical notes are based on a number of articles and books, with only 
specific references quoted. The main books consulted for the technical 
aspects were: the Handbook of Paper and Board by Herbert Holik and Paper 
and Paperboard: Manufacturing and Converting Fundamentals by James E. 
Kline, and for the interplay between the industry‘s technological requirements 
and economic conduct The Economics of the Pulp and Paper Industry by 
Magnus Diesen. Specific references to these works are omitted in the text.  
 
The Appendix is organized into four sections. It starts by describing the 
product, its varieties and classifications, followed by an overview of today‘s 
demand for paper and graphic papers. The third section presents a summary 
of the papermaking process, paper machines, technological advances and 
economies of scale. The Appendix finishes with a description of the main 
business strategies with respect to investment, vertical integration and 
pricing.   
 
 
A.1 The Product 
 
Paper is defined as a homogeneous sheet of felted cellulose fibres, bound 
together by interweaving and bonding agents1. It excludes any other material 
                                            
1
 Retrieved from RISI: http://www.risiinfo.com/community/paperdictionary on 25 May 2009. 
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made from synthetic polymers, such as non-wovens2 or material not formed 
by a random web of fibres, such as papyrus3.  
 
Although paper is a specific material, its versatility and availability have 
paved the way to creation of a multitude of different products and product 
markets over the centuries. Currently, there are some 3,000 kinds of paper 
and paperboard4 (hereafter referred to as paper or papers), which are used 
for storage and communication of information, cultural and artistic purposes, 
shipment and protection of goods, personal hygiene, medical care and 
industrial purposes. There are papers that can decompose in water or 
withstand wetness and acid, burn or resist fire, be opaque, translucent or 
transparent. Paper may be impregnated, enamelled, metallized, creped, 
watermarked, waxed, glazed, sensitised, folded, twisted, crumpled, moulded 
and coated, to cite a few kinds of treatment.  
 
Paper comes in hundreds of different grades5, with specific structural, optical, 
strength and water-sensitivity properties6. There is no universally adopted 
classification for paper, as there is no one-to-one relationship between 
grades and end-uses. To date, significant differences exist between the 
trade‘s and industrial statistical classifications, as well as, between those 
                                            
2
 Non-wovens are webs or mats made from synthetic polymers, such as high-strength 
polyethylene fibres. In recent years, non-wovens have become substitute for paper in large 
envelopes and tote bags. 
3
 Unlike paper that is made from vegetable fibres obtained through maceration, papyrus is 
made from thin strips of the pith of the plant, laid together, soaked, pressed and dried. It was 
the most commonly used writing medium in ancient Egypt, Greece and the Roman Empire. 
Papyrus is also the etymon of paper in the English language.  
4
 Specialized literature often refers to the industry as the paper and paperboard industry. The 
distinction between paper and paperboard is based on weight: the former up to 225g/m
2
 and 
the latter more than 225g/m
2
. Paperboard is used mainly to make items for packaging, such 
as cardboard boxes, shipping containers for produce and appliance containers. However, in 
recent times, some kinds of paperboard are lighter than certain papers, so there is no 
specific weight cut-off that separates universally the two categories. In this thesis, the term 
paper will be used to identify the broader group, including paper and paperboard products.  
5
 Paper grade is a type or class of paper identified as having the same fibre, colour, additive, 
and chemical composition and manufactured to the same physical and mechanical 
characteristics.  
6
 The structural properties include basis weight, calliper (i.e., thickness of the paper), bulk 
(i.e., volume per unit weight), density (i.e., ratio between basis weight and calliper), moisture 
content and stability, directionality (i.e., tendency to align the cellulose fibres in the machine 
direction) and felt/wire side. For graphic papers, optical and strength properties are crucial 
because they affect quality of print as well as performance of paper in printing presses, the 
so-called runnability.  
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used in North America and Europe. The differences between commercial and 
industrial classifications concern mainly the criteria by which the classes of 
products are disaggregated at the finest levels: content and basic properties 
in the case of commercial classifications and technology in the case of 
industrial classifications. The differences across regions mainly reflect 
differences in national systems of measurement. As a result, statistics from 
different sources are not immediately comparable. The remainder of this 
section describes the classification system used by paper associations and 
that by statistical institutions in Europe.   
 
 
A.1.1 Commercial Classifications of Paper  
 
Table A.1 presents the classification of papers according to the 
Confederation of European Paper Industries (CEPI)7 and the Italian 
association of pulp and paper producers (ASSOCARTA). This classification 
is substantially similar to that adopted by Pulp & Paper International, the 
foremost international magazine on papermaking, and the Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO)8.   
 
At first level, the trade groups paper into four basic categories: graphic, 
packaging, sanitary and others. Graphic paper refers to a large range of 
different paper grades suitable for printing and writing and made from virgin 
or recycled fibres or mixtures of them. It may be coated on one or both sides 
or uncoated and have been subjected to a variety of processes to improve 
smoothness and printability such as sizing, calendaring, super-calendering, 
glazing or similar processes. 
 
Packaging paper and board consists of a large group of papers and boards 
used for packaging. It includes case materials mainly used in the 
                                            
7
 The Confederation is composed of the 18 representatives of national associations (16 
European Union countries, Norway and Switzerland), of which the Associazione italiana fra 
gli industriali della carta, cartoni e pasta per la carta (ASSOCARTA) is the Italian member 
country. Through its member countries, CEPI represents some 800 pulp and paper 
producing companies across Europe. 
8
 For concordance between the trade‘s and statistical classifications, see CEPI, Harmonised 
List for Paper and Board Grades; retrieved from http://www.cepi.org on 27 May 2009. 
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manufacture of corrugated board, such as kraftliner, testliner, semi-chemical 
fluting and waste-based fluting; carton board, which has good folding 
properties, stiffness and scoring ability and is mainly used in cartons for 
consumer products; wrapping papers, which may be subject to various 
finishing and/or marking processes; and other papers for packaging mostly 
produced from recovered fibres and subject to conversion.   
 
 
1
st
 level 2
nd
 level 3
rd
 level 
graphic paper newsprint  
 printing and writing 
uncoated mechanical 
coated mechanical 
uncoated woodfree 
coated woodfree 
packaging paper case materials 
krafliner 
testliner 
recycled liners 
flutings 
 carton board  
 
wrappings 
sack kraft 
 kraft wrapping 
 food wrapping 
 other paper for packaging  
sanitary and household 
paper 
  
other paper   
 
Source: CEPI, Harmonized List of Paper and Board Grades 
 
Table A.1: Commercial classification of paper 
 
 
Sanitary and household paper encompasses tissue and other hygienic 
papers for use in households, commercial and industrial premises. Examples 
are cellulose wadding (a highly absorbent product made from virgin fibres 
and used for sanitary towels, surgical artificial cotton, patients‘ sheets and 
packaging cotton), toilet paper, facial tissues, kitchen towels, hand towels 
and industrial wipes and the like. In industrial statistics, quantities and values 
refer to parent reels before conversion to finished products. Trade statistics, 
however, record figures in both parent reels and finished products.  
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Other paper is a residual category including paper and paperboard for 
industrial and special purposes, such as base papers for décor and 
wallpaper, priming and barrier foils, cigarette papers, papers for electrical and 
technical purposes, filter papers, photographic base paper, gypsum liners, 
presspan, building paper and other specific applications and treatments. 
 
Each of the four categories is, then, segmented in a number of sub-
categories. In the case of graphic paper, these subcategories reflect the 
basic paper properties, which are determined, in turn, by two fabrication 
parameters: fibre content (woodfree or groundwood)9 and surface treatment 
(coating or uncoating)10. The former determines the durability of graphic 
paper while the latter its colour-printing quality. On these bases, the trade 
divides graphic paper into newsprint and printing and writing papers.  
 
 Newsprint is mainly used for printing newspapers. It is made largely from 
mechanical pulp and/or recovered paper with or without a minimal amount 
of fillers (less than 10 per cent). Since the mid-1980s, the use of 
recovered paper has increased dramatically, to reach 100 per cent in 
certain cases. Weights usually range from 40 to 52 g/m2 but can be as 
high as 65 g/m2. Newsprint is sold almost entirely in reels. Its 
                                            
9
 There are two basic types of fibres: groundwood, which is obtained by mechanical means; 
and woodfree, which is obtained from chemical pulping and is free from groundwood fibres. 
Mechanical pulp means that cellulose fibres have been separated by mechanical means. It is 
a low-grade material, often containing small pieces of timber still intact. By contrast, chemical 
pulp is obtained by separating cellulose fibres with chemical agents. Because of its structure, 
groundwood fibres have a greater tendency to yellow with age, so they are mainly used 
when the life of the printing material is likely to be relatively short. By contrast, woodfree 
fibres withstand age without loosing original colour, so they are used when printed material 
has to be retained for considerable time. 
10
  All graphic paper undergoes some sort of surface modification to improve their 
smoothness, such as surface sizing, calendaring and supercalendaring. However, pigment 
coating is treated separately because this operation creates a surface that is smother than 
the uncoated one making these grades particularly suited for high quality halftone 
reproduction. Coated grades constitute a very large category of graphic papers, which can 
be further divided in a variety of ways depending on the market, manufacturer and what else 
might be considered. It is common to categorise coated grades by weight: light-weight 
(LWC), medium-weight (MWC) and heavy-weight (HWC). The lighter weights are most likely 
to contain groundwood fibres. As the weight increases, the probability that the grade 
contains groundwood decreases to almost mil, cost increases, as does quality and 
probability of being used in promotional material and up-market publications. 
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performance properties are mainly assessed in terms of smoothness and 
runnability.  
 
 Printing and Writing Paper (pr/wr) comprises all paper for printing 
purposes other than for newspapers. It is distinguished from newsprint by 
such properties as brightness or smoothness. It includes office paper, 
data paper, manual and school writing paper, copy paper, stationary and 
the like. This class is sub-divided into four groups according to fibre 
content and surface treatment: 
 
 Uncoated mechanical is generally used for printed material whose life 
expectancy is limited and price low, as in the case of magazines, 
catalogues, directories and advertising materials such as inserts, 
flyers, coupons, as well as mass market paperback books. It contains 
mainly wood fibre from mechanical pulping and 15-30 per cent fillers. It 
is mostly sold in reels. Weights usually range between 50 and 60 g/m2. 
Stable quality, smooth surface for four-colour printing and good 
runnability are the most important performance properties.  
  
 Coated mechanical paper, occasionally referred to as coated 
groundwood paper, is made from mechanical pulp and undergoes 
super-calendering or other manufacturing processes to make it glossy. 
It is used mainly for magazines and catalogues. In Europe, coated 
mechanical paper is classified according to basis weight (medium- and 
light-weight) whereas, in North America, according to brightness. 
Europe is the world‘s largest producer of lightweight grades (LWC), 
which accounts for some 80 per cent of its total production of coated 
mechanical paper.   
 
 Uncoated woodfree paper covers a wide range of end-uses, including 
almost all office paper, such as forms, envelopes, stationary, 
reprographic papers, technical papers and the like, as well as offset 
grades used for general commercial printing. It contains mainly wood 
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fibre from chemical pulping and 20-30 per cent filler. Weights range 
between 50 and 140 g/m2. High brightness, stable quality and good 
formation are the most important properties. End-users usually 
purchase these grades from wholesale merchants.  
 
 Coated woodfree paper is made mainly from chemical pulp and 
contains 20-30 per cent filler. These grades are for high quality, four-
colour printing. Major end-uses are up-market catalogues and 
magazines, annual reports, books, brochures and promotion material. 
Two-thirds of the production are in sheets, with the remaining in reels. 
Most of these grades are sold through wholesale merchants.  
 
Although the definition of the major categories has remained virtually 
unaltered over the decades, the subdivisions within graphic paper have 
changed somewhat, with newsprint today encompassing also magazine 
paper.  
 
A.1.2 Industrial Classification of Paper   
 
Industrial classifications include a number of schemes, which organise the 
presentation of statistical data by economic activity. The International 
Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) is one of the most used. In Europe, 
the scheme adopted is NACE, which is an acronym11 used to designate the 
various statistical classifications of economic activities developed since 1970 
in the European Union. As a Member State of the European Union, Italy 
adopts its national version of NACE, that is, ATECO12. It works broadly to a 
level of four digits (i.e., sections, divisions, groups and classes). The first two 
digits identify the major economic activity, the third identifies the industrial 
group and the fourth the precise industry. Although two classification 
                                            
11
 Nomenclature générale des Activités économiques dans les Communautés Européennes.  
12
 NACE Regulations allow Member States to use a national version derived from NACE for 
national purposes. As though they must be entirely consistent with the structural and 
hierarchical framework of NACE, national versions differ from the original by including a fifth 
digit.  
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revisions13 have occurred from 1964 to 2004, such changes have not 
affected the four-digit definition of the paper industry, which encompasses 
manufacture of paper and paperboard intended for further industrial 
processing. As such, it includes all the four commercial categories of paper, 
that is, graphic, packaging, sanitary and other papers.   
 
 
A.2 Demand for Paper 
 
Since its introduction into Europe in the eleventh century A.D., paper has 
been produced in growing amounts and grades for an increasing number of 
purposes, to the point that it is almost impossible to imagine life without it. 
Initially, demand in western Europe was essentially for writing paper driven 
by the demand for writing materials, which, in turn, was spurred by the 
expansion of record-keeping and literacy among the laity that characterised 
the High Middle Ages14. Subsequently, the invention of movable type and 
Gutenberg‘s printing press, in circa 1440, provided the biggest stimulus to the 
development of printing grades, which has continued till now.  
 
By contrast, the development of packaging and industrial grades leapt a few 
centuries later, following the industrial revolution. Although brown paper for 
wrapping valuable commodities such as tobacco, grocery ware and fine silk 
was used already in the Middle Ages, packaging grades surged with the 
inventions of the cardboard box15 and commercial paper bags in the second 
half of nineteenth century. Sanitary and household grades were the last to 
                                            
13
 The first version of NACE was introduced in 1970. It offered poor comparability with other 
recognized international frameworks as well as within the Community, since Member States 
continued to provide data according to their own national classifications. To obviate this 
problem, the Council Regulation in 1990 launched NACE Rev.1 and established that its use 
should be mandatory in the EU. To account for the technological developments and 
structural changes of today‘s economy, a second revision, NACE Rev1.1, was introduced in 
2002.. 
14
 Spufford (2002) states that, ―[by the thirteenth century,] the keeping and auditing of 
accounts became a regular feature at every level from that of the Recette Générale of a 
kingdom to the humblest hospital. In addition, there was an explosive use of the use of 
written word in business … The literate nobility and entrepreneurs of the thirteenth century 
were joined in the fourteenth by literate artisans in the cities of northern Italy and the 
southern Low Countries, and by those elsewhere in the fifteenth.‖ (p.255). 
15
  Towards the end of the nineteenth century, an American, Robert Gair, had the idea of 
manufacturing in bulk a pre-cut cardboard panel that, once folded, would form a box. By 
making the transportation of goods easier than with wooden barrels, the box became the 
most widely used method of packaging for most of the twentieth century.   
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appear on the market. The introduction of toilet paper in the United States 
dates back to circa 1880, and the invention of disposable paper towels to 
1907. Spurred on by increasing standards of living, diffusion of tissue grades 
for hygienic and household purposes exploded in Europe only after the 
Second World War.  
 
 
A.2.1 Evolution of the Demand for Graphic Papers   
 
At first approximation, the demand for paper parallels economic 
development. Across countries and times, most of the change in demand for 
paper can be attributed to changes in pro-capita Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP), with printing and writing paper being the most sensitive.  Using panel 
data for 15 European countries from 1969 to 1992, Chas-Amil and 
Buongiorno (2000) found that the long-term elasticity of demand with respect 
to GDP was 1.1 and that with respect to price (measured as the weighted 
arithmetic average of unit values of imports and exports) was –0.9. 
Furthermore, the authors did not find any statistical evidence that demand 
elasticities were different across countries.   
 
Even if GDP is a robust predictor of paper consumption, to forecast demand 
accurately is complex. Being an intermediate product, paper demand 
depends on the needs of the other players along the relevant value chain. In 
the case of printing paper, which represents the bulk of graphic paper, 
papermakers supply publishers and printers—directly or through large 
merchants—and these, in turn, produce printed materials, such as 
newspapers, periodicals, books, commercial printings and the like, for the 
public. Any changes in literary rates, reading habits, advertising expenditure 
or new means to disseminate and store information affect the consumption of 
printed materials and, therefore, the amount of paper demanded by the 
publishing and printing industry.  
 
Increased literacy rates were the driving force of graphic paper demand in 
Italy until the 1960s. Subsequently with increasing standards of living, 
advertising expenditure became the most important factor. Currently, the 
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prospects for graphic paper are uncertain as competition from electronic 
media—computers, television, Internet and the like—may either increase or 
decrease the use of paper. On the one hand, people may consume less 
printed materials if they prefer to use electronic media; on the other hand, 
more printing paper may be demanded to make hard-copy records of what 
downloaded  (Zhang and Buongiorno, 1997). So far, the empirical evidence 
does not confirm that demand for graphic paper is on the decline. However, 
Andersson et al. (2007) are of the opinion that diffusion of new information 
technological advances, such as increased Internet penetration and 
circulation of electronic paper devices, will substantially decrease worldwide 
demand for printing paper. In addition, defensive tactics by publishers, such 
as on-line publishing and lowering quality of printed materials, may also 
accelerate substitution, though not eliminate it.    
 
As to the link between the graphic paper industry and the publishing-printing 
industry, most papermakers sell to large and moderately concentrated 
publishers, printers or merchants. Both parties are interested in maintaining 
stable long-term seller-buyer relationships and they at times agree on short-
term (between three months and a year) price-volume arrangements16.    
 
 
A.2.2 Demand-side Substitution 
 
The demand-side substitution among the four basic categories of paper is 
virtually non-existent. Because of their different end-uses, markets for 
graphic, packaging, sanitary and industrial papers are regarded as distinct, 
which, therefore, can be studied, from a demand-side perspective, 
separately. This is immediately evident. As graphic paper is not a substitute 
for packaging material, household paper does not replace wallpaper. Yet, 
subsets of grades within the same basic category may compete with each 
other and with products made from different materials but used for similar 
purposes.  
                                            
16
 Alajoutsijärvi et al. (2001) report, ―It is characteristic of buyers and sellers to agree loosely 
on future deliveries a maximum of one year in advance. However, eventual price levels are 
normally defined on a quaterly basis in accordance with global market prices.‖ (p. 493) 
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In the graphic segment of the industry, a certain amount of demand-side 
substitution is present both with others sectors and within this category, 
although it is less than a clear-cut issue. As merchandise, there is no 
substitute except, probably, parchment, papyrus and the like, which human 
civilization has long disregarded17. But, graphic paper is, first of all, a medium 
for written communication and, as such, it has faced increasing competition 
worldwide from electronic media as a means for dissemination, storage and 
processing information. The relationship between paper and electronic media 
is fast evolving and complex, as the previous section on evolution of demand 
has shown. In short, it appears that electronic newspapers and television 
currently represent a significant substitute for printed newspapers, thus 
lowering the demand for newsprint grades. On-line advertising might soon 
become an important substitute for printed and televised advertising 
(Andersson et al., 2007). By contrast, computers, photocopiers, printers and 
fax machines have stimulated, rather than depressed, demand for 
reprographic office paper, showing a significant complementary with these 
industries. 
 
Within printing and writing grades18, a certain degree of substitution exists 
between higher and lower quality grades. According to CEPI19, a moderate 
degree of demand-side substitution exits between newsprint and uncoated 
mechanical in directories, inserts and newspapers, uncoated and coated 
mechanical for magazines, and coated mechanical and coated woodfree in 
                                            
17
  The use of paper and parchment as a medium for writing continued side-by-side for most 
of the Middle Ages. The growing demand for printing grades following the invention of 
movable type and Gutenberg‘s printing press and technical improvements in papermaking 
made paper an increasingly closer competitor to vellum. By the end of the fifteenth century, 
paper had mainly supplanted parchment as medium for printing and writing. Coleman (1958) 
reports, ―price series show a fall of over 40 per cent in the price of paper during the fifteenth 
century and a rise in that of parchment…during the first eighty years of the [sixteenth] 
century the price of parchment rose a further 70 per cent or thereabouts, whist paper prices 
show an increase varying between 30 and 60 per cent.‖  (p. 7, footnote 2) 
18
 The definitions of the main grades in the graphic segment of the market, namely 
newsprint, uncoated, coated, mechanical and woodfree, are described in section A.1.2 of 
this appendix. 
19
  CEPI, Competitiveness Study of the European Pulp, Paper and Board Manufacturing 
Industry 1998: Executive Summary, July 1999, retrieved from http://www.cepi.org on 19 
February 2008.   
  
 136 
catalogues and brochures. A limited degree of demand-side substitution also 
exits between coated and uncoated woodfree in the case of high quality 
advertisement and stationary. This degree of substitution reflects the current 
situation, as some of these grades have been developed in the last decades. 
Coated paper first appeared in the mid-1960s, whereas woodfree grades saw 
a rise in demand with the increasing demand for photocopy paper and high-
quality publications in the mid-1980s. 
 
 
A.3 Technology of Production, Economies of Scale and  
Supply-Side Substitution 
 
Though the basic process itself differs little from the time of its invention and 
today‘s paper is remarkably similar to its predecessors, technological 
innovations throughout the centuries have improved enormously the quality 
of the product as well as the speed and reliability of the process, turning 
papermaking from a craft into a capital-intensive industry. This section 
describes the main feature of the process and equipment in order to discover 
how technology affects economies of scale and supply-side substitution in 
the industry. 
 
 
A.3.1 Modern Papermaking Process 
 
The process by which fibres are transformed into paper and paper products 
consists of three basic sequential stages: pulping, papermaking and 
converting. Pulping refers to the process by which logs and other plants are 
broken down into their fibre components through mechanical or chemical 
means. Papermaking consists of all manufacturing operations needed to 
reconstitute the fibres into a sheet, in conformity with the specifications that 
the various paper grades require. Converting comprises any manufacturing 
operation that transforms paper into finished or other paper products. Table 
A.2 summarises the basic operations at each stage.  
 
Pulping begins with selection and procurement of raw materials, continues 
with separation of cellulose fibres, and finishes with reduction of the 
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remaining fibres to pulp. The choices for raw material are primarily wood 
fibres—called virgin fibres—and waste paper—called secondary fibres.  
Cotton and linen rag is used almost exclusively for bank-notes and papers 
that must withstanding considerate wear and tear and be lasting as long as 
possible. Straw20, sugar cane and other grasses are virtually never used in 
western countries nowadays. The choice between virgin and secondary 
fibres, as well as between mechanical and chemical pulp, is made mainly on 
two accounts: strength and purity. Compared to virgin fibres, secondary 
fibres are generally weaker but cheaper. Compared to mechanical fibres, 
chemical fibres have less impurities.   
 
Pulping 
 
Papermaking 
 
Converting 
 
 stock 
preparation 
machine-
operations 
web 
modification 
 
 
selection of 
raw  material 
 
refining sheet formation sizing 
 
printing 
separation of 
fibres 
 adding fillers, 
chemicals, etc. 
couching calendering 
 
corrugating 
   pressing pigment coating  packaging 
   drying   others 
 
Source: Kline (1982, table 1.3 p.17) and FAO (1973, fig.24, p.323) 
 
Table A.2: Basic operations in the manufacture of paper 
 
 
Papermaking comprises21 a set of sequential manufacturing operations. The 
first group of operations, stock preparation, is the initial treatment of the fibres 
to impart special characteristics to them. At the paper mill, pulp is diluted in 
water and, then, subjected to violent mechanical action using steel rotor 
blades. The resulting slurry is passed to holding tanks. At this stage, auxiliary 
chemicals and additives may be added to provide the qualities of 
smoothness, opacity, colour or body to the finished sheet. After its 
                                            
20
 Due to its availability, Italy used to produce a significant amount of straw paper. Production 
was concentrated in Tuscany and carried out by small-sized paper mills. Due to its high level 
of pollution, this segment of the industry virtually disappeared in the mid-1980s following the 
introduction of new environmental regulations.   
21
 Reproduced from www.paperonline.org. 
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preparation, the watery mixture of fibres and additives—called stock or 
furnish—is passed into the head-box of the paper machine.  
 
The second group of operations is the machine-based operations because 
they are all performed on the paper machine. Representing the actual 
papermaking, they are organized into at least three main sub-stages: 
forming, pressing and drying. Forming is the process of making a sheet of 
paper—generally called web—, performed as soon as the stock arrives at the 
head-box. It determines the way in which paper fibres entwine, affecting the 
density, porosity and visual characteristics of the final product. Once at the 
head-box, the stock is squirted through a thin, horizontal slit across the full 
machine width onto a moving, endless wire mesh—called a mould. The water 
is removed through a mixture of gravity and suction in a process known as 
sheet formation where the fibres start spreading and consolidating into a thin 
mat. This operation is carried out in the former section of the paper machine, 
under carefully controlled conditions to ensure even distribution of the fibre 
and, thus, uniform thickness of the paper sheet.  Once the web of wet paper 
is formed, the second sub-stage, pressing22, is performed. The web is lifted 
from the wire to a press section of the paper machine, where it is squeeze 
between rolls and felts. During pressing, some 40-50 per cent of the water 
content is eliminated. The last sub-stage of machine-based operations is the 
drying process, which begins with the passage of the semidry sheet from the 
press section to the dryer section. Here, the sheet passes around a series of 
cast-iron cylinders, heated to temperatures more than 100C. The water 
content is reduced to between 5 and 8 per cent, depending on the level of 
moisture specified by users.  
 
After drying, the third group of operations is web modification, which 
encompasses a number of finishing treatments for the surface of the paper. 
Depending on the grade, they include sizing23, calendaring24 or more 
                                            
22
 This set of operations is also called consolidation of the web (Kline, 1982, p.17) 
23
  Surface sizing consists of treating the nearly dried paper with sizing agents to improve 
strength and reduce water absorbency.  
24
 Calendering is a process of smoothing the surface of the paper by passing it between a 
series of rotating, polished metal rollers so as to increase smoothness.  
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complicated processes as coating25 or supercalendaring26. By imparting 
additional qualities to the final product, these finishing techniques provide 
variability and choice to both manufactures and end-consumers. However, 
compromises have to be made between cost and quality, as well as between 
competing properties since they cannot all be maximised simultaneously.  
 
All grades of paper are subjected to all machine-based operations, though in 
varying amounts. Among them, forming is responsible for the major physical 
differences of the finished product: single-layer for lightweight or flexible 
paper and multi-layer for paperboard and heavy grades. Consequently, the 
first distinction among paper machines is based on forming devices.   
 
Converting is the last group of operations. The reels from the paper machine 
are slit into more narrow reels, or cut into sheets, or undergo more complex 
converting operations.   
 
 
A.3.2 Paper Mills  
 
Papermaking has been always a mill activity, requiring a plant exclusively 
built for that purpose according to specific construction parameters27. As in 
the past, a paper mill is a large plant whose construction is a complex 
undertaking, requiring years to be completed and considerable investment. 
The cost for a new mill producing commodity grades is some Euro 500 
million. Although the ratio of capital investment to annual production has 
almost halved in the last 30 years, its ratio to annual turnover has remained 
stable, if not, increased moderately.       
 
                                            
25
 Coating is a complex process that can involve up to a hundred of distinct operations, 
ranging from preparation of the coating raw materials, application of the coating to the web, 
drying of the coated web and other handling operations. By varying coating pigments and 
methods, an impressive array of different coated grades can be obtained. Coating can be 
performed on- or off-machine.  
26
 Supercalendering is a surface treatment that creates a polishing effect on the surface of 
the web.   
27
  The first descriptions of paper mills and machinery date to the sixteenth century (Piccard, 
1981). They describe how the process was organized and as well as the structural design of 
the mill.     
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The appearance and complexity of a paper mill is determined by the degree 
of integration with pulping or converting or both. Modern paper mills need to 
have convenient access to water resources and shipping facilities, whereas 
pulp plants are more suitably located near forests. Location of converting 
establishments is mainly determined by the relative costs of shipping paper in 
reels or as finished products and the speed with which products must be 
produced and supplied to the market. The level of integration among mills 
varies greatly. Some pulp plants exist primarily to produce pulp, while others 
are integrated with paper mills. Converting plants are more likely to be 
separate from paper plants. The large majority of paper mills are independent 
operations owned by different companies. The decision as to whether or not 
to build integrated facilities rests on economic convenience and tradition. 
Vertical integration is discussed in section A.4.2.   
 
 
A.3.3 Paper Machines 
 
With the mechanization of the industry, all papermaking operations except 
stock preparation are performed on paper machines. Consequently, they 
constitute the most important component of a paper mill, defining and limiting 
the mill‘s production capacity as well as its product mix. Today, the biggest 
newsprint machines are some 150m long, produce a sheet more than 10m 
wide and operate at speeds of over 100km/h.  
 
The basic structure of a paper machine mirrors the process. It consists of a 
wet end, which comprises the headbox, the forming wire and the press 
section, and a dry end, which includes the dryer, the calender, the reel and 
the winder. Yet, no paper machine is identical to another. They differ greatly, 
especially with respect to the design of the wet end. This is mainly due to the 
difficulty of manufacturing a continuous, uniform sheet of paper since fibres 
tend to clump together making paper lumpy. The need for uniformity coupled 
with increased product variety has led to development of many different 
headboxes and approach-flow-systems, each designed to ensure the most 
successful way to deliver a specific stock mixture to the forming wire. 
Furthermore, paper machines differ in terms of wire width, coating devices 
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and control systems, all custom built to produce only a limited range of 
grades. In addition, they become increasingly different with time as a result of 
repeated upgrades to reduce their technological age. Therefore, even if one 
specific grade of paper is selected, machines are never identical28.  
 
The age of a paper machine is on average 40 years but can span several 
decades. Each section of the paper machine can be modified, upgraded or 
replaced. During their lifetime, paper machines undergo several renovations 
to introduce the state-of-the-art technology, improve speed or overcome 
production bottlenecks. Through overhauls and upgrades, the technological 
age of the machine is slowed down. The only parameter that cannot be 
altered is the width of the forming wire. This will remain the same throughout 
the life of the paper machine constituting a limit to capacity expansion over 
time. 
 
The gross production rate of a paper machine is calculated on the basis of 
paper grammage29 multiplied by wire width and speed. This rate is, however, 
theoretical, for it does not take into account the overall efficiency of the 
machine. Even in periods of high demand, paper machines are subject to 
downtimes for maintenance, unexpected breakdowns, wire changes, 
statutory holidays and the like, which reduce the amount of paper actually 
produced in relation to the capacity of the machine. Thus, the overall 
efficiency of a paper machine is a combination of time efficiency30, which 
reflects the actual running time of a machine, and production efficiency, 
which reflects the amount of paper produced once all production losses31 are 
deducted. From an historical perspective, both time and production 
efficiencies have been increased. Today, some mills run all year, others 
                                            
28
  A detailed description of the paper machine and auxiliary equipment is provided in section 
II of Kline,J.E. (1985).  
29
 Grammage or basic weight is the weight in grams of one square metre of paper or board.   
30
 Time efficiency is calculated as the percentage of the actual running time of the machine, 
that is, 365 days less official and scheduled downtimes, in the maximum available operating 
time, that is, 365 days less official downtime (paper encyclopedia in www.risiinfo.com)  
31
 Production losses originated primarily from trimming, lowering speed and broke. Trim loss 
is the paper discarded due to adjustments of the maximum width of the sheet to customers‘ 
needs. Speed loss is the loss of production due to lower than optimal speed levels. Broke is 
the amount of paper discarded or returned for reprocessing as a result of breaks or 
imperfections in the sheet on the paper machine. 
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between 330 and 355 days. Furthermore, optimal operating rates should be 
about 93 per cent. There are no time-series statistics for overall efficiency of 
paper machines in Italy. A few sources32, however, have reported that, in the 
1970s and early 1980s, the average number of working days annually was 
300 in the graphic sector. This is a relatively low figure, which might reflect a 
downwards bias due to the relatively higher proportion of small-scale 
operations in the total. Unfortunately, there is neither information about the 
variance of these statistics, nor about the time efficiency of Italian paper mills 
in more recent times. However, from a number of company‘s annual reports, 
it appears that time efficiency has increased to 330-355 days annually.   
 
 
A.3.4 Technological Progress 
 
By appearance, the modern paper machine is not radically different from its 
twentieth century counterpart; it is faster, wider and, consequently, more 
specialized and computerized. Leaving grammage aside, higher production 
levels are achieved primarily by increasing speed or width or both. This fact 
has been and is at the core of technological advances in papermaking.  
 
At the turn of the twentieth century, maximum speed was some 150-200 
m/m; in the early 1950s, it was about 500 m/m. Currently, maximum speed is 
above 2,100 m/m for tissue machines, more than 1,900 m/m for newsprint 
machines and more than 1,550 m/m for woodfree grades.  As a rule of 
thumb, it is reckoned (Ferguson, 1994, p.19) that the doubling period for 
paper machine speeds is approximately 30 years. Similar developments 
apply to machines‘ width. The largest paper machine at the turn of the 
century had a width of about 2.5m. By the early 1950s, it was some 3-3.5m 
wide, and, by the end of the twentieth century, about 10m wide. Unlike speed 
that has increased incrementally, width has risen in steps. Throughout the 
last century, there were periods, up to 20-30 years, during which the width of 
new machines changed little. These periods ended with a new wave of new 
machines significantly wider than the previous ones. Specifically, major 
                                            
32
 See RESS (1982, p.29) and Gobbo (1974, n. 8, p. 126). 
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increments in width occurred between the turn of the twentieth century and 
the early 1920s, between 1950 and 1970 and between 1990 and 2000.  
To achieve these results, specific technological hurdles had to be overcome. 
As a result, all sections of the paper machine as well as the chemicals used 
in the stock and coating process have been subjected to substantial 
technological innovations. However, the most important advance has been 
introduction of information technologies, such as computer-aided-design 
(CAD) and computer-aided-manufacturing (CAM), which have significantly 
improved productivity and created new paper grades with advanced 
properties. Ghosal and Nair-Reichert (2009) has found that papermaking 
firms that implement a greater number of investment transactions in the 
information technology and digital monitoring devices have recorded 
particularly noticeable productivity improvements. At present, the industry 
ranks third after semiconductors and measuring devices in terms of the 
number of technologies in use (Autio et al., 1997).  
 
Far from being low-tech, the paper industry has developed strong linkages 
with the chemical and machinery industries as well as the information 
technology sector and electricity generation. Together, they form a cluster 
where technological advancement is ensured through a feedback process 
between the paper industry with its needs and the other players as providers 
of innovative solutions. Autio et al. (1997) report that ―the importance of 
supplier industries for innovations in the pulp and paper industry can be seen 
by the fact that the costs for equipment and materials constitute between 60 
and 70 percent of the total costs of capital projects‖ (p. 20). Furthermore, the 
industry‘s expenditure in R&D is traditionally very modest, some 0.5 percent 
of the total.   
 
 
A.3.5 Cost Structure  
 
The industry faces significant fixed costs, accounting generally for some 40 
percent of the total. Variable costs comprise raw materials, (both pulp and 
chemicals), labour, transport and energy. Pulp is the highest item, accounting 
for nearly one-forth of total costs. Although regarded as variable, labour and 
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energy costs are somewhat fixed. Because of the computerised systems 
controlling the paper machine, the number of skilled workers is, to a large 
extent, independent from the level of production. In addition, the amount of 
energy used when the machine is running is nearly the same whether or not 
producing paper.  
 
 
A.3.6 Commodity and Specialty Papers 
 
Depending on the level of value-added, paper ranges from commodity, or 
bulk paper, and specialty grades. Commodity grades are generally produced 
in large volumes and possess similar properties, which makes it possible for 
end-users to interchange products from different suppliers. Being a 
substantially homogenous product, price is the most important competitive 
factor. In order to survive, producers of commodity grades have pursued 
strategies of cost minimization through economies of scale, scope and cost 
reduction for raw materials. Newsprint and, currently, coated woodfree paper 
are examples of bulk products 
 
By contrast, specialty grades are manufactured to satisfy specific quality 
requirements (e.g. ultra-lightweight, release paper, cigarette paper, etc.). 
Consequently, they are produced in small quantities, differ from one 
manufacturer to another and prices vary according to final application and 
end-users. They are higher value-added products. The predominant strategy 
in this segment is product differentiation and customized services. Many 
specialities have become commodities with time, though the process is 
gradual. A typical example of a paper grade that has become a bulk product 
by the mid-1980s is coated woodfree paper.     
 
Fine paper can be regarded as a semi-commodity segment. In general, these 
grades are of high quality and serve a multitude of distinct end-users. 
Papermakers of fine papers tend to concentrate their marketing efforts on 
product quality improvements. Creation of brand names and management of 
efficient distribution systems are also strategies pursued by manufacturersin 
this segment (Autio et al., 1997).  
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A.4 Business Strategies and Practices 
 
Papermaking technology continues to affect the strategic alternatives 
available to papermakers today, as it has since the beginning of the industry. 
Before the industrial revolution, supply of water and rags dictated the location 
of paper mills and availability of skilled labour and capital requirements their 
appearance and further growth33. In an industrialised context, availability of 
water supply and skilled labour has greatly diminished, while capital 
requirements have become comparatively more important. In addition, the 
use of wood pulping, rather than rags, has given an unrivalled advantage to 
the northern countries of Europe compared to the southern ones. This 
section summarises the framework within which modern firms make their 
decisions regarding plant investment, vertical integration and pricing. 
 
 
A.4.1 Plant Investment  
 
A paper mill is a special-purpose facility with no alternative use should it 
prove uneconomic. It is capital intensive, and the lifespan of paper machines 
is several decades. Typically, a new mill will require a capital investment of 
several millions of Euros. Consequently, capital investment in the paper 
industry is a strategic decision that, once undertaken, restricts further moves 
for many years after.  
 
Options Investment projects are undertaken for a number of reasons, 
such as to expand production, improve the quality of the paper, enter new 
segments of the market, or lower costs. To achieve these objectives, 
papermakers face three main options. They may choose to erect a new 
paper machine (greenfield investment), upgrade or rebuild their existing 
machines (upgrading) or acquire existing plants from competitors 
                                            
33
 In analysing the influence of techniques and organisation in the economics of the British 
paper industry from 1495 to 1860, Coleman (1958) observed how differences in skilled 
labour and capital requirements between the papermaking and cloth-making industries had 
shaped their development. ―The techniques of cloth-making were ideally suited to a division 
of labour which allowed the ‗putting-out‘ or ‗domestic‘ system to flourish; those of 
papermaking demanded centralised work.‖  (p. 39). Since papermaking required both a 
minimum of buildings as well as skilled workers, who would learn the techniques slowly by 
training and application and be rewarded considerably, the industry could expand on the 
basis of availability of capital and skilled labour.  
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(acquisitions and mergers). The three options are not equal and their choice 
crucially depends on the specific conditions and objectives of a firm.  
 
In principle, the attractiveness of building a new paper machine rests on 
being more efficient. It will produce larger quantities of paper of better quality 
at lower cost34. However, establishment of a new, larger machine implies that 
the overall capacity in the industry is going to increase substantially.  But, if 
the increase is not justified in terms of increasing demand in the medium- 
and long-term, it will lead to overcapacity in the industry. This situation, in 
turn, will depress prices and destroy firms‘ profitability.  
 
The second option, expansion by upgrading, is a halfway solution. It involves 
modernization of some segments of paper machines with or without modest 
increases in their overall capacity. Although they comprise only a subset of 
the whole range of more advanced technologies, rebuilding is a sensible 
option as long as the machine will be able to provide a satisfactory return 
(Papermaker 82/4, 40). If not, then the machine should be shut down. 
Rebuilding and upgrading of existing machines are always unique, 
depending both on the technical conditions of the machine and the objectives 
set by a papermaker for products, processes and equipment. They happen 
some every ten to 15 years, so as to maintain the competitiveness of the 
machine in terms of costs and quality.  
 
In terms of acquisition, the choice of a firm to expand production by acquiring 
existing plants leaves the total capacity of the industry unchanged and, in 
turn, avoids pressure on market prices. However, this solution can be 
shortsighted. While it allows firms to expand without creating overcapacity in 
the industry, it postpones renewal of production capacity, which, in turn, 
might leave these firms behind their competitors (Pulp and Paper 
International 43/4, 20) in the medium run.  
 
                                            
34
  New machines generally offer lower production costs than existing ones due to 
economies of scale and increased efficiency through improved technology and raw material 
optimization (Pulp and Paper International, April 2001, p. 19) 
  
 147 
Choice of one rather than another is essentially financial, since, ultimately, 
the yardstick is whether the investment chosen will be able to provide a 
satisfactory return.  
 
Timing  Since paper products are cyclical in demand and price, timing 
of an expansion project affects considerably a firm‘s profitability. According to 
Achi et al. (1996), the best start-up time—when a paper machine begins 
production—is during the last stage of recession or when the industry is 
starting to recover. Full production will be achieved at the upturn of the 
business cycle, when product prices and demand are at their peak. On the 
contrary, the worst start-up time is at the zenith of the business cycle. 
Although prices are high, a machine will not be able to take full advantage of 
the favourable conditions because it is operating at reduced capacity. Full 
capacity will be reached when demand is low.  
 
By contrast, modernizing existing machinery should be carried out during 
upturns. Although rebuilds are easier to be undertaken during downturns 
when capacity utilization is low and downtime is less costly, they add 
capacity in a time of excess supply depressing prices even further. If 
undertaken during the beginning of upturns, modernising may lead to loss of 
sales since the machine is down and prices are still high.  
 
Considering the high debt burden and costs associated with expansion 
projects, any delay in implementation, technical problems or poor market 
conditions may cause considerable financial difficulties, threatening the 
survival of the firm.  
 
Financial requirements The cost of building a new large paper mill is 
estimated at some Euro 500 million, while that of rebuilding a paper machine 
in the range of Euro 150-200 million (Folio, 27/3, 76). It usually takes two to 
three years to erect a new machine and an additional two to three before full 
production is achieved. Though high, if calculated per tonne of annual 
production, these costs have approximately halved in the last 30 years, due 
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to increased speed and width of the new paper machines. By contrast, 
investment costs in relation to annual turnover have remained constant, if not 
increased.  
 
As rule of thumb, sales of a company should be at least two to three times 
expected investment. A US$400 million investment in a new machine may be 
justified by sales for up to 40 years (Folio, 27/3, 76). The characteristics of 
the investment decision are such that an erroneous expansion project is 
likely to jeopardise the survival of the firm, especially if small. Therefore, 
papermakers are generally very cautious in installing new machines and, 
everywhere, tend to exploit the machines they have to the maximum. 
 
Capacity rivalry  Any successful expansion project increases the 
industry‘s capacity. As these additions occur mainly in large lumps, a limited 
number of projects can be carried out without creating long-lasting problems 
of overcapacity. This begs the question of which projects are actually carried 
out. Christensen and Caves (1997) studied the selection among competing 
projects to expand capacity in North America. Using a two-stage game where 
market capacity was first determined and rivalry occurred within the limits of 
predetermined capacity, the authors found empirical evidence that, in the 
more competitive segment of the paper industry, ―project announcements 
lead to a form of continuing auction in which the more uncertain projects are 
more likely to expire, along with those sponsored by less well-endowed firms. 
In the less competitive sub-markets,…fewer projects are abandoned, and the 
appearance of a rival project…makes the firm more likely to finish a project 
that it has previously announced‖ (p. 70-71). 
 
 
A.4.2 Vertical Integration 
 
There are many kinds of paper mills. Their appearance is determined by the 
degree of integration with pulping and converting, that is, whether these 
operations are performed on the same site as the papermaking 
(forwards/downwards integration). While some plants exist primarily to 
produce pulp and are operated by independent companies, most pulping 
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operations are carried out in conjunction with papermaking operations, 
especially in the case of commodity papers such as newsprint (integrated 
mills). The majority of paper mills in Europe is non-integrated in that they 
operate without an associated pulp mill. Downward integration is less 
common. Converting is more likely to be separated from papermaking, 
except for tissue, cut size and folding boxboard for packaging grades.  
 
Forward integration between pulping and papermaking has often been 
advocated as a means to maximise profits in the long run. If the grades to be 
produced can be made from an almost standardised stock, the benefits of 
integration mainly originate from direct savings because some operations, 
such as pulp drying, packaging, storage and handling, become redundant 
and economies of scale in common auxiliary departments are achieved. 
Moreover, integration adds value to pulp products while evening out 
fluctuations in price.  
 
However, the magnitude of these benefits crucially depends on location of 
the mill. Transport, labour and energy costs, as well as environment and 
institutional requirements, affect considerably the cost structure of 
manufacturing units, by decreasing the benefits of integration to the point that 
they become minimal. Moreover, forward integration limits the ability of a 
paper mill to choose optimal pulp for specific products. There is no universal 
prescription in favour of integration. Depending on the specifics of the 
situation, non-integrated mills can perform as well as, if not better, than 
integrated competitors35.  
 
Except for the first half of the twentieth century, during which the largest 
Italian companies pursued strategies of forward integration in order to reduce 
uncertainty of pulp supply and hedge companies against fluctuations in 
prices, almost all Italian papermakers are currently non-integrated. Without 
natural resources required to produce pulp economically, Italian firms cannot 
exploit the benefits of integration.  
                                            
35
  For a critical analysis of the advantages of integration, see Pulp and Paper International, 
March 2001, p. 34-39. 
  
 150 
A.4.3 Pricing  
 
Like most basic material industries, the paper industry exhibits a prominent 
cyclical pattern: periods of high profits alternate with periods of substantial 
losses, yielding average returns that at times may not even cover the cost of 
capital. The wide fluctuations in firms‘ revenues and profits are hardly caused 
by fluctuations in demand; they are primarily the result of wide price swings36, 
which appear to have become larger and faster in the last two decades. 
 
The trade37 describes pricing strategies as a supplier‘s market in up-turns 
and a buyer‘s market in down-turns; economists (Booth et al., 1991) as an 
example of barometric price leadership. Pricing strategies reflect a complex 
interaction between sellers‘ need to operate at acceptable operating rates 
and buyers‘ priorities within a competitive environment. By and large, paper 
prices are determined by operating rates (van Roden, 1998 and Christensen 
and Caves, 1997). Ideally, paper mills should aim at the optimal 93 per cent 
operating rate, which is the threshold at which mills begin to face excess 
demand. Operating rates are projected on the basis of supply and demand 
forecasts. If supply is largely predictable because changes in the industry‘s 
capacity are generally known in advance, demand consistently proves 
difficult to forecast because actual demand may diverge significantly from 
current demand, that is, orders on the books. The result is a substantial price 
volatility.  
 
Given the extensive inventory capacities of suppliers and buyers and their 
commercial relationships (Section A.2.1), at the beginning of a demand up-
turn for printed materials, printers and merchants find profitable to build up 
inventories in order to secure the required amounts of paper. Paper mills 
respond by increasing their operating rates beyond the optimal 93 per cent. 
                                            
36
 For example, between 1988 and 1996 demand for graphic papers, measured in tonnes, 
rose steadily. By contrast, its value fell by 16 per cent during the recession period 1990-93 
and, then, shot up by 64 per cent by mid-1995. A year later, it had fallen by 18 percent 
(Glass, 1997).
  
 
37
 After the mid-1980s when price instability became prominent, papermakers have become 
increasingly concerned with forecasting the industry‘s business cycles. Ingram (1996), van 
Dijk (1995), Achi et al. (1996) and van Roden (1998) provide practical suggestions on how to 
forecast demand and prices. 
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At that point, the market turns into a supplier market and papermakers are 
able to raise prices. The more the prices increase, the more the buyers put 
forward orders in an attempt to stock inventories as much as they could 
before the next price increase38. But, the more orders, the more pressure on 
production. This process continues until buyers observe the first signs of a 
decline in the demand for printed materials. At that point, printers and 
merchants begin to use their inventories and cancel orders, while 
papermakers report temporary profit losses. Since sellers are a few, as soon 
as a papermaker grants a discount, the others follow suit and the market 
turns into a buyer-market, with prices falling and operating rates declining.               
 
 
 
                                            
38
 Because the price increases are too rapid, printers are not able to pass on the increases 
to their consumers.  
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APPENDIX B 
 
A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF THE PAPER INDUSTRY IN ITALY 
 
 
 
The development of papermaking in Italy extends over eight centuries, during 
which the industry reached a dominant position in the thirteenth and fourteenth 
centuries, lost it leadership in the fifteenth century, collapsed in the course of the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and came back to a middle-level producer 
in the European market in the twentieth century. Today, the graphic segment of 
the paper sector can be regarded as a mature industry. If this segment declines 
in the future, it will depend chiefly on whether electronic means of 
communication will supplant paper as a medium.  
 
This appendix provides an overview of the development of the Italian 
papermaking industry from the unification of the country in the second half of the 
nineteenth century to date, with emphasis on the period after Second World 
War. Specifically, the next section outlines the modernisation of the industry 
from the time of the foundation of the Italian state, in 1861, to the Second World 
War. Sections B2 and B3 focus on the developments of the industry after the 
war, the former describing the dynamics of the entire industry and the latter 
those of the graphic segment.   
 
 
B.1 Early Stages of Modernisation 
 
Despite the long tradition of hand-made papermaking, the organisation of this 
activity into an industry dates, in Italy, to the late nineteenth century, some 
decades later than in other European countries where the industrial revolution 
had already spread. At the time of the unification of the country, in 18611, Italy 
was largely an economically under-developed, rural state,  where the production 
                                            
1
 On 17 March 1861, the United Kingdom of Italy was proclaimed, though the Republic of Venice 
and the Papal State were annexed later, the former in 1866 and the latter in 1870.  
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system was still centred around artisanal workshops, rather than enterprises. A 
survey of the paper sector reported the presence of 687 vats and only 59 paper 
machines in 1862 (Table B.1). In the same year, production amounted to some 
24,000 tonnes annually, of which about a third was high quality paper for printing 
and writing, with the remaining two-thirds for packaging and other uses. 
Production was concentrated mainly in three areas: the neighbourhoods of 
Naples (25.2 per cent), Piedmont (20.6 per cent) and Lombardy (18.7 per cent). 
Compared with other European nations, the under-development of the 
papermaking industry in Italy is striking. In 1861, France and Germany were 
equipped with some 359 and 250 paper machines and manufactured some 
60,000-70,000 tonnes of paper and paperboard, respectively. Even the Austrian-
Hungarian Empire, which shared some similarities with the Italian situation, 
appeared more industrialised. Total annual production amounted to some 
45,000 tonnes and some 100 paper machines had been installed2.  
 
The decades that followed unification witnessed the beginning of 
industrialisation of the Italian economy and, in tandem, the modern papermaking 
industry.  
 
  
number of  
plants 
number of  
vats 
number of 
machines 
production  
(tonnes per year) number of 
employees  pulp paper 
1862 … 687 59 … 23.995 … 
1876    521
 2 
813 168 … 60.000 17.312 
1896 412 216 389 11.000 95.000 15.766 
1903 … 223 371 18.000 115.000 19.088 
1911 494 78
 1
 405 60.000 248.571 21.361 
1927 519 30 624 100.208 298.668 24.943 
1938 434 15
 1
 658 185.243 478.867 29.126 
Source:  Annuario delle cartiere d’ Italia, 1964, p. 13 and Pellegrini, 1954, p. 96-146 
Notes: (1) refers to the previous year. (2) includes pulp and paper mills. 
 
Table B.1: Structure of the Italian papermaking industry before 1940 
 
                                            
2
  Ferrari, 1999, p. 94. 
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As shown in Table B.1, the modernisation of the papermaking industry 
progressed at an unrelenting pace for more than half a century. Between 1876 
and 1911, the number of paper machines increased from 168 to 405. Not 
surprisingly, mechanisation of production was accompanied by a sharp rise in 
output and a moderate increase in employment. In 1911, output was more than 
ten times that recorded in 1862, while employment increased less than 25 per 
cent. More importantly, mechanisation transformed the industry in two crucial 
ways. It caused the disappearance of virtually all hand-made paper mills that did 
not adjust to the new technological advances and, contemporaneously, fostered 
the use of the public limited liability company (società anonima) as the most 
appropriate legal status for enterprises that aimed at setting up large, modern 
plants. The result was the appearance of a number of new plants that are still 
active and part of today’s leading papermaking groups in the country3.  
 
By the end of the 1920s, the mechanization of the papermaking industry could 
be considered to have almost been completed. Paper mills producing 
exclusively hand-made paper had virtually disappeared, and the average 
number of machines per mill had increased from 0.32 in 1876 to 1.20 in 1927.  
 
Although mechanised, the industry was clustered around micro- and small-scale 
firms (Table B.2), a feature that continues to characterise the Italian industry. In 
1927, a census recorded 510 paper mills, of which only 18 employed more than 
251 workers each and were equipped with some hundred paper machines in 
total. Besides this small group of large firms, there were 48 medium-scale 
(between 51 and 250 workers each), 304 small-scale (between six and 50 
workers) and 149 micro units employing, at most, five workers.  
 
 
                                            
3
 The company Cartiere Burgo, which has dominated the Italian industry for most of the 
twentieth century and is today’s largest group in Italy, was founded in 1905 and transformed into 
a stock company in 1924.  
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Number of employees  
(per mill)  
pulp paper  Total 
mills % mills % mills 
up to 1 employee 4 9.3 39 90.7 43 
between 2 and 5  16 13.7 101 86.3 117 
between 6 and 10  10 9.6 94 90.4 104 
between 11 and 50  40 16.0 210 84.0 250 
between 51 and 100  15 38.5 24 61.5 39 
between 101 and 250  5 17.2 24 82.8 29 
between 251 and 500  3 18.8 13 81.3 16 
between 501 and 1000 3 42.9 4 57.1 7 
above 1000 1 50.0 1 50.0 2 
Total  97 16.0 510 84.0 607 
Source: Pellegrini, 1954 
 
Table B.2: Distribution of plants by employment class, 1927 
 
 
The war years, from 1940 to 1945, represented an interruption in development 
of the papermaking industry, which was not considered essential. However, 
plants did not suffer major destruction. The rehabilitation of the plants started 
soon after the end of the war. By the end of the 1940s, total production had 
regained its pre-war levels (537,553 tonnes annually by 1950). Following the 
post-war recovery era, the papermaking industry began a period of expansion 
that, with some fluctuations, has lasted to today.  
 
 
B.2: The Evolution of the Paper Industry after the Second World War 
 
Throughout the second half of the twentieth century, the Italian paper industry 
enjoyed a continuous expansion. Italy currently produces nearly 18 times more 
paper than in the early 1950s and consumes 20 times more. Figure B.1 
illustrates the evolution of total capacity, production and apparent consumption 
between 1950 and 2003. The vertical difference between production and 
consumption equates trade balance. 
 
Three major phases can be distinguished in the evolution of the Italian 
papermaking industry after the Second World War: the first, from 1950 to the 
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early 1970s, characterised by rapid steady expansion of domestic production 
and substantial closure to foreign markets and producers; the second, from the 
early 1970s to the mid-1980s, characterised by substantial fluctuations in 
production and timid opening of the sector to the world; and the third, from the 
mid-1980s to 2004, characterised by an upward trend in production 
accompanied by increasing import penetration and internationalisation of Italian 
papermaking firms.  
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capacity production
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Figure B.1: Apparent consumption, production capacity and production of  
paper, 1954-2004 (in ‘000 tonnes) 
 
 
First phase: 1950 to early 1970s The rapid expansion of paper 
production in the first phase—on average, some ten per cent annually—was 
driven by domestic demand from a growing manufacturing sector, consumers 
with rising standards of living and an expanding service sector4. Trade volumes 
remained negligible, barely exceeding 10 per cent of total production.  
 
Stimulated by a sustained domestic demand for all types of paper as well as 
favourable expectations for the future of the industry, between the late 1950s 
                                            
4
  Domestic consumption of paper increased from some 11.2 to 65.4 kilograms per capita (see 
Balliano, P. and R. Lanzetti, Studio sull’evoluzione della concentrazione dell’industria cartaria in 
Italia, 1977, p. 30).   
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and late 1960s, capacity grew at buoyant rates (Figure B1). The expansion of 
the industry’s physical capital was realised through both greenfield investment 
and rehabilitation of a multitude of small- and medium-sized firms, in particular 
those producing straw or recycled papers in Lazio, Tuscany and Veneto. 
Between 1964 and 1971, the total number of paper machines not wider than one 
meter decreased from 131 to 51, whereas those wider than three meters 
increased from 32 to 625. Meanwhile, employment of unskilled workers began 
declining, which boosted productivity even further.  
 
The revamping of the industry was also accompanied by the appearance on the 
scene of a number of high-flying, new-to-the-industry businessmen, who built 
large plants with private and public funds. According to Assocarta, between 
1951 and 1964, the number of plants, for both pulp and paper, increased from 
556 in 1951 to a peak of 6406 in the mid-1960s. 
 
This wave of expansion was aimed mainly at increasing quantity, rather than 
quality. In fact, the majority of the new paper machines was designed for 
production of commodity papers, where economies of scale play a relevant role, 
such as for kraft paper, newsprint and magazine paper. For a country with no 
timber resources and expensive energy, this strategy soon revealed its 
shortcomings. In the second half of the 1960s, when domestic demand was 
slowing, the start-up of a number of large paper machines created substantial 
overcapacity in the market. With plants under-utilized and prices stagnating, a 
number of the established groups saw their profitability declining and their 
indebtedness to the banking system rising. To rescue them, the state stepped in 
                                            
5
  Balliano, P. and R. Lanzetti, 1977, op. p. 90 
6
  Census-based data on number of mills and firms are generally higher than those compiled by 
Assocarta because administrative registers include any enterprise that specifies pulp and 
papermaking as its principal activity as well as all local units, regardless of whether they are 
plants or administrative/commercial units. Moreover, the industrial census in 1951 did not 
differentiate pulp and paper mills from converters; therefore, the total number of mills in 1951 is 
an estimate by Assocarta.    
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by acquiring their controlling interest. This course of action merely postponed 
restructuring of the industry, which would emerge fully in the subsequent phase.  
 
Second phase: early 1970s to mid-1980s For the first time after the post-
war recovery era, the second phase saw substantial fluctuations in production 
and investment in physical capital leveling off. The sector grew at an average 
annual rate of 2.5 per cent, although in 1970, 1971, 1975, 1977 and most part of 
the first half of the 1980s the rates were negative7. Domestic demand continued 
to be largely met by domestic production. Throughout the 1970s, Italian 
papermakers maintained tight control of their domestic market, both because the 
Scandinavian producers were not interested in producing printing and writing 
papers and found it difficult to enter a market with a fragmented distribution 
system and because the Italian paper industry—primarily the printing paper 
segment—was sustained by a protective tariff system, a favourable exchange 
rate policy and direct state intervention.  
 
Despite being protected from foreign competition, this second phase saw a 
substantial contraction in the population of firms in the industry, which 
accelerated in the early 1980s. As shown in Table B.3, the total number of 
plants decreased from 610 in 1971 to 477 in 1981 and to 230 in 1986. The 
decline in the number of paper mills, which accelerated in the early 1980s, was 
driven by a series of concurrent events. Technological advances in 
papermaking, increased energy costs and more restrictive environmental 
regulations made it increasingly difficult for micro- and small-scale operations to 
survive and nearly killed the incentive for producing pulp locally, especially straw 
pulp. This caused the progressive closure of most of the pulp mills, the majority 
of micro- and small-scale plants and virtually all companies producing straw 
paper for packaging8.  
 
                                            
7
  Growth rates in the 1970s are likely be overestimated due to under-reporting in the 1960s.  
8
  Generally, these firms were small-scale operations, mainly localised in Tuscany.  
  159 
year 
number of  
mills 
output  
(tonnes per year) 
number of 
employees  
productivity  
productivity 
index (1971) 
output            
index (1971) 
1964 640 2,045,841 … … … … 
1971 610 3,288,341 40,957 80.29 100.00 100.00 
1976 554 4,498,937 … … … 136.81 
1981 477 4,841,983 34,037 142.26 177.18 147.25 
1986 230 4,807,215 28,000 171.69 213.84 146.19 
1991 222 5,932,188 27,900 212.62 264.83 180.40 
1996 210 7,588,700 25,700 295.28 367.78 230.78 
2001 200 8,926,100 24,800 359.92 448.29 271.45 
Source: various sources 
 
Table B.3: Key indicators of the Italian papermaking industry, selected years 
 
The restructuring of the industry is explicit in Table B.4. Between 1972 and 
1986, some 337 small plants—those producing between 1,000 and 5,000 
tonnes annually—closed, which accounts for nearly 95 per cent of the industry’s 
shake out in this second phase. Conversely, the presence of medium– and 
large-scale plants—those producing more than 50,000 tonnes annually—nearly 
tripled, from some 4.2 to 12.6 per cent. With the increase in plant size and 
decrease in employment, productivity more than doubled.  
 
year 
number of 
enterprises 
number of 
mills 
of which:  
  1,001 - 
5,000  
  5,001 - 
10,000 
  10,001 - 
25,000 
  25,001 - 
50,000 
  50,001 - 
100,000 
≥ 100,001 
1972 … 586 68,6  10,9  10,8  5,5  3,2  1,0  
1976 494 554 67,9 11,0  10,6  5,8  3,4  1,3  
1982 445 445 62,2  13,0  14,6  6,1  4,5  1,6  
1986 177 230 28,3  21,3  24,8  13,0  8,3  4,3  
1992 174 219 16,4  25,1  25,6  15,1  9,1  8,7  
1996 166 210 15,2  24,8  26,2  15,2  10,5  8,1  
2002 156 200 16,0  18,5  24,0  17,0  12,5  12,0  
Source: various sources 
Note: Size classes are measured in terms of tonnes per year. 
 
Table B.4: Distribution of paper mills by size, selected years (percentage) 
 
 
Third phase: mid-1980s to 2004  The mid-1980s represented a turning 
point in the Italian paper industry, on several levels. By then, the bulk of micro- 
and small-scale firms had disappeared. New policy measures lowering tariff 
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protection had been adopted making the Italian market profitable for the larger 
Scandinavian producers, while the Government decided not to renew law 
675/77, which allowed direct state intervention in the industry. Furthermore, the 
older generation of papermakers as well as the rampant new comers—such as 
the Cinque brothers and the Fabbri of Fabocart—had left the scene, replaced by 
new managers and stockholders. These developments paved the way for a 
change in strategy. Production of commodity paper, where economies of scale 
are central, was progressively abandoned in favour of manufacture of high-
quality, value-added paper. At this time that the segment of sanitary and 
household paper began its rapid expansion.  
 
As a result, the last two decades have witnessed an increasing openness of the 
Italian market, sustained consumption and renewed investment in the sector. 
Between 1984 and 2004, production grew at an average annual rate of 3.6 per 
cent, whereas consumption at 3.9 per cent. Imports and exports more than 
tripled. Investment in capacity slowly picked up in the early 1990s. With the 
exception of new tissue paper machines, the bulk of such investment was for 
upgrading existing paper machines, rather than establishing new ones. As 
Figure B.1 illustrates, the strategy helped to maintain healthy operating rates.  
 
More importantly, the industry has evolved towards a more consolidated 
structure with fewer firms of larger size. In 1982, the total number of registered 
companies was 445; 20 years later, it had decreased to 156. Micro- and small- 
plants have nearly disappeared. By contrast, the percentage of plants producing 
more than 50,000 tonnes annually has increased from six per cent to more than 
24 per cent of the total. 
B.3 Graphic Segment 
 
Within the paper sector, this class of grades has always made up a major 
segment of the industry, though its relevance has been declining. In the early 
1950s, it represented more than 47 per cent of total paper production.  Today, it 
  161 
accounts for some one-third9, suggesting diminishing attractiveness of this 
segment compared to packaging or sanitary papers. Figures B.2a and B.2b 
illustrate the evolution of production and apparent consumption of paper in 
relation to graphic paper, whereas the grey areas quantify the difference, that is, 
production and consumption of packaging, sanitary and industrial paper.   
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Fig. B.2: (a) Production of paper vs. production of graphic paper, 1964-2004  
          (b) Apparent consumption of paper vs. apparent consumption of  
graphic paper, 1964-2004 
 
 
These figures reveal that fluctuations in production and consumption of graphic 
paper have been less pronounced than those exhibited by the rest of the paper 
industry, mainly due to the fact that demand for graphic paper is less responsive 
to macroeconomic business cycles that packaging paper.   
 
Since the post-war recovery era, the graphic papermaking industry in Italy has 
been growing. Current production of graphic paper is nearly 13 times that in 
                                            
9
 Specifically, the relevance of graphic paper in the papermaking industry as a whole has been 
fluctuating during the last half century. From some 47 per cent in the early 1950s, the share 
decreased to some 36-38 per cent in the mid-1970s and increased to some 46 per cent by the 
mid-1980s. Since then, it has been loosing ground, again, to paper for sanitary and household 
use. In 2002, on the basis of data published by ASSOCARTA, the shares of graphic, packaging, 
sanitary and household and industrial paper were 33 per cent, 46.5 per cent, 14.2 per cent and 
6.3 per cent, respectively. 
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1950. Physical capital has also been enhanced in terms of the quality of the 
product as well as the speed, automation and reliability of the process, keeping 
pace with technological improvements.   
 
 
B.3.1 Production, Consumption and Trade of Graphic Paper 
 
By and large, the graphic paper sector has also evolved in three phases: 
uninterrupted rapid expansion, from 1950 to the early 1970s, pronounced 
fluctuations in production and fundamental structural changes, from the early 
1970 to the mid-1980s, and moderate growth with increased opening to the rest 
of the world, from the mid-1980s to 2004. Table B.3 illustrates the expansion of 
production, apparent consumption and capacity.   
 
Production and apparent consumption of graphic papers have expanded 
continuously throughout the period. Their pattern of expansion was virtually 
identical until the mid-1980s. Since, domestic demand was almost entirely met 
by domestic production. With the opening of the Italian market to foreign 
competition in the mid-1980s, domestic demand began to be increasingly served 
by imports, which is represented by the vertical difference between consumption 
and production in the above figure.   
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Figure B.3: Apparent consumption, production capacity and production of graphic 
paper, 1954-2004 (in ‘000 tonnes) 
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As shown by Figure B.3, significant fluctuations in demand and production 
began to appear towards the end of the 1960s. In the first two decades after the 
Second World War, the demand for graphic paper was dominated by the 
demand for printing and writing paper from the education and information 
sectors stimulated by the expanding literacy of the country. With the economic 
booming of the 1960s, demand for graphic paper began to be affected 
increasingly by demand for paper from the advertising sector, which is more 
susceptible to economic cycles. With minimal exports, at least until the mid-
1980s, production virtually coincided with domestic consumption.  
 
As for business cycles, Figure B.4 shows the de-trended times series for 
consumption (black line) and production (green line). Unlike production, 
apparent consumption seems to exhibit long-term cycles besides short-term 
ones. Figure B.4 shows two long periods in which deviations of consumption 
from its trend are persistently positive (1964-74 and 1988–2004 with the 
exception of a year) and one in which it is persistently negative (1975-1988).  
However, if the time series of deviations from trend are compared, their short-
term cycles appear similar in several occasions. This suggests that the 
determinants of short-term fluctuations are generally similar for production and 
consumption.  
0
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production apparent consumption
 
Figure B.4: De-trended times series for production and 
apparent consumption, 1964-2004 
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B.3.2 Capacity and Operating Rates 
 
Similar to production and consumption, capacity increased at a sustained rate 
until the early 1970s, slowed down in the second half of the 1970s and 1980s 
and surged in the 1980s. The evolution of capacity is best seen through the 
dynamics of operating rates, which are calculated as the ratio between 
production and capacity. It is a measure of the utilization of the physical capital 
in a given year in a given industry. In the case of the paper industry, it also 
provides an indication of the level of profits10. Figure B.5 shows the evolution of 
the operating rate (i.e. production/capacity) in the graphic sector between 1964 
and 2004. The red horizontal reference line is set at 0.83, which is the sample 
mean. If the period under consideration is limited to 1979 to 2004, then, the 
sample mean increases to 0.8711. The data on operating rates should be 
considered as indicative, rather than a precise description of the relation 
between capacity and production.  
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Figure B.5: Operating rates, 1964-2004 
 
                                            
10
 Operating rates can be viewed as a proxy for profitability because when supply is above 
demand, papermakers generally suspend production for a short period. As prices decline and 
operating rates worsen, which in turn increase production costs, profits decrease.  A description 
of the economics of papermaking is in Appendix A.     
11
 Ideally, machines should operate at a minimum of a 93 per cent operating rate. At that level, 
the market is generally strong enough to bear price increases and mills are maximizing their 
manufacturing efficiencies (van Roden, 1998)  
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As a result of the relentless accumulation of physical capital in the 1950s and 
1960s, the ratio between capacity and production had reached potentially 
damaging levels for the industry’s profitability by the early 1970s. With 
depressed prospects for demand growth, capacity growth slowed down capital 
until profitable and sustainable operation ratios were restored in the 1980s.  
Since then, capacity started to grow again (see Figure B.3), while maintaining 
operating rates near the long term optimal level.   
 
B.3.3 Newsprint vs. Printing and Writing Grades 
 
This evolution is the result of two distinct and somewhat opposite dynamics of its 
two major segments, which have been affected differently by the investment 
decisions of papermakers and, more importantly, by government policies and 
measures in the 1980s. Figures B.6 and B.7 below illustrate the dynamics of 
production of, apparent consumption of and trade in graphic paper and its major 
segments, that is, newsprint and printing/writing (pr/wr).  
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Figure B.6: Production, apparent consumption and trade of newsprint, 1950-2002 
 
As shown in Figure B.6, the newsprint segment of the industry enjoyed 
remarkable expansion in the first 15 years after the post-war recovery era, when 
it grew at an average rate of some 9.9 per cent annually. This expansion was 
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the response to a set of policy measures on newsprint prices12 and public funds, 
which the state put in place to foster the strategic publishing and printing 
industry. Between 1950 and 1965, some seven modern paper machines were 
installed and four new groups established, including three of the major Italian 
publishing houses. These new entries rapidly changed the industry, eroding the 
market shares of most of the traditional and smaller players, such as Cartiera 
Boimond, Cartiere Riunite Donzelli e Meridionali (CRDM), Cartiere Prealpine 
and Cartiere Tiburtine, which soon left the segment.  
 
 
Companies Firms New  plants 1960 1964 1968 1972 
Cartiere Burgo Burgo Mantova (1964) 42 35 27 29 
CRDM Donzelli Toscolano 10 6 6 5 
C.I.R Sertorio Serravalle 
21 14 14 10 Cartiere Sterzi Sterzi Crevacuore 
Soc. Idraulica del Liri Torlonia Avezzano (1959) 
Cartiere Prealpine Pirelli Verbania 
6 3 2 1 Cartiera Boimond Boimond Isola del Liri 
Cartiere Tiburtine UPM Tivoli 
Cartiera del Timavo Ferraro Duino (1958) 
11 28 31 32 
Cartiera di Arbatax Ferraro Arbatax (1964) 
Cartiera di Marzabotto Rizzoli  Marzabotto (1953) 9 13 14 15 
Cartiera di Ascoli Mondadori Ascoli (1965) 
1 1 6 8 
Cartiera Valcerusa Mondadori Voltri 
Source:  Reproduced from Balliano and Lanzetti, 1977, p. 109 
 
Table B.5: Market shares in the Italian newsprint and magazine sector (percentage) 
 
By the mid-1960s, this wave of expansion projects was exhausted. Meanwhile, 
the new plants had created overcapacity that the domestic economy, which was 
slowing and facing the first problems of a relatively chaotic post-war growth, was 
no longer able to absorb. Consequently, Italian papermakers were forced to look 
to foreign markets to utilise their plants at an acceptable level of efficiency. But 
                                            
12
  The state’s intervention in newsprint prices consisted of an elaborated mechanism of 
subsidies to the publishing industry. In practice, the Comitato Interministeriale dei Prezzi, a 
governmental committee overseeing domestic prices at national level, fixed the sale price for 
newsprint on the basis of the least efficient producer, while the Ente Nazionale Cellulosa e 
Carta, a public institute, was responsible for reimbursing editors through a rather complicated 
mechanism based on quotas. Therefore, on the supply side, this system ensured that domestic 
producers were shielded from foreign competition and, more importantly, the least efficient ones 
could survive. On the demand side, Italian publishers secured their paper requirements at a 
price comparable with that in international markets.   
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while the most modern mills could compete abroad, the old ones succumbed. 
However, the turning point in the evolution of the newsprint segment of the 
industry occurred in the early 1980s, when the Government embarked on a 
liberalisation policy.  With tariffs on imported newsprint having been substantially 
lowered and government subsidies greatly diminished, the Italian producers of 
this grade of paper found themselves unable to compete in price with their 
European rivals, especially the Scandinavian producers, who were, at that time, 
seeking wider market shares for newsprint and magazine paper in Europe. The 
result was a progressive penetration of the Italian market by foreign companies, 
which generated overcapacity domestically. Consequently, Italian producers 
started, very quickly, exiting this segment of the market, mainly by converting 
their paper machines exclusively to production of grades with higher value-
added, especially light-weight wood-free coated paper (LWC). By the mid-
1980s, only two plants were still producing mainly newsprint: one at Arbatax, 
with a total capacity of some 200,000 tonnes annually, and another at Mantova, 
with a total capacity of some 128,000 tonnes annually. While the former stopped 
producing in the mid-1990s, the latter is still in operation, accounting for most of 
the domestic production.   
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Figure B.7:  Production, apparent consumption and trade of  
                  printing and writing paper, 1950-2002 
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Unlike newsprint, the segment of printing and writing paper13 follows an 
evolution similar to that of graphic paper, of which it represents the bulk and, in 
turn, of the paper industry as a whole. After a rampant expansion in the first two 
post-war decades, the sector underwent a difficult period between the late 
1970s and early 1980s. With tariff protection dramatically diminished, 
disinvestment of the state from the sector and Scandinavian producers seeking 
a wider market share for newsprint and magazine papers in Europe, for which 
they had substantial comparative advantage, the already compromised financial 
position of some groups became acute. The nadir was reached in 1982, when 
Fabocart and a number of the traditional groups, such as Cartiere Binda, 
Cartiere Sterzi, Cartiera di Marzabotto, CIR and CRDM, faced severe financial 
difficulties and, ultimately, went into receivership.  In the years that followed, 
restructuring became the main challenge for those groups producing commodity 
grades of paper. Some of the plants were closed, while others were acquired 
and reorganised under different ownership.  
 
This negative phase was overcome by a substantial change in the strategy of 
the surviving groups, led by a new generation of managers and stockholders. 
With no timber resources, high energy costs and peripheral location in reference 
to Europe’s major paper-consuming markets, Italian producers began to 
concentrate on the production of high-quality, value-added paper. Following the 
liberalisation policies pursued by the state in the early 1980s, imports also 
started increasing at a sustained pace. Nevertheless, the Italian printing and 
printing paper industry has remained firmly in the hands of domestic producers.  
 
                                            
13
 Whereas newsprint is a specific grade and homogenous product, printing and writing paper 
encompasses a variety of different grades, from quasi-commodity paper to specialty and 
technical paper. Structurally, it is a concoction of different plants and firms where smaller hand-
made paper mills co-exist with larger modern ones for publication paper. For the purpose of this 
research, the producers of extra-light-weight paper are included in the graphic sector. As there is 
no universally employed classification, this almost specialty grade is often included in the 
residual category of so-called other papers or in the category of graphic paper, because it can 
be used for industrial purposes, such as cigarettes, as well as for printing, such as leaflets for 
pharmaceutical instructions.    
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APPENDIX D 
 
STATISTICAL TABLES 
 
      
  
  178 
 
Mill code Mill_Avezzano 
Mill address Via Leonardo da Vinci 1, 67051 Avezzano, Aquila (AQ) 
Telephone/fax 0863 04271; 0863 0509347 
e-mail/website www.burgo.it 
Contact person  
Business name Cartiere Burgo spa 
 
 
HISTORICAL NOTES 
 
 
No paper mill at this location had ever been in existence before 1955. 
 
1951 -1976 
 
On 31 January 1951, a new company SOCIETÀ IDROELETTRICA DEL LIRI was 
established by the Torlonia family to use the waters of the Fucino lake.  
 
In January 1954, Cassa per il Mezzogiorno agreed to release aid funds to  SOCIETÀ 
IDROELETTRICA DEL LIRI, which, together with the public administration of the Ente 
del Fucino, had submitted a proposal for the construction of a paper mill at Avezzano 
to make use of the nearby forest resources (mainly poplars). Construction work for 
the establishment of a new paper plant at this location began in 1955 and was 
concluded in 1959 with the installation of the first paper machine for the production of 
newsprint. The Torlonia family owned the paper mill.  
 
In 1964, the paper machine was modified to produce coated paper. During the period 
1966-68, a new paper machine was installed and a coater added in 1970.  
 
With the decline of the demand for newsprint and magazine paper in the late 1970s, 
production at the paper mill was re-oriented to light-weight coated paper (LWC).  
 
Source : Burgo, Paper and You : Fine Paper Division , p. 15-16 and Cellulosa e 
Carta, January 1954, p.17;  
1976 - 1982 
 
In 1976, the mill was acquired by FABOCART (Gruppo Fabbri-Bonelli) from the 
Torlonia family. The mill continued to operate under the founding company (SOCIETÀ 
IDROELETTRICA DEL LIRI), which was subsequently renamed CARTIERA DI 
AVEZZANO SPA.   
 
Source : R&S (1984) L’Industria della Carta, p. 18; PPI, January 1980, p. 10. 
1982 - 2001 
 
The crisis surrounding the Fabbri’s mills emerged in full in 1982. Early in the year, 
FABOCART group was broken up into two groups of companies: one headed by 
CARTIERE BURGO SPA, which controlled CARTIERA DEL SOLE, CARTIERA DEL 
TIMAVO, CARTIERA DI AVEZZANO and CARTIERA DI ROVERETO, and the other, 
CARTOSERVICE, consisting of the troubled CARTIERA DI ARBATAX, CIR, CRDM 
and NUOVA CARTIERA DELLA VALTELLINA. Specifically, on 1 January 1982, 
CARTIERA DI AVEZZANO SPA was absorbed by CARTIERE BURGO SPA.. 
 
After the government drastically reduced tariff protections and withdrew direct state 
intervention in the early 1980s, the convenience of producing newsprint in Italy was 
drastically curbed and most of the plants were converted to production of light-weight 
coated paper. Within this context, the Burgo group completed the conversion of the 
plant to LWC.  In 1987, an on-line four-headed coater on PM2 was installed and the 
colour preparation department enlarged. With the start-up of the new coater, output 
increased to 130,000 tons/year of printing papers of a higher basis weight (65-
150g/m2).  
 
Later on, in the context of a vast investment programme carried out by the BURGO 
Group in the 1990s, a turbogas power station was erected in 1999 and the second 
paper machine was rebuilt between 1999 and 2002.   
 
To finance a new wave of investments, in 2000, an OPA was launched.  DIECI SRL, 
who was a bidding consortium of a Italian companies led by the agro/chemical/energy 
company COMPART-MONTEDISON and several other stakeholders, acquired 
99.97% of the shares in CARTIERE BURGO. On 1 December 2001, CARTIERE 
BURGO SPA was absorbed by DIECI SRL.   
Source : Business Register; and PPI, Dec. 1987, p. 7 and, Burgo  Un secolo di carta 
p. 183. 
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2001 to date 
 
Following the take-over of CARTIERE BURGO SPA by the DIECI SRL, the acquiring 
company DIECI SRL was renamed CARTIERE BURGO SPA. All the production sites 
of the former CARTIERE BURGO SPA were taken over by the new company. As of 1 
December 2001, the mill at this location was officially registered as a local unit of the 
newly founded CARTIERE BURGO SPA (formerly, DIECI SRL). The Board of 
Directors and senior management of the previous Cartiere Burgo remained in place.  
 
However, in 2001 COMPART-MONTEDISON left the bidding consortium and the 
company started looking for a new partner with a solid industrial experience, which 
was identified in the MARCHI group. Between 2002 and 2003, the MARCHI group 
acquired shares from a number of original stakeholders of the DIECI group. By 
December 2003, the MARCHI group held 32% of the company shares.  
 
In early 2004, the Board of Directors approved the merger of the two groups, with the 
MARCHI group holding a 48.3% stake in BURGO. Both firms continued to operate as 
two separate units with their own brand names though.  The merger became effective 
in May 2004. 
 
Source : Business Register, visura and  Burgo  Un secolo di carta p. 188. 
 
 
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS 
current status ACTIVE 
year event sector 
1959 mill construction graphic (nesprint) 
 
 
PRODUCTION CHARACTERISTICS 
principal activity ATECO 21.12 
type of operation 
 pulp-making (until mid 1970s) 
 papermaking 
principal paper 
grades/ 
product categories    
1959- 1979/81: newsprint, magazine paper 
1964 on wards MWC and CWF: gloss and matt satin coated wood containing paper 
(65-85g/m2) and coated wood-free paper (89-200g/m2) 
 Capacity (in tons/y) 
Employment (at this 
location) 
Production (in tons/y) 
 1964    467 Asso 700q/d pulp, 1000q/d paper 
p 107 1970    540 Asso 1800q/d pulp, 2500q/d paper 
 1975-76      
 1978-79 130000 90000pulp    
 1981-82 130000 75000pulp 790   
 1986    602RESS 102000t/y RESS 
 1989 150000 75000pulp 790   
 1990 150000 40000pulp 474   
 1991 150000 40000pulp 665   
 1992 150000 40000pulp 665   
 1993 150000 40000pulp 661  capacity: 175000 PPI, Aug.93 
 1994 180000 40000pulp 600(110)   
 1995 180000  500   
 1996 180000  500  capacity: 180000 PPI,May96 
 1997 180000  500   
 1998 220000  528   
 1999 220000 40000pulp 530   
 2000 220000 40000pulp 530   
 2001 220000 40000pulp 530   
 2002 245000 40000pulp 282   
 2003 245000 275000www 511   
 2004  300000www  463 www  
 
 
PHYSICAL CAPITAL   
Sources Paper machines 
1964 Annuario Escher Wyss installed in 1959 [3.65m wide] 
1970 Annuario 
Escher Wyss  [3.65m wide] 
Beloit [5.3 m wide], 
Farinet PM1: installed in 1958, upgraded in 1986 [3.7 m wide, 500m/min] 
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Sources Paper machines 
PPI 
PM1: inst. 1959, rebuilt in 1976 [3.8 m wide, 500m/min] 
PM2: inst. 1968, rebuilt in 1986 [5.32 m wide, 830 m/min] 
RESS 86 2 PM 
company source 
PM1:  Escher Wyss installed in 1959 [3.65m wide; 100t/d], modified in 1964 (coated 
paper), upgraded in 1978/80, rebuilt in 1996 [3.8m wide, 600m/min], today [coated 
wood-containing, 65-85 g/m2, 785m/min, capacity 80000t/y] 
 
PM2: Beloit installed in 1966/68 [5.3 m wide; 150t/d], modified in 1970 (coated paper), 
upgraded in 1978/80, upgraded in 1987, rebuilt in 1999/02, today [89-200g/m2, 
900m/min, capacity 220,000] 
Note 
According to Burgo, Paper and You : Fine Paper Division , p. 15-16, PM1 was 
modified to produce coated paper in 1964 and PM2 was converted to coated papers 
in 1970. However, the production of newsprint ended in the late 1970s. It is 
reasonable to assume that the production of newsprint gradually diminished.  
 
 
PROPRIETORY RELATIONSHIPS  
 
period name status ownership 
1951 - 1976 Società Idroelettrica Liri spa - 
Cartiera di Avezzano 
ceased 
Torlonia family 
1976 - 1982 Fabbri-Bonelli group 
1982 - 2001 Cartiere Burgo spa ceased Burgo Group  
2001 to date Cartiere Burgo spa/ Dieci srl active 
Burgo Group (different 
shareholders) 
Notes 
 
 
 
 
DATABASE REFERENCES 
Company identifier Enterprise identifier 
1959 - 1982 avezzano_com 1959 – 1976  torlonia_enterprise 
1982 - 2001 burgoA_com 1976 – 1982  fabbri_enterprise 
2001 to date burgoB_com 1982 to date burgo_enterprise 
  
 
 
Table D.1: Profile of the paper mill at Avezzano 
  
 
Date  
APER-
LU 
Data 
CONST 
Data 
ISCR 
Data 
INI-AT 
Data  
CES-AT 
Data 
CESSAZ 
Data 
FALLIM 
Data 
LIQUID 
Cartiera di Avezzano  01/11/59 31/01/51 07/03/51 31/01/51  01/01/82   
Cartiere Burgo 01/01/82 1905  21/04/11  01/12/01   
Cartiere Burgo  01/12/01 17/02/00 07/12/01      
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year 
PRODUCTION ('000 tonnes)                                                                           APPARENT CONSUMPTION ('000 tonnes)                                             
total 
paper & 
board 
graphic paper 
total 
paper & 
board 
graphic paper 
total 
graphic 
of which:  
total 
graphic 
of which:  
newsprint 
printing & 
writing 
newsprint 
printing & 
writing 
1938 478.9 75.0 … … 478.2 … … … 
1950 537.6 247.4 91.9 155.5 552.0 … … … 
1951 572.0 268.9 104.6 164.4 528.7 … … … 
1952 589.5 280.2 112.0 168.2 589.5 … … … 
1953 667.1 316.6 116.2 200.4 703.7 … … … 
1954 738.3 340.1 127.8 212.3 765.0 … … … 
1955 815.3 366.7 143.6 223.1 840.2 … … … 
1956 930.1 414.1 167.2 246.9 953.5 … … … 
1957 1,061.1 449.2 181.2 268.1 1,117.6 … … … 
1958 1,095.1 461.0 187.2 273.7 1,160.8 … … … 
1959 1,263.0 522.7 217.3 305.4 1,329.2 … … … 
1960 1,468.8 609.0 259.3 349.8 1,554.2 … … … 
1961 1,599.6 697.9 293.2 404.7 1,801.4 … … … 
1962 1,761.7 767.5 330.0 437.5 1,977.5 … … … 
1963 1,926.5 824.9 331.6 493.3 2,217.5 … … … 
1964 2,045.8 910.4 378.8 531.6 2,269.3 … … … 
1965 2,208.0 953.0 379.4 573.7 2,340.8 … … … 
1966 2,524.0 1,088.8 407.7 681.2 2,596.6 … … … 
1967 2,890.5 1,238.4 272.7 965.7 2,977.7 1,158.8 232.9 925.9 
1968 3,024.1 1,283.3 264.5 1,018.8 3,113.0 1,177.9 223.4 954.5 
1969 3,452.9 1,475.7 303.6 1,172.1 3,555.9 1,296.9 256.2 1,040.7 
1970 3,448.1 1,475.4 272.7 1,202.6 3,542.1 1,339.5 244.0 1,095.4 
1971 3,288.3 1,404.4 267.4 1,137.1 3,403.9 1,275.1 246.1 1,029.0 
1972 3,577.5 1,542.4 258.8 1,283.6 3,706.9 1,388.0 232.9 1,155.1 
1973 4,369.2 1,701.8 260.9 1,440.8 4,638.7 1,630.9 260.0 1,371.0 
1974 4,395.9 1,652.4 266.3 1,386.1 4,672.8 1,606.3 267.3 1,339.0 
1975 3,582.9 1,318.8 247.3 1,071.5 3,508.3 1,220.9 249.2 971.7 
1976 4,498.9 1,733.1 263.1 1,470.0 4,466.8 1,600.0 265.9 1,334.1 
1977 4,271.8 1,715.8 234.5 1,481.3 4,235.2 1,535.2 217.5 1,317.7 
1978 4,615.5 1,980.4 262.5 1,718.0 4,591.8 1,725.4 259.1 1,466.4 
1979 5,100.6 2,159.3 272.3 1,887.1 5,243.8 1,904.1 282.2 1,621.9 
1980 4,945.4 2,071.3 277.3 1,794.1 5,255.4 1,939.5 328.0 1,611.5 
1981 4,842.0 2,034.7 233.9 1,800.8 4,983.7 1,886.0 320.5 1,565.5 
1982 4,502.8 1,877.0 197.7 1,679.2 4,813.0 1,815.6 315.0 1,500.6 
1983 4,259.5 1,865.1 193.8 1,671.3 4,855.0 1,913.3 370.7 1,542.6 
1984 4,722.1 2,211.9 206.8 2,005.2 5,295.6 2,141.4 354.4 1,787.0 
1985 4,673.5 2,105.0 178.1 1,926.8 5,297.6 2,155.2 381.3 1,773.9 
1986 4,807.2 2,199.7 212.3 1,987.4 5,523.0 2,295.5 458.8 1,836.8 
1987 5,107.9 2,266.4 243.0 2,023.4 6,069.0 2,522.3 517.5 2,004.8 
1988 5,512.4 2,472.2 264.1 2,208.0 6,352.3 2,738.0 504.2 2,233.9 
1989 5,735.1 2,535.2 252.5 2,282.7 6,852.8 3,065.8 604.5 2,461.3 
1990 5,731.8 2,479.8 233.1 2,246.7 7,088.2 3,135.8 607.6 2,528.2 
1991 5,932.2 2,447.8 196.2 2,251.6 7,267.2 3,131.0 553.9 2,577.1 
1992 6,131.9 2,440.0 101.0 2,339.0 7,801.7 3,390.4 578.1 2,802.6 
1993 6,811.0 2,419.4 83.1 2,336.3 8,327.8 3,152.0 543.9 2,601.3 
1994 7,395.0 2,659.5 154.0 2,505.5 9,232.4 3,461.1 621.1 2,835.7 
1995 7,477.3 2,674.7 183.0 2,491.7 9,109.8 3,445.6 640.4 2,800.0 
1996 7,588.7 2,615.2 178.4 2,436.8 8,801.1 3,163.7 557.3 2,591.0 
1997 8,146.7 2,833.9 179.7 2,654.2 9,751.3 3,606.9 632.5 2,966.4 
1998 8,365.9 2,868.9 189.7 2,679.2 10,050.1 3,763.5 642.9 3,115.8 
1999 8,676.3 2,968.9 183.3 2,785.6 10,412.9 3,917.5 648.6 3,259.5 
2000 9,125.2 3,044.8 173.7 2,871.1 11,069.8 4,147.4 709.1 3,421.4 
2001 8,926.1 2,951.3 188.8 2,762.5 10,772.5 3,986.6 756.9 3,213.8 
2002 9,272.8 3,064.1 175.1 2,889.0 10,993.3 3,966.3 705.7 3,251.9 
2003 9,373.3 3,189.0 182.0 3,007.0 11,045.8  4,197.9  …  … 
2004 9,547.1 3,303.0 193.0 3,110.0  11,465.5  4,314.3  …  … 
         
Source: Industria della carta and other sources (see section C.1) 
 
 
Table D.2: Production and apparent consumption of paper by grade, 1938 and 
1950-2004 
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year 
IMPORTS EXPORTS 
total 
paper & 
board 
graphic paper 
total 
paper & 
board 
graphic paper 
total 
graphic 
of which:  
total 
graphic 
of which:  
newsprint 
printing & 
writing 
newsprint 
printing & 
writing 
1938 11.3 … … … 12.0 … … … 
1950 32.0 … … … 17.6 … … … 
1951 23.7 … … … 67.1 … … … 
1952 27.8 … … … 27.8 … … … 
1953 56.0 … … … 19.4 … … … 
1954 55.5 … … … 28.8 … … … 
1955 57.3 … … … 32.4 … … … 
1956 51.7 … … … 28.3 … … … 
1957 84.8 … … … 28.4 … … … 
1958 88.4 … … … 22.7 … … … 
1959 97.3 … … … 31.2 … … … 
1960 131.5 … … … 46.0 … … … 
1961 240.1 … … … 38.3 … … … 
1962 254.2 … … … 38.4 … … … 
1963 334.7 … … … 43.7 … … … 
1964 314.0 … … … 90.6 … … … 
1965 316.1 … … … 183.2 … … … 
1966 292.8 … … … 220.2 … … … 
1967 314.8 28.6 11.9 16.7 227.5 108.2 51.7 56.5 
1968 361.2 31.9 10.3 21.6 272.3 137.3 51.4 85.9 
1969 442.6 34.6 9.2 25.4 339.6 213.4 56.6 156.8 
1970 462.6 46.8 13.8 32.9 368.6 182.7 42.5 140.1 
1971 505.9 46.5 1.6 44.9 390.4 175.9 22.9 153.0 
1972 544.1 44.4 1.5 42.9 414.7 198.8 27.4 171.4 
1973 661.4 81.9 8.3 73.6 391.9 152.7 9.3 143.5 
1974 757.2 127.2 11.1 116.1 480.4 173.4 10.1 163.3 
1975 359.5 62.0 11.5 50.5 434.1 160.0 9.6 150.4 
1976 483.5 82.5 12.3 70.2 515.7 215.7 9.5 206.1 
1977 538.3 93.1 18.9 74.2 575.0 273.7 35.9 237.8 
1978 626.5 103.9 27.6 76.3 650.1 358.9 31.0 327.9 
1979 855.9 153.9 42.8 111.1 712.6 409.1 32.9 376.2 
1980 993.5 238.1 63.7 174.4 683.5 369.9 12.9 357.0 
1981 963.0 310.6 99.0 211.6 821.3 459.3 12.3 446.9 
1982 1,099.6 364.8 121.6 243.2 789.5 426.2 4.4 421.8 
1983 1,373.1 478.8 178.2 300.5 777.7 430.6 1.3 429.3 
1984 1,601.6 536.2 176.7 359.5 1,028.0 606.7 29.0 577.6 
1985 1,615.8 609.4 231.7 377.8 991.8 559.2 28.5 530.7 
1986 1,791.7 672.7 257.6 415.1 1,075.8 576.8 11.1 565.7 
1987 2,123.7 867.9 302.5 565.4 1,162.6 612.0 27.9 584.1 
1988 2,149.2 871.7 265.1 606.6 1,309.2 605.8 25.1 580.7 
1989 2,491.6 1,114.0 363.8 750.2 1,373.8 583.3 11.7 571.6 
1990 2,760.7 1,227.3 384.9 842.4 1,404.3 571.4 10.4 560.9 
1991 2,846.0 1,263.2 363.8 899.4 1,511.0 580.0 6.1 573.9 
1992 3,299.9 1,553.4 486.8 1,066.6 1,630.1 612.7 9.7 603.0 
1993 3,143.4 1,554.9 467.6 1,087.3 1,626.6 829.1 6.8 822.3 
1994 3,587.3 1,734.3 471.4 1,262.9 1,749.9 937.0 4.3 932.7 
1995 3,521.5 1,732.4 462.6 1,269.8 1,889.0 966.7 5.2 961.5 
1996 3,325.7 1,550.5 394.3 1,156.2 2,113.3 1,017.4 15.4 1,002.0 
1997 3,857.6 1,872.6 460.8 1,411.8 2,253.0 1,107.6 8.0 1,099.6 
1998 3,934.9 1,960.7 458.0 1,502.7 2,250.7 1,070.9 4.8 1,066.1 
1999 4,173.5 2,095.4 474.7 1,620.7 2,436.9 1,156.2 9.4 1,146.8 
2000 4,543.8 2,343.1 552.3 1,790.8 2,599.2 1,257.4 16.9 1,240.5 
2001 4,464.4 2,283.2 584.0 1,699.2 2,618.0 1,263.8 15.9 1,247.9 
2002 4,534.9 2,226.1 539.3 1,686.8 2,814.4 1,332.6 8.7 1,323.9 
2003 4,557.7 2,522.2 … … 2,885.2 1,416.0 … … 
2004 5,046.9 2,740.7 … … 3,248.5  1,646.2 … … 
         
Source: Industria della carta and other sources (see section C.1) 
 
 
Table D.3: Imports and exports of paper by grade, 1938 and 1950-2004 
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Entry Exit Net entry Turbulence 
Existing 
plants 
  number rate number rate number rate number rate number 
1964 2 3.0 0 0.0 2 2.9 2 3.0 69 
1965 1 1.4 0 0.0 1 1.4 1 1.4 70 
1966 1 1.4 1 1.4 0 0.0 2 2.9 70 
1967 0 0.0 1 1.4 -1 -1.4 1 1.4 69 
1968 1 1.4 2 2.9 -1 -1.5 3 4.4 68 
1969 0 0.0 1 1.5 -1 -1.5 1 1.5 67 
1970 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 67 
1971 1 1.5 0 0.0 1 1.5 1 1.5 68 
1972 0 0.0 2 3.0 -2 -3.0 2 3.0 66 
1973 0 0.0 1 1.5 -1 -1.5 1 1.5 65 
1974 1 1.5 1 1.5 0 0.0 2 3.1 65 
1975 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 65 
1976 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 65 
1977 1 1.5 3 4.8 -2 -3.2 4 6.3 63 
1978 0 0.0 1 1.6 -1 -1.6 1 1.6 62 
1979 0 0.0 1 1.6 -1 -1.6 1 1.6 61 
1980 1 1.6 1 1.6 0 0.0 2 3.3 61 
1981 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 61 
1982 0 0.0 3 5.2 -3 -5.2 3 5.2 58 
1983 0 0.0 1 1.8 -1 -1.8 1 1.8 57 
1984 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 57 
1985 0 0.0 2 3.6 -2 -3.6 2 3.6 55 
1986 1 1.8 0 0.0 1 1.8 1 1.8 56 
1987 0 0.0 1 1.8 -1 -1.8 1 1.8 55 
1988 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 55 
1989 0 0.0 1 1.9 -1 -1.9 1 1.9 54 
1990 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 54 
1991 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 54 
1992 0 0.0 1 1.9 -1 -1.9 1 1.9 53 
1993 1 1.9 2 3.8 -1 -1.9 3 5.7 52 
1994 0 0.0 1 2.0 -1 -2.0 1 2.0 51 
1995 0 0.0 1 2.0 -1 -2.0 1 2.0 50 
1996 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 50 
1997 0 0.0 5 11.1 -5 -11.1 5 11.1 45 
1998 0 0.0 1 2.3 -1 -2.3 1 2.3 44 
1999 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 44 
2000 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 44 
2001 0 0.0 1 2.3 -1 -2.3 1 2.3 43 
2002 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 43 
2003 0 0.0 2 4.9 -2 -4.9 2 4.9 41 
2004 0 0.0 1 2.5 -1 -2.5 1 2.5 40 
Total  11   38   -27   49     
 
 
 
Table D.4: Plant entry, exit, net entry and turbulence, 1964-2004 
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Entry Exit Net entry Turbulence 
Existing  
firms 
  
number rate number rate number rate number rate number 
1964 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 48 
1965 1 2.0 0 0.0 1 2.0 1 2.0 49 
1966 1 2.0 1 2.0 0 0.0 2 4.1 49 
1967 0 0.0 3 6.1 -3 -6.5 3 6.1 46 
1968 1 2.3 3 6.5 -2 -4.5 4 8.8 44 
1969 1 2.3 1 2.3 0 0.0 2 4.5 44 
1970 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 44 
1971 1 2.3 1 2.3 0 0.0 2 4.5 44 
1972 2 4.8 4 9.1 -2 -4.8 6 13.9 42 
1973 0 0.0 2 4.8 -2 -5.0 2 4.8 40 
1974 0 0.0 1 2.5 -1 -2.6 1 2.5 39 
1975 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 39 
1976 0 0.0 2 5.1 -2 -5.4 2 5.1 37 
1977 1 2.9 3 8.1 -2 -5.7 4 11.0 35 
1978 0 0.0 1 2.9 -1 -2.9 1 2.9 34 
1979 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 34 
1980 3 8.6 2 5.9 1 2.9 5 14.5 35 
1981 1 2.9 1 2.9 0 0.0 2 5.7 35 
1982 0 0.0 1 2.9 -1 -2.9 1 2.9 34 
1983 0 0.0 2 5.9 -2 -6.3 2 5.9 32 
1984 1 3.2 2 6.3 -1 -3.2 3 9.5 31 
1985 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 31 
1986 2 6.3 1 3.2 1 3.1 3 9.5 32 
1987 1 3.3 3 9.4 -2 -6.7 4 12.7 30 
1988 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 30 
1989 1 3.6 3 10.0 -2 -7.1 4 13.6 28 
1990 0 0.0 1 3.6 -1 -3.7 1 3.6 27 
1991 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 27 
1992 1 3.7 1 3.7 0 0.0 2 7.4 27 
1993 1 3.7 1 3.7 0 0.0 2 7.4 27 
1994 0 0.0 2 7.4 -2 -8.0 2 7.4 25 
1995 1 3.8 0 0.0 1 3.8 1 3.8 26 
1996 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 26 
1997 1 4.2 3 11.5 -2 -8.3 4 15.7 24 
1998 3 12.5 3 12.5 0 0.0 6 25.0 24 
1999 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 24 
2000 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 24 
2001 1 4.2 1 4.2 0 0.0 2 8.3 24 
2002 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 24 
2003 0 0.0 2 8.3 -2 -9.1 2 8.3 22 
2004 1 4.5 1 4.5 0 0.0 2 9.1 22 
                    
 
 
 
Table D.5: Enterprise entry, exit, net entry and turbulence, 1964-2004 
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Entry Exit Net entry Turbulence 
Existing 
companies 
  number rate number rate number rate number rate number 
1964 2 3.5 0 0.0 2 3.5 2 3.5 57 
1965 1 1.7 0 0.0 1 1.7 1 1.7 58 
1966 1 1.7 1 1.7 0 0.0 2 3.4 58 
1967 0 0.0 4 6.9 -4 -7.4 4 6.9 54 
1968 1 1.9 3 5.6 -2 -3.8 4 7.5 52 
1969 2 3.8 1 1.9 1 1.9 3 5.7 53 
1970 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 53 
1971 1 1.9 0 0.0 1 1.9 1 1.9 54 
1972 3 5.7 4 7.4 -1 -1.9 7 13.1 53 
1973 2 3.8 3 5.7 -1 -1.9 5 9.5 52 
1974 1 2.0 2 3.8 -1 -2.0 3 5.8 51 
1975 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 51 
1976 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 51 
1977 1 2.0 3 5.9 -2 -4.1 4 7.9 49 
1978 0 0.0 1 2.0 -1 -2.1 1 2.0 48 
1979 2 4.4 5 10.4 -3 -6.7 7 14.9 45 
1980 2 4.5 3 6.7 -1 -2.3 5 11.2 44 
1981 0 0.0 1 2.3 -1 -2.3 1 2.3 43 
1982 0 0.0 2 4.7 -2 -4.9 2 4.7 41 
1983 1 2.4 1 2.4 0 0.0 2 4.9 41 
1984 2 4.9 2 4.9 0 0.0 4 9.8 41 
1985 1 2.5 2 4.9 -1 -2.5 3 7.4 40 
1986 3 7.5 3 7.5 0 0.0 6 15.0 40 
1987 1 2.6 3 7.5 -2 -5.3 4 10.1 38 
1988 1 2.6 0 0.0 1 2.6 1 2.6 39 
1989 7 18.4 8 20.5 -1 -2.6 15 38.9 38 
1990 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 38 
1991 0 0.0 1 2.6 -1 -2.7 1 2.6 37 
1992 2 5.4 2 5.4 0 0.0 4 10.8 37 
1993 2 5.6 3 8.1 -1 -2.8 5 13.7 36 
1994 1 3.0 4 11.1 -3 -9.1 5 14.1 33 
1995 2 6.1 2 6.1 0 0.0 4 12.1 33 
1996 0 0.0 1 3.0 -1 -3.1 1 3.0 32 
1997 0 0.0 2 6.3 -2 -6.7 2 6.3 30 
1998 9 28.1 7 23.3 2 6.3 16 51.5 32 
1999 0 0.0 2 6.3 -2 -6.7 2 6.3 30 
2000 4 12.9 3 10.0 1 3.2 7 22.9 31 
2001 3 10.3 5 16.1 -2 -6.9 8 26.5 29 
2002 2 7.1 3 10.3 -1 -3.6 5 17.5 28 
2003 0 0.0 4 14.3 -4 -16.7 4 14.3 24 
2004 1 4.2 1 4.2 0 0.0 2 8.3 24 
                    
 
 
 
Table D.6: Company entry, exit, net entry and turbulence, 1964-2004 
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Entry   Exit 
total 
of which:  
total 
of which: 
construction conversion   shutdown conversion 
1964 2 2 0  0 0 0 
1965 1 1 0  0 0 0 
1966 1 0 1  1 1 0 
1967 0 0 0  1 1 0 
1968 1 1 0  2 2 0 
1969 0 0 0  1 1 0 
1970 0 0 0  0 0 0 
1971 1 1 0  0 0 0 
1972 0 0 0  2 1 1 
1973 0 0 0  1 1 0 
1974 1 0 1  1 1 0 
1975 0 0 0  0 0 0 
1976 0 0 0  0 0 0 
1977 1 1 0  3 3 0 
1978 0 0 0  1 1 0 
1979 0 0 0  1 1 0 
1980 1 0 1  1 1 0 
1981 0 0 0  0 0 0 
1982 0 0 0  3 3 0 
1983 0 0 0  1 1 0 
1984 0 0 0  0 0 0 
1985 0 0 0  2 2 0 
1986 1 0 1  0 0 0 
1987 0 0 0  1 1 0 
1988 0 0 0  0 0 0 
1989 0 0 0  1 1 0 
1990 0 0 0  0 0 0 
1991 0 0 0  0 0 0 
1992 0 0 0  1 1 0 
1993 1 1 0  2 2 0 
1994 0 0 0  1 1 0 
1995 0 0 0  1 1 0 
1996 0 0 0  0 0 0 
1997 0 0 0  5 5 0 
1998 0 0 0  1 1 0 
1999 0 0 0  0 0 0 
2000 0 0 0  0 0 0 
2001 0 0 0  1 1 0 
2002 0 0 0  0 0 0 
2003 0 0 0  2 1 1 
2004 0 0 0  1 0 1 
                
 
 
 
Table D.7: Plant entry and exit by mode, 1964-2004 
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Entry   Exit 
total 
of which:  
total 
of which: 
greenfield acquisition   shutdown sale 
1964 0 0 0   0 0 0 
1965 1 1 0  0 0 0 
1966 1 1 0  1 1 0 
1967 0 0 0  3 1 2 
1968 1 1 0  3 1 2 
1969 1 0 1  1 0 1 
1970 0 0 0  0 0 0 
1971 1 0 1  1 0 1 
1972 2 0 2  4 1 3 
1973 0 0 0  2 1 1 
1974 0 0 0  1 1 0 
1975 0 0 0  0 0 0 
1976 0 0 0  2 0 2 
1977 1 1 0  3 3 0 
1978 0 0 0  1 1 0 
1979 0 0 0  0 0 0 
1980 3 1 2  2 1 1 
1981 1 0 1  1 0 1 
1982 0 0 0  1 1 0 
1983 0 0 0  2 0 2 
1984 1 0 1  2 0 2 
1985 0 0 0  0 0 0 
1986 2 1 1  1 0 1 
1987 1 0 1  3 0 3 
1988 0 0 0  0 0 0 
1989 1 0 1  3 0 3 
1990 0 0 0  1 0 1 
1991 0 0 0  0 0 0 
1992 1 0 1  1 0 1 
1993 1 1 0  1 1 0 
1994 0 0 0  2 1 1 
1995 1 0 1  0 0 0 
1996 0 0 0  0 0 0 
1997 1 0 1  3 2 1 
1998 3 0 3  3 1 2 
1999 0 0 0  0 0 0 
2000 0 0 0  0 0 0 
2001 1 0 1  1 1 0 
2002 0 0 0  0 0 0 
2003 0 0 0  2 2 0 
2004 1 0 1  1 0 1 
                
 
 
 
Table D.8: Enterprise entry and exit by mode, 1964-2004 
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Entry   Exit 
 
total 
of which:  
total 
of which: 
  
greenfield acquisition 
re-
organization 
  shutdown sale 
re-
organization 
1964 2 2 0 0  0 0 0 0 
1965 1 1 0 0  0 0 0 0 
1966 1 1 0 0  1 1 0 0 
1967 0 0 0 0  4 1 2 1 
1968 1 1 0 0  3 1 2 0 
1969 2 0 1 1  1 0 0 1 
1970 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 
1971 1 1 0 0  0 0 0 0 
1972 3 0 3 0  4 1 2 1 
1973 2 0 0 2  3 1 0 2 
1974 1 0 1 0  2 1 0 1 
1975 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 
1976 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 
1977 1 1 0 0  3 3 0 0 
1978 0 0 0 0  1 1 0 0 
1979 2 0 0 2  5 1 0 4 
1980 2 1 1 0  3 1 1 1 
1981 0 0 0 0  1 0 1 0 
1982 0 0 0 0  2 2 0 0 
1983 1 0 1 0  1 0 1 0 
1984 2 0 2 0  2 0 2 0 
1985 1 0 0 1  2 0 0 2 
1986 3 1 1 1  3 0 2 1 
1987 1 0 1 0  3 0 3 0 
1988 1 0 1 0  0 0 0 0 
1989 7 0 5 2  8 0 5 3 
1990 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 
1991 0 0 0 0  1 0 0 1 
1992 2 0 1 1  2 0 1 1 
1993 2 1 0 1  3 1 0 2 
1994 1 0 0 1  4 1 1 2 
1995 2 0 1 1  2 1 0 1 
1996 0 0 0 0  1 0 0 1 
1997 0 0 0 0  2 2 0 0 
1998 9 0 8 1  7 1 4 2 
1999 0 0 0 0  2 0 0 2 
2000 4 0 0 4  3 0 0 3 
2001 3 0 1 2  5 1 1 3 
2002 2 0 0 2  3 0 0 3 
2003 0 0 0 0  4 2 0 2 
2004 1 0 1 0  1 0 1 0 
                    
 
 
 
Table D.9: Company entry and exit by mode, 1964-2004 
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  PSIZEMRK PSIZEG GSIZEMRK VINTAGE EFFICIENT LPAGE LGAGE OWN25TOT OWN40TOT COM25TOT COM40TOT 
PSIZEMRK 1.000           
PSIZEG -0.247 1.000          
GSIZEMRK 0.675 -0.586 1.000         
VINTAGE 0.318 -0.075 0.209 1.000        
EFFICIENT 0.674 -0.223 0.532 0.397 1.000       
LPAGE -0.117 0.021 -0.087 -0.214 -0.147 1.000      
LGAGE 0.092 -0.260 0.243 -0.026 -0.056 0.339 1.000     
OWN25TOT 0.088 -0.019 -0.025 0.186 0.354 0.243 -0.348 1.000    
OWN40TOT 0.185 -0.012 0.034 0.171 0.357 0.219 -0.364 0.946 1.000   
COM25TOT 0.295 -0.077 0.173 0.303 0.464 0.165 0.027 0.683 0.683 1.000  
COM40TOT 0.239 -0.076 0.172 0.227 0.396 0.146 0.005 0.631 0.665 0.941 1.000 
            
  
OWNCOM 
10TOT 
OWNCOM 
25TOT 
OWNCOM 
40TOT 
OWNONLY 
10TOT 
OWNONLY 
25TOT 
OWNONLY 
40TOT 
COMONLY 
10TOT 
COMONLY 
25TOT 
COMONLY 
40TOT 
    
OWNCOM10TOT 1.000           
OWNCOM25TOT 0.739 1.000          
OWNCOM40TOT 0.746 0.949 1.000         
OWNONLY10TOT -0.165 0.046 0.018 1.000        
OWNONLY25TOT 0.271 0.367 0.291 0.628 1.000       
OWNONLY40TOT 0.261 0.353 0.253 0.447 0.860 1.000      
COMONLY10TOT 0.163 0.304 0.274 -0.264 0.144 0.128 1.000     
COMONLY25TOT 0.108 0.209 0.193 -0.235 0.125 0.168 0.860 1.000    
COMONLY40TOT 0.074 0.193 0.168 -0.267 0.097 0.153 0.796 0.905 1.000   
                        
 
 
 
Table D.10: Correlation matrix for selected variables 
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PDIVER  GTYPE  GDIVER  GCORE 
  
graphic 
only 
graphic 
& other 
total   
single-
plant 
firm 
multi- 
plant 
firm 
total   
graphic 
only 
graphic 
& other 
total   graphic 
other 
than 
graphic 
total 
PSPEC                               
commodity 38 17 55  19 34 53  36 17 53  24 29 53 
specialty  15 8 23  9 16 25  15 10 25  16 9 25 
total 53 25 78  28 50 78  51 27 78  40 38 78 
Pearson chi-squared test chi2(1) = 0.1117    Pr = 0.74  chi2(1) = 0.0002    Pr = 0.99    chi2(1) = 0.4713    Pr = 0.492    chi2(1) = 2.3820    Pr = 0.12   
                
PDIVER                
graphic only     17 38 55  42 13 55  28 27 55 
graphic & other     11 12 23  9 14 23  12 11 23 
total      28 50 78  51 27 78  40 38 78 
Pearson chi-squared test   chi2(1) = 2.0170    Pr = 0.16    chi2(1) = 9.9337    Pr < 0.01    chi2(1) = 0.0104    Pr = 0.92   
                 
GTYPE                
single-plant firm         20 8 28  16 12 28 
multi-plant firm         31 19 50  24 26 50 
total         51 27 78  40 38 78 
Pearson chi-squared test          chi2(1) = 0.7050    Pr = 0.40   chi2(1) = 0.6005    Pr = 0.44 
                 
GDIVER                
graphic only             34 17 51 
graphic & other             6 21 27 
total             40 38 78 
Pearson chi-squared test             chi2(1) = 13.9579    Pr < 0.01 
                                
 
 
Table D.11: Cross-tabulation of selected plant- and firm-level variables
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Table D.12: Cross-tabulation between plant location and  
selected categorical variables
  
Centre 
and 
South 
Italy  
  
North 
West 
Italy 
  
North 
East 
Italy 
  Italy 
PMVINTAGE        
before 1945 11  3  3  17 
1945-1963 7  17  9  33 
1964-2004 11  8  9  28 
total  29  28  21  78 
Pearson chi2 test  Chi2(4) = 10.827  Pr = 0.029 
PSPEC        
commodity 18  21  14  53 
specialty  11  7  7  25 
total 29  28  21  78 
Pearson chi2 test  Chi2(2) = 1.1154  Pr = 0.573 
PDIVER        
graphic only 21  22  12  55 
graphic & other 8  6  9  23 
total  29  28  21  78 
Pearson chi2 test  Chi2(2) = 2.7304  Pr = 0.255 
GTYPE        
single-plant firm 16  10  2  28 
multi-plant firm 13  18  19  50 
Total 29  28  21  78 
Pearson chi2 test  Chi2(2) = 11.0303  Pr = 0.004 
GDIVER        
graphic only 18  18  15  51 
graphic & other 11  10  6  27 
total 29  28  21  78 
Pearson chi2 test  Chi2(2) = 0.4947  Pr = 0.781 
GCORE        
graphic  16  12  12  40 
other than graphic 13  16  9  38 
total 29  28  21  78 
Pearson chi2 test  Chi2(2) = 1.2599  Pr = 0.533 
GPAST        
papermaker 12  11  7  30 
industrialist 4  6  3  13 
capitalist 13  11  11  35 
total 29  28  21  78 
Pearson chi2 test  Chi2(4) = 1.2674  Pr = 0.867   
OWN25        
no ownership change 15  15  15  45 
ownership change  14  13  6  33 
total 29  28  21  78 
Pearson chi2 test  Chi2(2) = 2.2414  Pr = 0.326 
COM25        
no registration change 15  11  5  31 
registration change  14  17  16  47 
total 29  28  21  78 
Pearson chi2 test  Chi2(2) = 3.9670  Pr = 0.138 
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Centre 
and 
South 
Italy  
  
North 
West 
Italy 
  
North 
East 
Italy 
  Italy 
OWN25TOT              
0 change 15  15  15  45 
1 change 6  5  5  16 
2 changes 6  4  0  10 
3 changes 1  3  1  5 
4 changes 1  1  0  2 
total 29  28  21  78 
Pearson chi2 test  Chi2(8) = 7.3289   Pr = 0.502   
OWNCOM25TOT        
0 change 19  17  17  53 
1 change 5  7  3  15 
2 changes 5  3  1  9 
3 changes 0  1  0  1 
total 29  28  21  78 
Pearson chi2 test  Chi2(8) = 5.0302   Pr = 0.540 
OWNONLY25TOT        
0 change 20  20  18  58 
1 change 8  6  3  17 
2 changes 1  2  0  3 
Total 29  28  21  78 
Pearson chi2 test  Chi2(8) = 3.1121  Pr = 0.539 
COM25TOT        
0 change 15  11  5  31 
1 change 4  11  8  23 
2 changes 6  2  7  15 
3 changes 3  2  0  5 
4 changes 1  0  1  2 
5 changes 0  2  0  2 
total  29  28  21  78 
Pearson chi2 test  Chi2(8) = 17.4268   Pr = 0.065 
COMONLY25TOT        
0 change 20  17  5  42 
1 change 5  9  11  25 
2 changes 3  0  5  8 
3 changes 1  2  0  3 
total 29  28  21  78 
Pearson chi2 test  Chi2(8) = 17.9314   Pr = 0.006 
                
 
 
 
Table D.13: Cross-tabulation between plant location and  
selected history-level variables 
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Before 
1945 
  
Between 
1945-
1963 
  
Between 
1964-
2004 
  Total  
OWN25        
no ownership change 11  23  11  45 
ownership change  4  12  17  33 
Total 15  35  28  78 
Pearson chi2 test  Chi2(2) = 1.2674  Pr = 0.043 
COM25        
no registration change 9  15  7  31 
registration change  6  20  21  47 
Total 15  35  28  78 
Pearson chi2 test  Chi2(2) = 5.2533  Pr = 0.072   
OWNONLY25        
no mere ownership change 13  29  16  58 
mere ownership change  2  6  12  20 
Total 15  35  28  78 
Pearson chi2 test  Chi2(2) = 6.8701  Pr = 0.032 
OWNCOM25        
no ownership/registration change 12  26  15  53 
ownership/registration change  3  9  13  25 
Total 15  35  28  78 
Pearson chi2 test  Chi2(2) = 4.3032  Pr = 0.116 
COMONLY25        
no mere registration change 12  19  11  42 
registration  change  3  16  17  36 
Total 15  35  28  78 
Pearson chi2 test  Chi2(2) = 6.5199  Pr = 0.038 
 
 
 
Table D14: Cross-tabulation between technological vintage and  
selected history-level variables 
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PDIVER PSPEC PMMAX 
graphic 
only  
graphic 
& other 
P-value commodity specialty P-value 
above 
3m wide 
less than 
3m wide 
P-value 
PSIZEMRK 1.97 0.71 0.00 2.10 0.54 0.00 3.62 0.47 0.00 
PSIZEG 52.92 63.27 0.35 58.78 50.01 0.41 44.75 62.25 0.08 
GSIZEMRK 12.39 6.85 0.17 14.07 3.74 0.00 21.42 4.78 0.00 
OWN25TOT 0.67 0.96 0.38 0.77 0.72 0.85 1.29 0.46 0.00 
COM25TOT 1.00 1.35 0.34 1.09 1.12 0.93 1.71 0.76 0.00 
             
  
GTYPE GDIVER GCORE 
single-
plant firm 
multi-
plant firm 
P-value 
graphic 
only  
graphic 
& other 
P-value 
graphic 
only  
graphic 
& other 
P-value 
PSIZEMRK 0.54 2.19 0.00 2.09 0.67 0.00 1.81 1.38 0.43 
PSIZEG 100.00 31.31 0.00 54.15 59.41 0.63 52.88 59.21 0.53 
GSIZEMRK 0.54 16.48 0.00 13.81 4.98 0.01 15.35 5.92 0.02 
OWN25TOT 0.43 0.94 0.04 0.59 1.07 0.10 0.40 1.13 0.00 
COM25TOT 0.61 1.38 0.00 1.02 1.26 0.47 0.95 1.26 0.26 
             
  
OWN25 COM25   
  
no 
change  
change P-value no change  change P-value       
PSIZEMRK 1.13 2.24 0.05 0.65 2.23 0.00       
                    
 
 
 
Table D.15: Two-sample tests for group mean 
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Means  Ha: diff≠0 
  
  Leavers Survivors   P-value 
Regional-level 
variables 
AREAREST 0.447 0.300  0.178   
AREANW 0.447 0.275  0.113  
AREANE 0.105 0.425  0.002 *** 
        
Plant-level 
variables 
PSIZEMRK 0.007 0.025   0.001 *** 
PSIZEG 0.059 0.527  0.506  
PDIVER 0.316 0.275  0.693  
PSPEC 0.342 0.300  0.690  
LPAGE 4.537 4.390  0.474  
VINTAGE45 0.316 0.075  0.007 *** 
VINTAGE64 0.500 0.400  0.375  
VINATGE04 0.184 0.525  0.002 *** 
PMMAX 0.763 0.525  0.028 ** 
PMMIN 0.237 0.475  0.028 ** 
VINTAGE 65.789 87.917  0.012 ** 
EFFICIENT 17.105 44.250  0.006 *** 
              
Firm-level 
variables 
GTYPE 0.579 0.700   0.265   
GDIVER 0.500 0.200  0.005 *** 
GCORE 0.605 0.375  0.042 ** 
LGAGE 4.046 3.562  0.041 ** 
GSIZEMRK 0.062 0.151  0.023 ** 
              
History-level 
variables 
GPAST1 0.474 0.425  0.666  
GPAST2 0.158 0.175  0.839  
GPAST3 0.500 0.395  0.356  
CHANGE 1.368 2.025  0.082 * 
OWN25 0.395 0.450  0.627  
COM25 0.421 0.775  0.001 *** 
OWNCOM25 0.289 0.350  0.572  
OWNONLY25 0.263 0.250  0.896    
COMONLY25 0.237 0.675  0.000 *** 
OWN25TOT 0.763 0.750  0.957  
COM25TOT 0.711 1.475  0.005 *** 
OWNCOM25TOT 0.421 0.500  0.645  
OWNONLY25TOT 0.342 0.250  0.457  
COMONLY25TOT 0.289 0.975  0.000 *** 
              
 
 
 
Table D.16: Statistics for selected variables 
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 CR4 CR8 CR2-4 CR5-8 HHI 
Total 
Capacity in 
tonnes 
1964 50.133 68.001 28.648 17.868 929.824 1,354,390 
1965 48.245 65.440 27.569 17.195 872.336 1,407,390 
1966 49.307 66.380 29.434 17.073 858.874 1,464,290 
1967 50.131 71.574 29.918 21.443 904.599 1,489,090 
1968 49.302 70.268 31.711 20.966 894.779 1,733,790 
1969 53.880 73.672 36.632 19.792 958.137 1,768,390 
1970 53.330 73.231 36.474 19.901 938.526 1,809,490 
1971 52.155 71.627 35.149 19.472 911.166 1,849,290 
1972 58.447 77.352 39.989 18.905 1085.075 1,904,290 
1973 62.836 80.311 41.460 17.476 1237.286 1,974,190 
1974 62.986 80.296 41.521 17.311 1239.472 2,021,890 
1975 62.742 80.371 40.862 17.630 1239.474 2,070,390 
1976 67.329 83.548 40.676 16.219 1437.695 2,149,890 
1977 67.688 84.164 40.514 16.476 1461.912 2,218,990 
1978 68.458 84.564 46.454 16.106 1433.293 2,269,990 
1979 68.731 84.746 35.305 16.015 1830.857 2,314,090 
1980 67.400 83.717 34.626 16.317 1783.934 2,375,370 
1981 67.055 83.808 32.179 16.753 1818.640 2,465,870 
1982 67.994 84.142 32.316 16.148 1868.752 2,424,470 
1983 69.792 84.814 32.796 15.022 1963.427 2,416,470 
1984 68.253 84.204 32.244 15.951 1879.618 2,482,670 
1985 67.547 83.670 30.129 16.123 1883.226 2,456,070 
1986 66.645 83.063 26.833 16.418 1969.000 2,515,570 
1987 67.589 86.805 27.647 19.216 2000.921 2,549,970 
1988 67.616 86.765 27.651 19.149 2000.873 2,611,070 
1989 73.518 91.249 25.421 17.731 2647.887 2,678,920 
1990 73.944 91.397 26.278 17.453 2625.003 2,738,820 
1991 73.840 91.433 25.946 17.593 2640.020 2,773,820 
1992 74.242 91.888 25.211 17.646 2735.104 2,984,820 
1993 72.149 90.185 25.408 18.036 2517.845 2,981,320 
1994 73.668 91.583 25.572 17.915 2644.717 3,001,320 
1995 76.134 91.209 26.473 15.075 2787.819 2,906,720 
1996 76.652 91.419 27.672 14.767 2733.038 3,001,220 
1997 78.902 92.718 26.617 13.815 3036.539 2,849,720 
1998 75.301 87.277 25.290 11.975 2785.458 2,889,320 
1999 75.978 87.711 25.439 11.733 2840.550 3,076,820 
2000 76.504 87.952 26.187 11.447 2832.901 3,179,820 
2001 78.641 89.214 25.194 10.573 3136.535 3,433,320 
2002 81.837 90.261 29.501 8.425 3068.354 3,525,320 
2003 82.457 90.724 29.603 8.268 3121.666 3,604,320 
2004 84.328 91.918 30.275 7.590 3258.811 3,524,320 
              
 
 
 
Table D.17: Concentration indexes and market shares of the  
first eight largest firms, 1964-2004 
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1st 
Largest 
Firm 
2nd 
Largest 
Firm 
3rd 
Largest 
Firm 
4th 
Largest 
Firm 
5th 
Largest 
Firm 
6th 
Largest 
Firm 
7th 
Largest 
Firm 
8th 
Largest 
Firm 
1964 21.486 15.136 7.125 6.387 4.799 4.799 4.430 3.839 
1965 20.677 14.566 6.857 6.146 4.618 4.618 4.263 3.695 
1966 19.873 14.000 9.527 5.907 4.780 4.439 4.098 3.756 
1967 20.214 13.767 9.368 6.783 6.212 6.165 4.701 4.365 
1968 17.592 17.476 8.104 6.131 5.825 5.335 5.191 4.614 
1969 17.247 17.247 13.176 6.209 5.938 5.089 4.524 4.241 
1970 16.856 16.856 13.263 6.355 6.085 4.974 4.697 4.145 
1971 17.007 16.493 12.437 6.219 5.954 4.867 4.596 4.056 
1972 18.458 17.828 16.016 6.144 6.039 4.726 4.201 3.938 
1973 21.376 18.438 17.197 5.825 5.065 4.559 4.052 3.799 
1974 21.465 18.003 17.583 5.935 4.946 4.699 3.957 3.709 
1975 21.880 17.654 17.412 5.796 4.830 4.589 4.589 3.623 
1976 26.653 17.396 17.233 6.047 4.651 4.586 3.954 3.028 
1977 27.175 17.328 17.102 6.084 4.957 4.443 3.831 3.245 
1978 22.005 21.498 19.009 5.947 4.846 4.344 3.745 3.172 
1979 33.426 23.573 5.899 5.834 4.753 4.477 3.673 3.111 
1980 32.774 23.575 5.683 5.368 4.782 4.631 3.831 3.073 
1981 34.876 21.027 5.678 5.475 5.454 4.607 3.690 3.001 
1982 35.678 20.974 5.774 5.568 5.548 4.537 3.052 3.011 
1983 36.996 21.043 5.959 5.794 5.173 3.931 3.021 2.897 
1984 36.010 20.482 6.122 5.639 5.156 5.035 2.940 2.820 
1985 37.418 17.508 6.514 6.107 5.212 5.089 2.972 2.850 
1986 39.812 14.510 6.360 5.963 5.088 4.969 3.180 3.180 
1987 39.942 14.314 7.059 6.275 5.882 5.098 4.902 3.333 
1988 39.964 13.979 7.315 6.358 5.745 5.170 4.979 3.255 
1989 48.098 12.206 6.906 6.309 6.159 5.973 3.173 2.426 
1990 47.667 13.071 6.755 6.452 6.024 5.842 3.213 2.373 
1991 47.894 12.906 6.670 6.370 5.948 5.768 3.353 2.524 
1992 49.031 12.245 6.701 6.265 6.198 5.987 3.116 2.345 
1993 46.741 11.589 7.111 6.708 6.205 6.128 3.354 2.348 
1994 48.096 11.512 7.397 6.664 6.164 6.087 3.332 2.332 
1995 49.661 11.955 7.637 6.881 5.959 3.612 3.096 2.408 
1996 48.980 11.579 8.330 7.764 5.871 3.565 2.999 2.332 
1997 52.286 9.492 8.773 8.352 5.885 3.930 2.456 1.544 
1998 50.012 11.006 8.653 5.631 4.222 2.665 2.665 2.423 
1999 50.539 11.050 9.100 5.288 3.965 2.828 2.503 2.438 
2000 50.317 11.950 8.806 5.431 3.931 2.736 2.422 2.359 
2001 53.447 12.087 8.155 4.951 3.786 2.534 2.184 2.068 
2002 52.336 12.339 9.361 7.801 2.468 2.127 2.014 1.815 
2003 52.853 12.208 9.156 8.240 2.442 2.081 1.970 1.776 
2004 54.053 12.485 9.364 8.427 2.128 2.015 1.816 1.632 
                  
 
 
 
Table D.18: Market shares of the first eight largest firms, 1964-2004 
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  Arbatax Bertelsman Burgo Donzelli  Fabbri Fedrigoni 
1964 0 0 21.486 6.387 0 2.916 
1965 0 0 20.677 6.146 3.197 3.162 
1966 0 0 19.873 5.907 3.073 3.039 
1967 0 0 20.214 6.165 3.022 2.988 
1968 0 0 17.476 6.131 5.191 2.970 
1969 0 0 17.247 6.209 5.089 2.912 
1970 0 0 16.856 6.085 4.974 2.846 
1971 0 2.433 17.007 5.954 4.867 3.272 
1972 0 2.363 17.828 0.110 6.144 3.177 
1973 0 5.065 17.197 0.127 21.376 3.065 
1974 0 4.946 17.583 0.124 21.465 3.066 
1975 0 4.830 17.412 0.121 21.880 2.995 
1976 0 4.651 17.233 0.140 26.653 3.028 
1977 0 4.957 17.328 0.135 27.175 2.934 
1978 0 4.846 22.005 0.132 21.498 2.868 
1979 0 4.753 23.573 0.156 33.426 2.813 
1980 0 4.631 23.575 0.152 32.774 3.073 
1981 0 5.678 31.252 0.146 21.027 2.960 
1982 0 5.774 35.678 0.177 20.974 3.011 
1983 0 5.794 36.996 0.178 21.043 3.021 
1984 0 5.639 36.010 0.777 20.482 2.940 
1985 0 6.107 37.418 1.026 17.508 2.972 
1986 0 5.963 39.812 1.002 14.510 3.180 
1987 0 5.882 39.942 0.988 14.314 3.333 
1988 0 5.745 39.964 1.007 13.979 3.255 
1989 6.906 5.973 48.098 0.982 0 3.173 
1990 6.755 5.842 47.667 1.008 0 3.213 
1991 6.670 5.768 47.894 0.995 0 3.353 
1992 6.198 6.701 49.031 0.975 0 3.116 
1993 6.205 6.708 46.741 1.110 0 3.354 
1994 6.164 6.664 48.096 1.103 0 3.332 
1995 3.096 6.881 49.661 1.170 0 3.612 
1996 2.999 8.330 48.980 1.133 0 3.565 
1997 0 8.773 52.286 1.193 0 3.930 
1998 0 0 50.012 1.246 0 4.222 
1999 0 0 50.539 1.170 0 3.965 
2000 0 0 50.317 1.132 0 3.931 
2001 0 0 53.447 1.180 0 3.786 
2002 0 0 52.336 1.149 0 7.801 
2003 0 0 52.853 1.124 0 8.240 
2004 0 0 54.053 1.149 0 8.427 
              
 
 
 
Table D.19: Market shares of the largest firms, 1964-2004 
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  Ferraro Lecta Marchi Pirelli Sottrici State 
1964 15.136 0 0.886 3.692 0.554 7.125 
1965 14.566 0 0.853 3.553 0.533 6.857 
1966 14.000 0 0.922 3.415 0.512 9.527 
1967 13.767 0 0.907 6.783 0.504 9.368 
1968 17.592 0 0.779 5.825 1.298 8.104 
1969 17.247 0 0.848 5.938 1.470 13.176 
1970 16.856 0 0.829 6.355 1.437 13.263 
1971 16.493 0 2.163 6.219 1.406 12.437 
1972 16.016 0 2.101 6.039 1.365 18.458 
1973 0.000 0 2.026 5.825 1.393 18.438 
1974 0.000 0 2.053 5.935 1.459 18.003 
1975 0.000 0 2.149 5.796 1.425 17.654 
1976 0.000 0 2.070 6.047 1.372 17.396 
1977 0.000 0 2.005 6.084 1.893 17.102 
1978 0.000 0 2.026 5.947 1.850 19.009 
1979 0.000 0 2.074 5.834 1.815 5.899 
1980 0.000 0 2.021 5.683 1.768 5.368 
1981 0.000 0 2.028 5.475 1.825 5.454 
1982 0.000 0 2.062 5.568 1.856 5.548 
1983 0.000 0 2.069 2.897 1.862 5.959 
1984 0.000 0 2.336 2.820 2.215 6.122 
1985 0.000 0 2.361 2.850 2.239 6.514 
1986 0.000 0 2.385 0 3.180 6.360 
1987 0.000 0 2.353 0 7.059 6.275 
1988 0.000 0 2.489 0 7.315 6.358 
1989 0.000 0 6.159 0 12.206 6.309 
1990 0.000 0 6.024 0 13.071 6.452 
1991 0.000 0 5.948 0 12.906 6.370 
1992 0.000 0 6.265 0 12.245 5.987 
1993 0.000 0 7.111 0 11.589 6.128 
1994 0.000 0 7.397 0 11.512 6.087 
1995 0.000 0 7.637 0 11.955 5.959 
1996 0.000 0 7.764 0 11.579 5.871 
1997 0.000 0 8.352 0 9.492 5.885 
1998 0.000 8.653 11.006 0 0 5.631 
1999 0.000 9.100 11.050 0 0 5.288 
2000 0.000 8.806 11.950 0 0 5.431 
2001 0.000 8.155 12.087 0 0 4.951 
2002 0.000 9.361 12.339 0 0 0.993 
2003 0.000 9.156 12.208 0 0 0.971 
2004 0.000 9.364 12.485 0 0 0.993 
              
 
 
 
Table D.19: Cont. 
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APPENDIX C 
 
DATA SOURCES AND MEASURES 
 
 
 
This Appendix lists and defines all variables used in the quantitative analyses 
of the thesis. It is organised into five sections, according to their scope.     
 
 
C.1 Industrial Structure Variables (Chapter 4 and Appendix B) 
 
This section contains the variables referring to the industry‟s structural 
evolution. These time-series data have been compiled from a number of 
official publications, with only the exception of the time series of total capacity 
of the graphic sector, which has been assembled using the thesis‟s dataset. 
They have been mainly used in Chapter 4 and Appendix B. 
 
 
Variables 
Sources and Technical Notes 
Code Definition 
PROD_pb Annual production of paper and 
paperboard in tonnes 
The time-series for 1954 to 2004 is drawn from 
L’industria della carta.  
PROD_gr Annual production of graphic 
paper in tonnes 
The time-series for 1954 to 2004 is drawn 
L’industria della carta. 
KAP_pb Annual capacity of paper and 
paperboard in tonnes 
The time-series for 1964 to 2004 is that published 
by FAO. FAO is the primary source for data on 
production capacity in the paper industry. Since 
1961, FAO has published the annual survey as 
World Pulp and Paper Capacities, which contains 
country tables for capacity (in tonnes) by major 
grade categories. FAO figures are based on 
information received early in the year of publication 
from national correspondents, which, in Italy, is 
ASSOCARTA.   
KAP_gr Annual capacity of graphic paper 
in tonnes 
The time-series for 1964 to 2004 is drawn from the 
thesis‟ plant database by aggregating the estimated 
annual capacity of each plant manufacturing graphic 
paper. Compared to the time-series published by 
FAO, there are minor discrepancies. 
IMP_pb Annual imports of paper and 
paperboard in tonnes 
The time-series for 1954 to 2004 is drawn from 
L’industria della carta. 
IMP_gr Annual imports of graphic paper 
in tonnes 
The time series on imports are those published in 
Industria della Carta for 1966 to 1994, Industria 
Cartaria: Rassegna statistica 1993-2002 for 1995 to 
2002. Figures for 2003 and 2004 have been 
obtained by interpolation . As both publications were 
published by ASSOCARTA, figures over time are 
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Variables 
Sources and Technical Notes 
Code Definition 
consistent. For 1951 to 1965, no comparable data 
on imports are available. Following the transfer of 
responsibility for data collection from the Ministry of 
Industry to ISTAT, in 1966 more detailed 
classification and wider coverage were introduced, 
which made it difficult to reconcile trade data prior to 
and after 1966.  
EXP_pb Annual exports of paper and 
paperboard in tonnes 
The time-series for 1954 to 2004 is drawn from 
L’industria della carta. 
EXP_gr Annual exports of graphic paper 
in tonnes 
The time series on exports are those published in 
Industria della Carta for 1966 to 1994 and Industria 
Cartaria: Rassegna statistica 1993-2002 for 1995 to 
2002. Figures for 2003 and 2004 have been 
obtained by interpolation. As both publications were 
published by ASSOCARTA, figures over times are 
entirely consistent. For 1951 to 1965, see note on 
IMP_gr 
CON_pb Annual apparent consumption of 
paper and paperboard in tonnes 
Apparent consumption of paper and paperboard 
was calculated directly from the time-series of 
production, exports and imports published by 
ASSOCARTA 
CON_gr Annual apparent consumption of 
graphic paper in tonnes 
Apparent consumption of graphic paper was 
calculated directly from the time-series of 
production, exports and imports as published by 
ASSOCARTA, with two major exceptions due to the 
unavailability of trade figures for the years prior to 
1967 and subsequent to 2002 (see technical notes 
for imports and exports above).   
(1) For 1951 to 1966, the times series reproduces 
figures published in Carta e Cellulosa, 9/1976, 
p. 5. Since there is no difference between 
figures published by ASSOCARTA and Carta e 
Cellulosa for the overlapping years (1967-72), it 
is reasonable to assume that figures prior to 
and after 1967 are consistent.  
(2) For 2003 to 2004, figures are calculated by 
dividing FAO data on apparent consumption by 
1.007. For 1961 to 2002, apparent consumption 
on the basis of FAO data was, on average, 
1.007 more than apparent consumption 
calculated on the basis of ASSOCARTA data.   
OP_pb Annual operating rate in the 
paper and paperboard industry 
Operating rates are calculated as the ratio of annual 
production to annual capacity of paper and 
paperboard  
OP_gr Annual operating rate in the 
graphic paper industry 
Operating rates are calculated as the ratio of annual 
production to annual capacity of graphic paper 
 
 
C.2 Demographic Business Variables  (Chapters 3 and 4) 
 
Besides economics, the study of entry and exit has been a playground for 
scholars from other disciplines, most notably, demography, organisational 
 171 
sociology and economic geography. Firms can be seen as a specific type of 
organisations (organisational sociology), located in a specific geographical 
area (economic geography and regional studies) and going through stages 
between the two events of foundation and dissolution (demography)1. As a 
result of this cross-fertilisation, economists have borrowed a number of terms 
from these disciplines, especially demography. This section defines the 
demographic business variables.  
 
Turbulence  In the literature of entry and exit, especially firm creation, 
turbulence has come to denote, “the flux created in an industry‟s total 
composition by flows of births and deaths” (Beesley and Hamilton, 1984, p. 
220). Though widely adopted, this usage is not universal. In discussing the 
empirical evidence on entry and exit patterns and resulting churning of 
population, Caves uses, instead, generational turnover (1976) or, simply, firm 
mobility (1998). On the contrary, for Davies and Geroski (1997) turbulence 
indicates changes in market shares of individual firms.  In this research, 
turbulence follows the definition used by Sutton (1997), that is, the sum of 
gross entry and gross exit rates. Beesly and Hamilton (1984) propose a 
similar measurement. They define turbulence as the ratio between gross 
entry and exit and total number of establishments in the industry before the 
start of the birth and death flows.   
 
Firm  As noted in Chapter 3, firm designates the generic profit-
making legal entity of a decentralised economy. Firm and enterprise are used 
interchangeably throughout the thesis. 
 
Enterprise As detailed in Chapter 3, enterprise is the empirical counterpart 
of the firm, as one of the unit of analysis of the thesis‟ research.  
 
                                            
1
 van Wissen (2002) provides an overview of the demography of the firm as an 
interdisciplinary research field of economics, sociology and economic geography. By 
highlighting similarities and differences between the birth and death processes in firm and 
human populations, the author discusses the application of demographic concepts and tools 
to the study of firms and their extent.  
 172 
Company  Company, or registered company, is used exclusively to 
indicate the reporting unit of the dataset of legal personalities.  
 
Turnover  In general terms, the turnover of subjects in a particular 
population or group is the pace at which subjects leave it and are replaced by 
others. As such, this term could be used, “to embrace three processes: the 
births and deaths of business units…, variations in sizes and market shares 
of continuing units…, and shifts between enterprises in the control of 
continuing business units” (Caves, 1998, p.1948). However, in this thesis, 
this term has a restricted usage. It denotes the change in the market share of 
the top-ranked firms.  
 
Demographic events, turnover  Drawing on the analogy of the birth-
death process between firms and people, demographic is added to qualify 
the corresponding noun as pertaining to the process of population change. 
For example, demographic events refer to firm entry, birth, exit and death 
and demographic turnover to the churning of the population through the entry 
of new firms and exit of old ones.  
  
Firm mobility As defined by Caves (1998), firm mobility indicates 
changes in configuration of the industry‟s incumbent population as some 
firms grow and others shrink.  
 
 
Variables 
Sources and Technical notes 
code definition 
EN_firm 
EN_com 
EN_plant 
Total number of firms, 
companies and plants that 
entered the industry in a year  
The times series for 1964 to 2004 are drawn from 
the thesis‟ database 
EX_firm 
EX_com 
EX_plant 
Total number of firms, 
companies and plants that 
exited the industry in a year  
ibidem. 
NEN_firm 
NEN_com 
NEN_plant 
Difference between total 
number of firms, companies and 
plants that entered the industry 
and those that have exited in a 
year  
ibidem. 
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Variables 
Sources and Technical notes 
code definition 
TUR_firm 
TUR_com 
TUR_plant 
Sum of total number of firms, 
companies and plants that 
entered and exited the industry 
in a year  
ibidem. 
REN_ Entry rate calculated as the 
percentage of total number of 
exits out of total number of 
existing of firms, companies and 
plants in a year  
ibidem. 
REX_ Exit rate calculated as the 
percentage of total number of 
exits out of total number of 
existing of firms, companies and 
plants in a year 
ibidem. 
RNEN_ Net entry rate calculated as the 
percentage of net entries out of 
total number of existing firms, 
companies and plants  in a year  
ibidem. 
RTUR_ Turbulence rate calculated as 
the sum of entry and exit in a 
year 
ibidem. 
 
 
 
C.3 Variables for Chapter 5 
 
This section defines the variables used for the econometric analysis of plant 
closure presented in Chapter 5. All variables are measured as at end-of-year, 
if not indicated otherwise. They are drawn from the thesis dataset.  
 
 
Variables 
Code Definition 
EXIT Indicator variable that equals 1 if plant j exits the industry during year t and zero 
otherwise. 
Plant level variables 
PSIZEMRK Ratio between plant j„‟s estimated capacity (in tonnes) and total estimated 
capacity of the Italian graphic paper industry  
PSIZEG Ratio between plant j„‟s estimated capacity (in tonnes) and total estimated 
capacity of the firm owning plant j  
PSPEC Indicator variable that equals 1 if plant j produces technical or specialty grades, 
and 0 otherwise 
LPAGE Logarithm of number of years of existence of plant j in the Italian graphic paper 
industry  
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Variables 
Code Definition 
PDIVER Indicator variable that equals 1 if the plant produces only graphic paper and 0 if 
it produces a mix of graphic and other paper grades (packaging, tissue and 
industrial, etc.) 
PMMAX Indicator variables that equals 1 if the width of the largest paper machine in 
operation at plant j is less than 3m and 0 otherwise 
VINTAGE45 
VINTAGE64 
VINTAGE04 
Dummy variables indicating age class of the newest paper machine in 
operation at plant j. Paper machines are grouped by installation year into three 
categories: before 1945, between 1945 and 1963 and from 1964 onwards.  
VINTAGE Percentage of functioning paper machines installed before 1945 out of the total 
number of machines in operation at plant j  
EFFICIENT Percentage of paper machines at least 3m wide out of the total number in 
operation at plant j. 
Firm level variables 
GTYPE  Indicator variable that equals 1 if plant j is owned/controlled by a firm with more 
than one papermaking plant (regardless of paper category) and 0 otherwise.  
LGAGE Logarithm of number of years of existence of the firm owning/controlling plant j  
GCORE Indicator variable that equals 1 if the sector of origin of the firm 
owning/controlling plant j was other than graphic papermaking and 0 if firm was 
making graphic paper or started as graphic papermaker.  
GDIVER Indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm owning/controlling plant j produced a 
mix of graphic and other paper grades, such as packaging, tissue and 
industrial, etc.. 
GSIZE Logarithm of estimated total estimated capacity (in tonnes) of the firm owing 
plant j. 
GSIZEMRK Ratio of estimated total capacity (in tonnes) of the firm owning/controlling plant j 
to the industry‟s estimated capacity. 
Regional level variables 
AREAREST 
AREANW 
AREANE 
Dummy variables indicating the geographical area where the plant is located, 
grouped into three regions: AREANNE including Veneto, Trentino-Alto Adige, 
Friuli-Venezia Giulia and Emilia-Romagna, AREANW including Aosta valley, 
Liguria, Lombardy and Piedmont, and AREAREST including the rest of Italy. 
Plant-firm history variables 
GPAST1 
GPAST2 
GPAST3 
Dummy variables indicating the background of the founder of plant j, grouped 
into three categories: GPAST1 including all founders whose background was 
neither in manufacturing nor paper-related activities, GPAST2 including all who 
were industrialists and GPAST3 including all whose background was in paper-
related activities 
OWN25 Dummy variables indicating whether plant j had undergone an ownership 
change in the last 25 years of existence  
COM25 
 
Dummy variables indicating whether plant j had undergone registration changes 
in the last 25 years of existence  
OWN25TOT Number of ownership changes that plant j had undergone in its last 25 years of 
existence 
COM25TOT Number of registration changes that plant j had undergone in its last 25 years of 
existence 
OWNCOM25TOT  Number of ownership changes accompanied by registration changes that plant j 
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Variables 
Code Definition 
had undergone in its last 25 years of existence 
OWNONLY25TOT Number of ownership changes without registration changes that plant j had 
undergone in its last 25 years of existence 
COMONLY25TOT Number of registration changes without ownership changes that plant j had 
undergone in its last 25 years of existence 
 
 
C.4 Variables for Chapter 6 
 
This section defines the variables used for the econometric analysis of firm 
survival as presented in Chapter 6. For each variable, some descriptive 
statistics (namely mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values) 
are also reported.  
 
Variables 
Code Definition 
 
SURVIVAL 
 
Length of time (in days) from entry to exit from the industry of firm i. 
EVENT Indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm exits and 0 otherwise 
Demographic variables 
ENMODE Indicator variable if the firm i entered by plant acquisition and 0 if by plant 
construction or conversion. 
ENSTATE Indicator variable if the firm i was a de novo entrant and 0 if it was a diversifying 
one.  
Size variables 
LSIZE Logarithm of current estimated total capacity (in tones) of firm i. 
SIZEMRK Ratio of firm i‟s current capacity to total capacity of the industry  
SIZECLASS1 
SIZECLASS2 
SIZECLASS3 
Dummy variables indicating current size class of firm i, grouped into three 
classes: SIZECLASS1 including all firms whose current annual capacity was up 
to 25,000 tonnes, SIZECLASS2 including all those with annual capacity was 
between 25,000 and 100,000 tonnes and SIZECLASS3 including all those with 
capacity more than 100,000 tonnes  
 
Technical variables 
PMAGE Number of paper machines installed after 1945 
  
PMAGE% Number of paper machines installed after 1945 and wider than 3m. 
PMEFFICIENT Share of paper machines installed after 1945 in total number of machines in use 
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Variables 
Code Definition 
PMEFFICIENT% Share of paper machines installed after 1945 and wider than 3m in total number 
of machines in use 
 
Firm strategic and location variables 
DIVER Indicator variable that equals 1 if firm i has been producing a mixture of different 
categories of paper and 0 if it has been producing only graphic paper. 
TYPE Indicator variable that equals 1 if firm i was multi-plant operation and 0 if a single-
plant 
EXPAND Number of times when firm i acquired or construct plants, excluding any 
acquisition at time of entry 
SHRINK Number of times when firm i shut down or sold plants during its life, excluding 
sales or shutdowns at time of exit 
REORG Number of times when firm i underwent a reorganization during its life. 
AREANE Indicator variable that equals 1 if all plants belonging to firm i are located in  
North-East Italy and 0 in any other part of the country. 
 Firm history variables 
PAST Indicator variable indicating the background of firm i. It takes the value 1 if firm j‟ 
was a papermaker and 0 otherwise  
CORE Indicator variable that equals 1 if the sector of origin of firm i was other than 
graphic papermaking, and 0 if it was graphic papermaking 
ORIGINCORE Indicator variable that equals 1 if the entering firm was foreign or a diversifying 
firm with a major core business in another sector  
COHORT1 
COHORT2 
COHORT3 
Dummy variables indicating the period in which firm i was established, grouped 
into three cohorts: COHORT1 including firms established prior to 1950, 
COHORT2 including those established between 1950 and 1963 and COHORT3 
from 1964 onward 
 
 
C.5 Variables for Chapter 7 
 
This section presents the definition of concentration measures used in 
Chapter 7 and their corresponding method of calculation.   
 
Variables 
Code Definition 
 
CR4 
CR8 
 
Sum of the annual market share of the top four and eight firms. Market shares 
are calculated as percentage ratio of firm j’s total capacity (in tonnes) to 
industry‟s total capacity. 
HHI Herfindahl-Hirschman index, calculated as the sum of the squared individual firm 
market shares 
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